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Abstract 
There is still limited knowledge available on how SME and midcap firms perform 
financing decisions and on what such a decision is based on. The literature revealed 
that capital structure theories can only partly explain parameters that determine 
financing decisions, particularly in a bank dominated lending environment like in 
Germany. Academic research tried to expand towards a broader and more strategic 
approach regarding a financing strategy and towards behavioural bias of a company’s 
management. Furthermore, existing research tried to identify an interaction between 
business strategy and financing strategy but failed to identify a causal direction so far.  
The present research provides a unique research approach to bridge this gap as it 
introduces a new aspect into the discussion on the decision for a financing instrument 
and whether a formulated financing strategy is followed. Based on a case study 
approach that combines manager interviews, document analysis and calculation of key 
financial ratios, the research explores the management’s decision in a specific 
situation, the refinancing of standard mezzanine. Firms that used standard mezzanine 
had to perform a decent refinancing decision between the years 2011 and 2014 as there 
was no exact substitute instrument available in financing markets anymore. 
The results showed that a financing strategy exists in the cases explored, but elements 
and form varied across cases. In addition, the cases indicated that behavioural bias on 
management level might exist, based on identified inefficiencies and delays. However, 
these inefficiencies cannot be primarily assigned to owner-managers as done by 
previous research. Furthermore, a causal direction between business strategy and 
financing strategy could be indicated in the cases investigated. 
The results led to the development of a financing strategy typology, based on existing 
types of business strategies that might help to explain financing decisions. A template 
for a holistic financing strategy has been designed based on the investigations that 
allows midcap firms to establish and implement their own financing strategy (or adjust 
their existing strategy). The holistic framework provides core elements and financing 
principles as well as a prototype financing process that help to avoid the identified 
inefficiencies in their financing processes. 
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1. Introduction 
”How do firms choose their capital structures?" (Myers, 1984b, p. 575). This basic 
question is intended to be answered easily. However, in his article “The Capital 
Structure Puzzle”, published in 1984, Stewart Myers’ answer was once again “We 
don’t know” (Myers, 1984b, p. 575). Since his publication, intensive research was 
performed to examine the capital structure of a firm and the decision mechanisms that 
led to the choice of a specific financing instrument or security. 
Nevertheless, it seems that company management is still reacting on developments of 
financial markets in their decisions rather than to actively initiate a process that is 
based on a clear and formulated financing strategy for the firm. Competing theories to 
determine the optimal capital structure of a company or the optimal choice of a specific 
financing instrument within the capital structure have not been able to completely 
explain these decisions. Therefore, Myers stated seventeen years later, that „There is 
no universal theory of the debt-equity choice, and no reason to expect one“ (Myers, 
2001, p. 81). 
This DBA research wants to bring a new aspect into the discussion on the decision for 
a financing instrument by a firm and whether a formulated financing strategy is 
followed. The research explores the management’s decision in a specific refinancing 
situation as it focuses on the maturing standard mezzanine facilities that have been 
used by German midcap companies in the years 2004 to 2007 through a case study 
approach. These findings are contrasted with the propositions from the strategic capital 
structure theory developed by Barton & Gordon (1987) and two already existing PhD 
theses on standard mezzanine (Brüse, 2011; Nohtse, 2012) for explanation. 
Before looking at midcap financing in general and mezzanine refinancing in particular, 
the introduction chapter starts in section 1.1 with a definition on what a midcap 
company represents in terms of this research. Section 1.2 follows with an overview on 
the corporate lending environment at the time of the effective refinancing to describe 
the market situation during the financing process. In section 1.3 the specific 
refinancing situation the research focuses on is presented to explore management 
decision mechanisms on the choice of financing instruments and to emphasize the need 
for investigating the basis for such decision mechanism. Chapter 1 then describes the 
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aims and objectives of the DBA thesis as well as the approach to achieve these aims 
in section 1.4 and closes with an overview on the further organisation of the thesis in 
section 1.5. 
1.1 Definition of a Midcap Company 
The term “small” or “medium” enterprise does not describe the same cluster of 
companies on an international basis. This is predominantly dependant on the varying 
stages of development of the respective economy. However, on an European as well 
as on a national level, there are quantitative and qualitative criteria used in segmenting 
small and medium-sized companies. 
1.1.1 Quantitative Criteria 
On an European level, a quantitative definition for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(“SMEs”) has been carried out by the EU Commission. The Commission defines three 
criteria and respective thresholds to categorise (EU Commission, 2003, 2005). 
According to this definition, a company can be quoted a medium sized enterprise, if 
its staff headcount is below 250 persons employed – calculated on an annual work unit 
basis which corresponds to full-time-equivalent units – and either its annual turnover 
does not exceed € 50 million or its total annual balance sheet does not exceed  
€ 43 million (EU Commission, 2003). Within Germany, very similar definitions for 
SMEs can be found by the German Institut für Mittelstandsforschung (Institute for 
Medium-Sized Businesses Research, “IfM”) which defines an enterprise as an SME, 
if its staff headcount is below 500 employees and the annual turnover does not exceed  
€ 50 million (Institut für Mittelstandsforschung, n.d.).  
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Table 1.1 provides an overview of the exact criteria by institution. 
Table 1.1: Criteria for SME 
 EU Commission IfM 
 Staff 
headcount; 
and 
Annual sales, 
or 
Balance sheet Staff 
headcount; 
and 
Annual sales 
Micro < 10 ≤ € 2 million ≤ € 2 million n.a. n.a. 
Small < 50 ≤ € 10 million ≤ € 10 million < 10 < € 1 million 
Medium < 250 ≤ € 50 million ≤ € 43 million < 500 ≤ € 50 million 
Sources: Adapted from EU Commission (2003, 2005); Institut für Mittelstandsforschung, (n.d.); 
Reinemann, (2011). 
Despite these two almost congruent definition schemes in terms of the maximum staff 
headcount and annual sales or balance sheet numbers a company must not exceed to 
be qualified as a SME, there have been several other thresholds applied to companies 
to be qualified as a medium-sized company or midcap company. The German 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (“KfW”), the promotional bank of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, defines in its subsidy and state-backed lending programmes 
companies to be qualified as medium-sized if their annual sales are not exceeding  
€ 500 million (KfW Bankengruppe, 2011a). 
Other institutions, e.g. the Deloitte Mittelstandsinstitut at the University of Bamberg, 
even exceed the midcap classification for companies beyond a level of 3.000 
employees and annuals sales of € 600 million (Becker, Staffel & Ulrich, 2008a) in 
cases where a strong linkage between owner (family) and the management or the 
company’s business model can be identified (Becker, Staffel & Ulrich, 2008b). 
These differences emphasize that a pure economic and quantitative focus does not 
provide a complete set of criteria in defining “midcap” companies (Börner & Grichnik, 
2003). Therefore, several institutions and research admit that qualitative elements have 
to be considered as criteria in identifying a midcap company (Becker et al., 2008b). 
1.1.2 Qualitative Criteria 
Midcap companies are characterised primarily through the “unity of capital and 
management” (Reinemann, 2011, p. 5) and are therefore also labelled as “family-
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owned companies” in many publications (BMWi, 2007; Reinemann, 2011). The IfM 
tried to operationalise this criterion by identifying a company being family-owned, if 
(a) up to two family trees are owning at least 50% of the company’s common 
stock, and 
(b) members of the family trees are also members of the top management team 
(Haunschild & Wolter, 2010; Wolter & Hauser, 2001). 
In addition to the two qualitative criteria above, Reinemann (2011) presented four 
attributes to characterise a SME or midcap company: 
(a) the unity of ownership, risk and control,  
(b) a flat hierarchy and consensus between top management and employees,  
(c) a strong relationship between company and its environment, and  
(d) independency from a holding. 
The unity of ownership, risk and control describes the typical midcap scenario, where 
members of the owners are also holding positions in the top management, whereas in 
a large cap company, the “management board (leadership), the supervisory board 
(control) and the shareholders (ownership and risk) are typically separated from each 
other” (Reinemann, 2011, p. 5). 
These managers that are also members of the family shareholders of the firm will be 
referred to as ‘owner-managers’ (Schachner, Speckbacher & Wentges, 2006; Woods 
& Joyce, 2003). These owner-managers are characterised to act less economically 
rational and may therefore cause types of agency problems (Speckbacher & Posch, 
2010) which will be described in section 2.3.1. On the other hand, they tend to be 
closely involved into daily operations of the firm that “may induce a more direct 
management style making formal control systems less important” (Speckbacher & 
Posch, 2010, p. 4). This is seen as a major difference compared to ‘external managers’ 
who are not members of the (family) shareholders (Lauterbach, Vu & Weisberg, 1999; 
Lutz & Schraml, 2011). Nevertheless, external managers can develop similar patterns 
as owner-managers in case they are compensated by stock options or a minority stake 
in the firm (Hiebl, 2014). These external managers – in other research publications 
also labelled as ‘other manager’ (Richbell, Watts & Wardle, 2006; Woods & Joyce, 
2003) – were in many cases introduced in family firms as core element of a succession 
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(Lauterbach et al., 1999), or in situations, where several family trees are involved as 
shareholders to avoid frictions between the family trees (Hiebl, 2014; Schachner et al., 
2006). 
Another attribute that is described to be typical for midcap companies is a flat 
hierarchy between top management and operative functions, such as sales, marketing, 
and financing. Even in larger family-owned businesses, the owners are expected to 
establish a direct control relationship to the operative functions (Börner, Grichnik & 
Reize, 2010). 
The third attribute focuses on the relationship between the company (including its 
family owners) and their environment and can be summarised with the term corporate 
social responsibility (Haunschild & Wolter, 2010). Corporate social responsibility 
describes companies that are integrated into regional networks as well as close 
personal networks of the owner-managers and are actively taking responsibility for 
elements such as environmental protection, social equity and economic growth 
(Bender & Ward, 2013). 
The last attribute to characterise a midcap company is its independency from a holding 
company. This should avoid that a third company owns more than 25% of the common 
stock of the midcap company (Reinemann, 2011). However, a family holding, where 
family trees have pooled their interests is excluded from this definition (Wolter & 
Hauser, 2001). 
1.1.3 Interaction between Quantitative and Qualitative Criteria 
Reinemann (2011) admits that a factual classification for a midcap company is difficult 
in many cases, e.g. in situations where a family-owned company is led by an employed 
management team. However, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy (“BMWi”) stated in its survey on the German “Mittelstand”, that in such cases, 
the most important criterion to identify a midcap company is that an owner (family) 
maintains the strategic and operative control on the company (BMWi, 2007). 
To differentiate between company clusters based on the discussed quantitative and 
qualitative criteria, Reinemann (2011) presented a typology of company categories to 
be identified by the criteria. The typology is shown in Figure 1.1: 
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Figure 1.1: Typology of Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Reinemann (2011). 
Based on the presented matrix, midcap companies describe the companies in the 
clusters Type I and Type II. Given the fact that the majority of the firms that used 
standard mezzanine as an element of their financing structure can be found in these 
two clusters as they usually lack further financing alternatives such as debt capital 
markets in Germany (Börner & Grichnik, 2003), this research will focus on midcap 
companies which are composed by the two clusters Type I and Type II and not solely 
on SMEs. 
Therefore, midcap companies in this research are defined as family-owned firms with 
annual sales of up to €500 million, given that the standard mezzanine instrument was 
designed to mitigate equity constraints for these companies in Germany (PwC, 2011), 
as discussed in the following section 1.2. Midcap companies are either family-operated 
by owner-managers or by external managers with a direct link between management 
and family shareholders (Schachner et al., 2006). This direct link can be either through 
formal (e.g. supervisory board) or informal (direct communication) channels (Hiebl, 
2014). Furthermore, the midcap company as defined in this research is reluctant to 
provide information about the firm to external parties such as banks, suppliers and 
clients, as they fear that these information could leak to competitors or the broader 
public (Börner & Grichnik, 2003). 
Q
u
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ti
ta
ti
ve
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ri
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ri
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Degree of fulfilment of qualitative criteria
Large 
companies
Small and 
medium 
companies
Type IV:
Small and medium sized 
companies being part of a 
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1.2 Financing of Midcap Companies 
Extensive research has been performed on the specific financing situation of midcap 
companies and their typical restrictions in terms of external funding e.g.  
(a) dilution of the existing shareholder structure, 
(b) limitations to access debt and equity capital markets, and 
(c) dependency on bank loans (Beck, Demirguec-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2008; 
Börner et al., 2010; Psillaki & Daskalakis, 2008). 
Especially the dominant bank loan financing of German midcap companies is still a 
differentiator compared to other matured economies (Ampenberger, Schmid, 
Achleitner & Kaserer, 2013; Bassen, Basse Mama, Koch & Rothe, 2013), even though 
alternative financing instruments gained influence given the restrictive bank lending 
policies since the financial crisis (T. Kraus, Schröder & Schnutenhaus, 2014). 
Therefore, this section will focus on the financing environment that midcap companies 
faced at the time of the upcoming refinancing of their standard mezzanine facility in 
the years 2010 until 2013. 
1.2.1 General Financing Environment at the Time of the Refinancing 
At the time of the refinancing, the financing environment for larger companies and 
midcaps was rather challenging: “Things are going from bad to worse in the syndicated 
loan market in [the] EMEA [region] as aggressive bank deleveraging and companies' 
aversion to debt continue to hammer lending volume and dealflow” (ThomsonReuters, 
2012, p. 1). Given the complexity of their business model and their financing 
requirements in terms of form and volume, midcap companies usually have to 
approach syndicated loan markets as bilateral lending with core or relationship banks 
was not able to cover these requirements (Beck et al., 2008). Figure 1.2 shows that the 
syndicated loan markets in the United States had not only recovered in 2010 and 2011, 
but reached new record levels after a severe deterioration in the years 2008 and 2009 
(ThomsonReuters, 2012). New record levels in syndicated corporate lending were also 
observed for the Asia/Pacific region. However, the EMEA region and particularly 
Europe had not returned to normal levels at that time, given the uncertainty of 
European banks and the extent of the state debt crisis (Standard & Poor’s, 2012a). 
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Figure 1.2: Syndicated Loans to Corporates – Comparison of Global Regions 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: S&P (2012a), ThomsonReuters (2012). 
1.2.2 Refinancing Wave in Europe and Germany 
Figure 1.2 does not only indicate the availability of syndicated bank lending to 
enterprises. Based on the assumption that the typical maturity for a corporate term loan 
ranges between three to five years (Börner et al., 2010; Hernandez-Canovas & Koeter-
Kant, 2011; Scherr & Hulburt, 2001), it also indicates that the record lending volumes 
to companies in the years 2005 to 2007 need to be refinanced between 2010 and 2012 
(Standard & Poor’s, 2012a). This is likely to have two implications: 
(1) Growth financing versus refinancing: Companies that are looking for 
additional financing volumes to finance growth initiatives will have to compete 
with those, who are trying to refinance their existing bank debt. Alternative 
financing sources – such as leasing, factoring, subsidised loans – provide only 
limited additional funding capacity for refinancing scenarios and have been 
available in specific growth financing situations only (Börner & Grichnik, 
2003; T. Kraus et al., 2014). 
(2) Large cap versus midcap companies versus SMEs: With almost no access to 
the debt capital markets due to their company size and the disadvantage of 
being unrated (Beck et al., 2008; Lobe & Curac, 2014), midcap companies can 
be expected to be hit harder by restrictive bank lending than large cap 
enterprises which have access to other sources of debt financing and equity 
(Börner et al., 2010). SME’s on the other hand, were investigated not to face 
more restrictive bank lending, as bilateral lending via cooperative banks and 
local savings banks was still available to them. 
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The trend for large cap companies to access other sources of debt financing becomes 
even more obvious by contrasting the development of the syndicated loan market with 
the bond market within the EMEA and the Western Europe region. Figure 1.3 shows 
that market analysts expected an ongoing shift from bank lending towards debt capital 
market financing via bonds in 2012 (Standard & Poor’s, 2011, 2012c; 
ThomsonReuters, 2012). 
Figure 1.3: Corporate Borrowing in Western Europe – Loans versus Bonds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Adapted from S&P (2012c) and ThomsonReuters (2012). 
Even though bank lending tended to become more restrictive during every crisis of the 
last decades, this market trend in 2012 showed a clear reaction from borrowers and 
demonstrated the shift towards a direct lending relationship between companies and 
debt capital market investors (Standard & Poor’s, 2012a), which is not available to 
midcap companies to that extent (T. Kraus et al., 2014). 
Given their underdeveloped debt capital market access and the restrictive situation in 
the syndicated loan market already described, the remaining source of external funding 
for midcap companies is equity. However, their typical shareholder structure limits 
their ability to raise new equity capital either (Ang, 1991; Tappeiner, Howorth, 
Achleitner & Schraml, 2012). Even though empirical research showed that German 
SMEs and midcaps were able to significantly increase their equity ratio (Lobe & 
Curac, 2014), this effect and the already described emerging alternative financing 
instruments (Koropp, Kellermanns, Grichnik & Stanley, 2014; T. Kraus et al., 2014) 
have not yet been able to mitigate the dependency of midcap companies from bank 
lending (Bassen et al., 2013). 
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1.2.3 Equity Ratio and Access to external Equity 
To better understand the development of the equity position of SMEs and midcap 
companies, the changes in the past 25 years should be taken into consideration. In the 
1980s and 1990s, the equity positions of German SMEs and midcap companies were 
set at levels around 10%. However, this percentage is solely focussing on balance sheet 
equity, not on economic equity as introduced later in this chapter. Two further effects 
have been of significance in assessing the development of the equity ratio in addition 
to the lack of access to capital market financing and the avoidance of shareholder 
dilution already introduced in the previous section: 
(1) The tax regime in Germany in the 1980s and 1990s that penalised companies 
which retained their earnings compared to a dividend payment. This led to a 
development, where companies that wanted to retain earnings paid them out 
as a dividend and received a shareholder loan immediately afterwards 
(Ampenberger et al., 2013). These loans ware typically subordinated to 
existing bank debt, an early form of mezzanine financing.  
(2) Prior to the implementation of the regulations of Basel II in all EU member 
states on January 1, 2007, banks in Germany did not necessarily include a 
sufficient equity ratio as an important factor in their risk assessment 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2012). In addition, the focus on balance sheet equity 
ratios is only a limited predictor of capital strength. In companies that are 
constituted in the legal forms of private partnerships, shareholders are liable 
with their private assets to the obligations of the company and therefore did 
not aim to maintain a solid equity position at company level. 
Between 1997 and 2007, equity ratios for SMEs and midcap companies improved from 
6% to 18.4% on average (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2009). This development was mainly 
driven by an increase in retained earnings resulting from changes in the tax system as 
well as a favourable economic environment in the middle of the last decade (Valentin 
& Wolf, 2013).  
Midcap companies further took the opportunity to strengthen their equity position to 
mitigate expected financing and operational risks they envisaged due to the dotcom 
and the financial crisis (KfW Bankengruppe, 2012) as well as with the changed bank 
financing environment after the implementation of Basel II in 2007. With the 
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implementation, German banks were forced to adopt their credit approval processes so 
that every company has to be rated to get a loan. As internal ratings have a focus on 
quantitative data and the equity ratio in particular, SMEs and midcap companies had 
to improve this ratio in order to restore their bank funding capabilities (Valentin & 
Wolf, 2013). 
Rauch & Stadler (2012) analysed the equity ratio within SME and midcap companies 
in accordance with the IfM definitions. They surveyed 319 companies in 2010 and 
identified that especially medium-sized companies were able to generate comfortable 
equity ratios with 66% quoting levels of 20% or above. On the other hand, 13% of the 
small companies and 35% of the micro companies reported equity ratios smaller than 
10% or even negative. Figure 1.4 displays a segmented diagram of SME and midcap 
companies’ equity ratios. 
Figure 1.4: Equity Ratios of SME and Midcap Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Rauch & Stadler (2012). 
The German KfW presents every year a panel research of the German SME and 
midcap companies by annual feedback from 9.000 to 15.000 companies. They showed 
a steady improvement of the equity ratio across all clusters. Starting with an average 
equity ratio of 22.5% in 2005, the equity ratio showed levels between 26.6% in 2010 
and 27.4% in 2012. These years are of particular interest, as the companies in need to 
refinance their standard mezzanine facilities have to perform their negotiations in the 
years 2011 to 2013, based on the current financial data. Given the strong economic 
development in Germany, the equity ratio further bolstered. SMEs in the cluster 
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companies with negative or weak equity ratio (below 10%) dropped further (KfW 
Bankengruppe, 2014). Figure 1.5 illustrates the development of the equity ratio within 
each cluster. 
Figure 1.5: Development of average Equity Ratios in German SME and Midcap Companies 
 
Sources: KfW Bankengruppe (2011, 2014) 
In a second survey on the development of equity ratios in SME and midcap companies, 
the IfM analysed the development of balance sheet data of more than 4.500 companies 
between 2010 and 2013. They assessed an average equity ratio for the companies in 
2013 of 37.1% and a stable level of bank debt (Lamsfuß, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the increased equity ratio was primarily achieved based on retained 
earnings. Only 1% of the generated equity was provided via external funds (KfW 
Bankengruppe, 2011a, p. 36). This supports the propositions of Börner et al. (2010, p. 
229), as they identify difficulties in preserving external equity, given the lack to 
directly access the capital markets and the limited transparency many SME and midcap 
companies are willing to provide to external stakeholders.  
This lack to directly access the capital markets is not only caused by the reservation of 
family firms to provide information to external parties, but also by a more risk-averse 
approach of family shareholders towards debt financing, given their largely 
undiversified asset portfolios (Ampenberger et al., 2013). Therefore, family firms 
seem to be less indebted. According to Ampenberger et al. (2013), the investigated 
lower level of indebtedness could be also based on the fact that family firms have lower 
agency costs given the connection between management and shareholders. A 
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disciplining effect of external debt for the company management becomes less 
relevant. Both aspects could have an influence on the financing strategy of a family 
firm that would not necessarily apply to a non-family firm.  
Research by Lobe & Curac (2014) and by Rauch & Stadler (2012) identified the 
avoidance of shareholder dilution by the existing (family) shareholders as additional 
explanation. According to Tappeiner et al. (2012) family firms highly value their 
independence. They do not necessarily follow a strict shareholder value approach but 
also focus on qualitative aspects, as indicated in section 1.1.2. Several research 
presented varying results of whether family impact supports or reduces shareholder 
value of a family firm (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Villalonga 
& Amit, 2006). This focus on maintaining independence is seen to be one of the 
reasons, why private equity firms did not play such an important role in family firm 
successions or in enhancing equity ratios in Germany (Tappeiner et al., 2012). 
1.3 Standard Mezzanine 
1.3.1 Standard Mezzanine as a Response to a Gap in Bank Financing 
As a result of the dotcom crisis in the years 2001 to 2003 and the described difficulties 
to increase external bank debt or to raise external equity, financial institutions invented 
a new product for German midcap companies to close the gap between bank debt and 
equity: the standard mezzanine or program mezzanine (Gündel & Hirdes, 2008). For 
the first time, this financing layer was a useful instrument for the broad variety of 
midcap companies, because  
(a) these mezzanine tranches offered additional financing capacity by being 
subordinated to senior (bank) debt and were standardised which allowed for a 
less expensive instrument compared to individual mezzanine (Brüse, 2011; 
PwC, 2011), 
(b) depending on the accounting principles of the company, the standard 
mezzanine was not only qualified as economic equity but also as balance sheet 
equity element (Küting & Dürr, 2005), 
(c) only a standard rating check was used for a rather quick risk assessment 
(Moody’s Investors Service, 2006; PwC, 2011), and  
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(d) it was made available to the companies in relatively small sizes, with tickets 
between € 500 thousand and € 20 million (Hommel, Nohtse & Schneider, 
2011; PwC, 2011). 
Mezzanine however was not a new product at all for midcap companies. Two types of 
mezzanine instruments were already available as financing options. Private equity-
backed buy-out transactions typically include mezzanine financing elements in 
addition to senior and secured debt instruments to enhance leverage, reduce the equity 
portion of the private equity investor and therefore increase the IRR (Brokamp, Ernst, 
Hollasch, Lehmann & Weigel, 2008). These transactions are labelled as leveraged buy-
outs (“LBOs”) (Bösl & Sommer, 2006; Wolf, Hill & Pfaue, 2011). On the other hand, 
in many family-owned companies the owners provided capital injections not via 
straight equity, but through a shareholder loan to reduce tax burden on company level 
(De Ruijter Korver & Ongena, 2008; Meissner, Kritikos, Maas & Schmidt, 2009). 
Upon request of banks providing debt to the company, these shareholder loans had to 
be subordinated against the bank loans and can therefore be qualified as mezzanine 
financing instruments (Bösl & Sommer, 2006; Brokamp et al., 2008). These forms of 
mezzanine are named individual mezzanine (Herweg & Sonn, 2009; PwC, 2011). 
Typically, individual mezzanine is offered by banks or other financing providers, such 
as specialised funds in terms of LBO financings, or – in case of an injection by 
shareholder loans – provided from the existing shareholders (Bean, 2008). 
1.3.2 Structure of a Standard Mezzanine Fund 
The funds for standard mezzanine were provided via the implementation of special 
funds or single purpose vehicles (“SPVs”). These SPVs achieved their funding through 
the placement of securities with international institutional investors, comparable with 
collateralised loan obligations (“CLOs”) (Brüse, 2011; Lehmann-Tolkmitt, Knöll & 
Elmers, 2010). Therefore, no financial resources from banks or funds were necessary 
for providing standard mezzanine, which allowed banks to offer midcap companies a 
debt-like product that did not affect their own balance sheet (Lehmann-Tolkmitt et al., 
2010). Figure 1.6 shows an overview of a typical standard mezzanine structure and the 
refinancing of the SPVs. 
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Figure 1.6: Overview of a typical Standard Mezzanine Structure and Research Focus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Adapted from PwC (2011) and Brüse (2011). 
1.3.3 The Collapse of the Standard Mezzanine Market 
Liquidity pressure from the capital markets and especially the competition between 
the active sales forces of German banks and financing intermediaries led to a situation 
in 2004, where the amount of standard mezzanine raised in Germany exceeded the 
money provided to companies via an IPO (PwC, 2011; Standard & Poor’s, 2012b).  
At the same time, the risk assessment from the mezzanine providers became less 
conservative but also the management of the companies stopped to carefully evaluate 
the risks of these mezzanine instruments (Lehmann-Tolkmitt et al., 2010). They took 
the advice from an educated party (the banks and financing intermediaries) that the 
presented standard mezzanine product would be a new option to fill a financing gap or 
even expand the financing capabilities. In addition, there was an external rating process 
which they had to undergo. There was neither a clear examination by the respective 
company if the terms and conditions of standard mezzanine would fit into the 
company’s financing structure nor an individual assessment of a potential refinancing 
at maturity (Brüse, 2011). 
The market for standard mezzanine collapsed in 2008 with the breakdown of the 
market for CLOs during the last financial crisis and the appearance of the first 
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insolvencies of standard mezzanine borrowers. Planned funding for new SPVs failed 
because of the lack of investor appetite (Nohtse, 2012; PwC, 2011). 
This collapse had implications to the overall mezzanine market, which almost came to 
a standstill in 2008 and 2009. It slowly recovered since then, but is still only at a level 
of approximately 10%, compared to its record year 2007 (Standard & Poor’s, 2012b, 
2014). Figure 1.7 illustrates the development of the overall mezzanine market in 
Western Europe during the refinancing period. 
Figure 1.7: Annual Mezzanine Volume and Mezzanine Share of Leveraged Finance in Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: S&P (2012b). 
In addition, pricing for these individual mezzanine tranches with an all-in yield of up 
to 14% were almost twice as high compared to the typical standard mezzanine with an 
all-in yield between 7% and 10% (Brüse, 2011; Standard & Poor’s, 2012b). 
Figure 1.8 displays the developments of the average spread as well as the all-in yield 
for individual mezzanine financing.  
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Figure 1.8: Average Mezzanine Spread and all-in Mezzanine Yield 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: S&P (2012b). 
Midcap companies that financed themselves during 2004 and 2007 by using a standard 
mezzanine instrument were forced to refinance this part of their capital structure. 
However, the recognition of the refinancing issue started in 2010 as all of the standard 
mezzanine programmes in Germany matured during the years 2011 to 2014 
(Lehmann-Tolkmitt et al., 2010; PwC, 2011) and several academic (Brüse, 2011; 
Nohtse, 2012) and market-driven research (Hommel et al., 2011; Lehmann-Tolkmitt 
et al., 2010; PwC, 2011) approached these companies during their studies to assess the 
refinancing. 
German midcap companies had to find alternative financing instruments as there is no 
standard mezzanine market anymore. Several of the studies referred to indicate that 
between 60% and 80% of the companies expected to replace the matured standard 
mezzanine by classical debt financing and retained earnings, because of improved 
economic conditions and a deleverage in the existing senior lending over the last years 
(Hommel et al., 2011). However, the remaining midcap companies were expected to 
face a problematic refinancing situation (Brüse, 2011; Hommel et al., 2011) as 
standard mezzanine is no longer available as a refinancing instrument (Mayer-
Friedrich & Müller, 2013). Figure 1.9 depicts the maturity profile of the major standard 
mezzanine funds in the years 2011 until 2014.  
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Figure 1.9: Maturity Profiles of German Standard Mezzanine Funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Adapted from Brüse (2011) and PwC (2011). 
Most of the fund names were labels, except for PREPS, which is the acronym for 
preferred pooled shares. 
1.3.4 Refinancing Options for Standard Mezzanine – The € 5bn Wave 
According to PwC's (2011) study on the upcoming refinancing cycle, the expected 
refinancing can be clustered as followed, based on expert interviews with bankers and 
mezzanine funds: 
(a) Between 35% and 45% of the companies that used one or more standard 
mezzanine facilities are expected to be able to refinance these facilities by 
using retained earnings and/or existing debt facilities. 
(b) 45% to 55% of the companies will be in an operational position that is solid 
enough to successfully perform their refinancing. However, these companies 
might need to introduce equity or equity-like financing instruments such as 
individual mezzanine in their refinancing concept as their performance will 
not allow for a debt-only refinancing. In addition, it was not clear at the time 
of the study whether such equity or equity-like financing will be available to 
these companies in sufficient quantum. 
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(c) The remaining 5% to 15% are classified as being problematic and might even 
have to file for insolvency because of an unsuccessful refinancing process. 
PwC is highlighting that the increased insolvency risk might even persist after 
a refinancing as a result of increased cost of financing for these problematic 
cases. 
The analysis of key financial ratios in the study by PwC (2011) indicated that between 
23% and 50% of the companies might not be able to refinance their standard 
mezzanine via senior debt as their leverage ratio exceeds 3.5x EBITDA already.  
Whereas leverage is defined in a majority of academic literature as balance sheet 
financial indebtedness to balance sheet equity (e.g. De Jong, Kabir & Nguyen, 2008; 
Graham & Harvey, 2001), leverage in the study by PwC is defined as financial debt to 
EBIT(DA). (PwC, 2011, p. 47). This corresponds to the leverage definition to be found 
predominantly in financing contracts (Achleitner, Braun, Hinterramskogler & 
Tappeiner, 2011; Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, 2014; Tappeiner et al., 2012). 
This research also uses the terminology ‘leverage’ to describe the ratio financial debt 
to EBITDA; the ratio balance sheet equity to balance sheet debt is described by the 
term ‘gearing’. 
The review of financing documents in this research revealed that in every financing 
agreement, individualised definitions of leverage were used. Adjustments were made 
to calculate financial debt by excluding in some cases cash and cash equivalent 
positions as well as to calculate EBITDA by adjusting non-operational items for 
example. 
1.4 Aim and Objectives of the Thesis 
The aim of the research project is to investigate the current state of the financing 
decision process to provide an increased understanding on whether a formal financing 
strategy has been formulated by the midcap company management and will be 
followed through this specific refinancing process. 
This DBA thesis will establish which constituents are essential for the successful 
implementation of a refinancing project. The findings from the investigation will lead 
to the formulation of propositions how to overcome the expected deficiencies in the 
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current financing strategies and financing processes of midcap firms. In addition, it 
will provide guidelines to support a sound formation for these decisions. 
Two existing PhD research projects on the upcoming refinancing of standard 
mezzanine admitted that a clear identification of one of the generally accepted theories 
on the capital structure by examining the relevant determinants for the initial choice to 
use standard mezzanine as a financing instrument was not possible (Brüse, 2011; 
Nohtse, 2012). In addition, a strategic planning of the refinancing was not identified. 
What makes this research especially interesting is the sample it looks at. All of the 572 
companies that used standard mezzanine will have to refinance the facility until the 
maturity of the last funds in 2014 by a different financing instrument (PwC, 2011). 
Therefore, the refinancing process will have to be performed in a limited timeframe 
and allows to a certain extent that a change in lender’s appetite to enter into a new 
financing would influence the observation. In addition, refinancing of standard 
mezzanine allows a focus on midcap companies, as standard mezzanine represented a 
dedicated financing instrument for midcaps. 
Furthermore, the research project aims to expand the current discussion on capital 
structure theories. It explores whether Barton & Gordon’s (1987, 1988) strategic 
capital structure theory could serve as an integrating concept to combine heuristics and 
bias from behavioural finance with qualitative determinants from the rational capital 
structure theories such as tradeoff theory, agency theory and pecking order. 
The strategic capital structure theory could provide a more detailed explanation of the 
financing decision, as it tries to include theses qualitative aspects of financing 
decisions under uncertainty. The research will focus on two major aspects,  
(a) the choice or selection of an alternative that is compliant with the goals of the 
firm (strategy), and 
(b) the execution and implementation of the selected alternative (process) 
to allow for an in-depth investigation of financing decisions. 
Given the qualitative approach, this research will not yet be another empirical 
investigation on capital structure, but a qualitative research using case studies to gain 
a deeper understanding of the management decision on the refinancing and the basis 
for such refinancing.  
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Qualitative research on midcap financing decisions in Germany is rare (Tappeiner et 
al., 2012), given the reluctance to provide information to external parties as already 
discussed in section 1.1.3. However, based on the importance of midcap firms for the 
overall economy in Germany, this research wants to add to the academic research. 
Empirical research on financing decisions in German firms emphasizes the need for 
management teams to broaden their financing base as they still rely to core banks in 
their external financing (Börner et al., 2010). However, other research presents 
evidence that this core bank principle is economically rational for SME and midcap 
companies as it allows to mitigate information asymmetries (Lichtblau & Utzig, 2002).  
Brüse (2011) and Nohtse (2012) request in their research to contrast their findings 
regarding the planned refinancing of the standard mezzanine with the factual 
refinancing and to explore whether midcap management has learned from the 
experience they made. Based on the aims, the following objectives for the research 
study have been developed: 
 Explore the behaviour of the midcap management team in the refinancing 
decision and whether different types of managers and shareholder structures in 
midcap firms will influence such decision; 
 Identify the elements of the underlying financing strategy or the routines 
governing such a financing decision; 
 Investigate the performed process for the refinancing, the core milestones as 
well as the interaction between the parties involved in the process; 
 Develop recommendations how midcap companies can improve their decision 
making process to facilitate and substantiate the evaluation of financing 
options and the selection of appropriate financing instruments as well as to 
enhance transparency of the decision for the shareholders. 
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
Following the introduction in chapter 1 that sets out the aim and objectives of the 
thesis, chapter 2 will present the theoretical literature review on capital structure and 
financing decisions. It starts with an overview of relevant theories that are based on a 
rational decision-maker. The chapter will then focus on behavioural aspects in 
decision-making and introduces strategic capital structure theory as a potential 
integrating approach. 
Chapter 3 reviews the empirical literature with a particular focus on research on 
German companies and on refinancing of the standard mezzanine. The chapter further 
introduces a management typology that is used to categorise the investigations. The 
chapter ends with presenting the research questions that were identified by the review 
of the existing literature and the derived research propositions. 
Chapter 4 contains the research methodology applied in this thesis. It explains the 
research methods that have been used to generate an own data set. Since the 
investigation is based on a qualitative approach, the chapter contains a detailed 
explanation about why the respective methods have been chosen, how they have been 
applied and how data quality is ensured. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the investigation which was conducted as a case study 
approach. It is structured alongside the units of analysis that were developed in chapter 
3. 
Chapter 6 transposes elements of business strategy typology towards a financing 
strategy typology. The results from chapter 5 form the basis for the transfer and 
identified refinancing determinants are assigned to the respective types. The 
investigated cases are linked with one of the types derived to serve as examples. This 
financing strategy typology might support to categorise management characteristics 
that exceed a sole distinction between owner-managers and external managers. 
The following chapter 7 contains a framework for a financing strategy, outlining the 
core elements that a financing strategy could include based on the identified 
differences between the several types. A framework for a financing strategy in this 
thesis is seen as a set of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices. This framework 
is then more detailed as financing principles are assigned to each of the four core 
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elements. Firms could use these principles to develop an own financing strategy by 
choosing which core elements and principles are useful for them. As a third element, 
a template for executing a financing process is described that might help in avoiding 
the identified inefficiencies and delays in the cases investigated. 
Chapter 8 sets out the conclusions and recommendations of this thesis. It sums up the 
main findings of the research and demonstrates that most propositions can be 
confirmed by the findings. However, there are also some rejections and additional 
findings which result in adjustments to some of the research this thesis is based on. 
The chapter also highlights the limitations of the present research and features 
indications for further research. 
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2. Capital Structure Theories and Financing Decisions 
Chapter 2 presents the main theoretical concepts on capital structure decisions that this 
research is based upon. It starts with a short overview in section 2.1 by explaining the 
underlying theoretical concepts. Section 2.2 will outline and critically review the 
different capital structure theories that are located in an environment of rational 
decision-making and are relevant for this research. The following section 2.3 contrasts 
that by introducing the behavioural and non-rational decision-making approaches. 
Section 2.4 discusses a more strategic concept towards capital structure decisions that 
might be seen as an integrative approach towards the presented dichotomy in the 
previous sections. Based on this inclusion of the strategic capital structure theory in 
financing decisions, section 2.5 critically reviews typologies to assess business 
strategies, especially whether they already cover financing considerations or whether 
they can be adopted to evaluate a management financing decision. The summary in 
section 2.6 completes the chapter. Figure 2.1 displays an overview on the structure of 
this chapter as well as the theoretical approaches discussed. 
Figure 2.1: Overview on Capital Structure Theories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Own illustration. 
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2.1 Overview on theoretical Concepts 
For almost sixty years, academic research tried to develop a modern and integrated 
theory on the capital structure of a company. The first theoretical model to explain the 
capital structure was presented by Modigliani & Miller in 1958. Their model was based 
on the hypothesis of the existence of a perfect capital market that is characterised by a 
large number of investors who analyse and value securities for profit. These investors 
deal with securities that are all highly divisible into small parcels, therefore all assets 
are perfectly divisible and liquid. The perfect capital market has no market entrance 
barriers and all transactions are done without any transaction or taxation costs (Fama, 
1970; Modigliani & Miller, 1958). The perfect capital market hypothesis introduces 
the rational investor or rational market participant. These rational market participants 
– which in this thesis would also include company managers – are characterised  
(a) to act risk-averse,  
(b) are not able to influence prices, and  
(c) have homogenous expectations (Fama, 1970, 1998). 
As there are no differing expectations amongst investors or managers (Fama, 1970; 
Malkiel, 2003), any arbitrage will immediately result in a market equilibrium. These 
managers are described in this research as rational decision-makers. 
Furthermore, the capital market is efficient. This means that all information is available 
at the same time to all investors and prices of securities reflect those information and 
adjust immediately to new information (M. H. Miller, 1988; Modigliani & Miller, 
1958). Theories then evolved by acknowledging factors or anomalies that could lead 
to an imperfect market that is still efficient. 
On the contrary, numerous empirical studies have indicated that investors or managers 
do not necessarily act rational as some investigated anomalies are no explainable by 
concepts that are based on efficient capital markets (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 
1991; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Malmendier & Tate, 2005). Managers rather 
decide based on their experience and by including behavioural aspects (Meier & 
Esmatyar, 2015). These managers are referred to as non-rational or irrational decision-
makers in this study. 
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2.2 Rational Capital Structure Decisions 
Table 2.1 lists the main sources of academic literature that is focussing on research 
based on rational decisions. The first part of this section starts with assessments 
performed under the perfect capital market hypothesis. The literature then 
acknowledges certain influencing factors, corporate income taxes and cost of 
insolvency, leading to the tradeoff theory. Tradeoff theory still assumes an efficient 
capital market, where information is available to all market participants immediately 
at no costs and where prices for goods react promptly on new information. The second 
part of this section then discusses the literature on capital structure decisions in a 
market with information asymmetries. 
Table 2.1: Literature Summary on Rational Capital Structure Decisions 
Author / Research focus Key findings 
Modigliani & Miller (1958) 
Conceptual paper 
Presentation of the irrelevance of the capital structure on 
the value of a firm. 
Substitution of equity by debt instruments will be 
balanced through increasing cost of equity because of the 
growing risk profile of the firm. 
Durand (1959) 
Conceptual paper 
Criticises the negligence of corporate income taxes on 
capital structure decisions by Modigliani & Miller 
(1958).  
Firms will aim to reduce pre-tax profits via increased 
indebtedness to lower income taxes. 
Modigliani & Miller (1963) 
Conceptual paper 
Acknowledge the demonstrated effect of income taxes on 
the level of indebtedness.  
Conclude that even under consideration of income taxes, 
this would not necessarily mean that companies should 
aim for the maximum possible amount of debt in all 
situations.  
So called ‘real-world problems’ and limitations by 
lenders might pose to prefer other funding sources, such 
as retained earnings.  
N. D. Baxter (1967) 
Analysis of 3 U.S. firms that were in receivership 
Refines the conclusion by Modigliani & Miller (1963), 
that lenders might limit debt availability.  
Argues that as the leverage of firm increases, firm's 
insolvency cost increases and creditor demand more risk 
premium. This ultimately leads to the conclusion that 
excess leverage can reduce the total value of the firm. 
Source: Own illustration. 
  
 Capital Structure Theories and Financing Decisions 
 
 
Mark Hill  Page 27 
Mind the Gap 
Table 2.1 (continued) 
Author / Research focus Key findings 
Baxter & Cragg (1970) 
Analysis of 230 U.S. firms between 1950 and 1965 
Indicate the existence of an optimal financing structure. 
Failed to present consistent results. Suggest the 
development of a detailed and integrated theory of the 
financial decision of the firm, based on their empirical 
findings. 
A. Kraus & Litzenberger (1973) 
Theoretical paper 
An increased company indebtedness leads to an 
increased risk of insolvency. This results in higher costs 
associated with a potential insolvency. Debt repayments 
have to be allocated by using the company’s cash flows 
which depend on the operational performance 
Combining these two mitigating effects leads to an 
optimal capital structure, achieved when the additional 
positive tax effect by issuing new debt is compensated by 
the increased cost of insolvency. 
Martin & Scott Jr (1974) 
Study of 112 U.S. corporates in 1971 
Reduction of model complexity. Primarily large cap 
companies with a low working capital ratio issued bonds. 
Taub (1975) 
Assessment of 172 U.S. companies in the years 
1960-1969 
Size and risk premium show a positive link to a debt 
issuance; Significance of other factors could not be 
proven. 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
Theoretical paper 
Principal-agent relationships exist that are characterised 
by information asymmetries.  
Agency costs occur, based on the asymmetric 
information amongst parties. These consist of monitoring 
expenditures, bonding expenditures and the residual loss.  
Leland & Pyle (1977) 
Conceptual paper 
Moral hazard problems exist that could be mitigated by a 
signalling model.  
Information on project or company quality could be 
observed by actions of the manager.  
Manager willingness to invest in own project or company 
could be seen as a signal on project quality. 
Ross (1977) 
Conceptual paper 
Development of the incentive-signalling model.  
Management could reveal the quality of a project or a 
firm by using debt rather than equity.  
Contractually fixed payments in debt contracts would 
increase financial risk of the firm in case the management 
assumes volatile and probably insufficient cash flows 
from the project.  
Management will only choose debt in case it is certain 
about cash flow predictability. 
Marsh (1982) 
Analysis of 748 UK-based firms between 1959 and 
1970 
Companies are following a target capital structure, based 
on the variables insolvency risk, asset base and company 
size. Current market developments influence decisions. 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Table 2.1 (continued) 
Author / Research focus Key findings 
Myers & Majluf (1984) 
Conceptual paper 
Preference-model on funding sources. 
Managers use private information to issue risky securities 
when they are overpriced.  
Investors assume an asymmetric information problem as 
managers use private information to issue risky securities 
when they are overpriced. This assumption leads to a 
discount on the new and existing risky securities when 
new issues are announced. Managers anticipate these 
discounts and might waive profitable investments if they 
must be financed with new risky securities. 
To avoid this distortion of investment decisions, 
managers prefer to finance projects with retained 
earnings, which involve no asymmetric information 
problem, and with low-risk debt, for which the problem 
is negligible. 
Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) 
Survey of 157 U.S. firms between 1971 and 1989 
Empirical test of tradeoff theory versus pecking order. 
The pecking order model predicts external debt financing 
is driven by the internal financial deficit. Pecking order 
with greater time-series explanatory power than a 
tradeoff model. 
Lewis et al. (1999) 
Review of 644 transactions in the U.S. between 
1977 and 1984 
Introduction of hybrid financing instruments. Financing 
decisions and stock price developments are triggered by 
almost similar variables. 
Hovakimian, Opler & Titman (2001) 
Analysis of 18,502 U.S.-issuances in the timeframe 
1979-1997 
Target capital structure is less relevant in issuing 
financing instruments but in repurchasing or prepaying 
those instruments. Significance of tradeoff-variables. 
Fama & French (2002) 
Longitudinal research of U.S. companies between 
1965 and 1999 
Confirming the pecking order model but contradicting 
the trade-off model, more profitable firms are less levered 
Firms with more investments have less market leverage, 
which is consistent with the trade-off model and a 
complex pecking order model.  
Firms with more investments have lower long-term 
dividend payouts, but dividends do not vary to 
accommodate short- term variation in investment. As the 
pecking order model predicts, short-term variation in 
investment and earnings is mostly absorbed by debt. 
Dutordoir & van de Gucht (2009) 
Analysis of 812 European transactions between 
1997 and 2004 
European companies differ from those in the U.S. as they 
are using hybrid financing instruments to expand debt 
capabilities and reduce interest burden. Investor 
requirements in both markets differentiate significantly. 
Source: Own illustration. 
2.2.1 Rational Decisions in Efficient Capital Markets 
2.2.1.1 Modigliani-Miller-Theorem and the Inclusion of Taxes 
Modigliani & Miller stated in their original research the irrelevance of using debt or 
equity on the entity value as well as on the shareholder value of a company (1958, p. 
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271), based on the perfect capital market hypothesis. According to Modigliani & 
Miller, the selection between debt and equity is irrelevant to the value of a firm because 
the “substitution of equity via [cheaper] debt instruments will be debilitated via an 
increasing cost of equity that reflects the increasing risk structure” of the firm (1958, 
p. 296). Even though further research disproved relevant assumptions of the original 
Modigliani-Miller-theorem (Akerlof & Yellen, 1987; Myers, 1984b; Wohlschiess, 
1997), the article can be seen as the starting point to modern capital structure theory 
(Schneider, 2010). In fact, the relevance of the Modigliani-Miller-theorem has not 
been the evidence of the irrelevance of a capital structure for a company, but to identify 
the determinants which could lead to such irrelevance (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993; M. 
H. Miller, 1988; Wolf et al., 2011). Modigliani & Miller addressed this issue in the 
last sentences of their research: “These and other drastic simplifications have been 
necessary in order to come to grips with the problem at all. Having served their purpose 
they can now be relaxed in the direction of greater realism and relevance, a task in 
which we hope others interested in this area will wish to share” (1958, p. 296). 
Based on various critique on their approach and the drastic simplifications, especially 
neglecting the effect of income taxes (e.g. Durand, 1959), Modigliani & Miller 
themselves admitted that effect and corrected their original theorem in 1963. As 
already discussed in section 1.2.3, corporate income taxes do effect financing 
decisions. However, Modigliani & Miller did not focus on the differences between 
retained earnings and dividends of German midcaps, but on the general tax-shield 
effect of interest payments on a company’s pre-tax profits. The basic effect describes 
that a company that is solely financed via equity has to pay income taxes on the 
complete dividend payment to its shareholders, whereas interest payments to 
debtholders would reduce the company’s taxable income and therefore its tax 
payments. (A. Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973). 
Research performed by Baxter (1967) and Stiglitz (1969) questioned this effect as they 
revealed that it would ultimately lead to a scenario, where companies aim to be 
completely financed via debt. However, an increased indebtedness of the company 
would also trigger negative effects such as an increased risk of insolvency. 
The analysis performed by Baxter & Cragg (1970) can be identified as the first 
empirical research on capital structure decisions. They analysed issuances of long-term 
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capital (in the form of either debt or equity) by U.S. companies. However, they had to 
admit that the variables chosen have shown no or unexpected significance, which 
questions their analysis (N. D. Baxter & Cragg, 1970, p. 234). Their approach 
highlights the methodological and theoretical problems at the beginning of the security 
choice research.  
Two further studies performed by Martin & Scott (1974) and Taub (1975) tried to 
develop a model that differentiates between debt and equity choice of a company by 
analysing key financial performance indicators. Martin & Scott reduced their analysis 
to seven factors, which they expect to be relevant for a management of a company in 
deciding the preferred financing instrument. However, they include no justification for 
using these factors. Martin & Scott concluded that primarily large cap companies with 
a low working capital ratio issued bonds and propose their model to be used by 
company managers to identify which financing decision other managers made under 
the given factors (Martin & Scott Jr, 1974, p. 235). Therefore, their research was also 
not able to present an adequate theoretical background for the financing decision, but 
a more practical benchmarking framework. Even though Taub tried to perceive more 
general results by the investigation of several financing decisions per company, he was 
not able to present results that showed significance in all tested variables. He had to 
admit that “if there exists an optimal debt-equity ratio for the firm we obviously need 
a more general theory as to those factors that influence the firm’s choice” (Taub, 1975, 
pp. 415–416). 
2.2.1.2 Tradeoff theory 
A more realistic concept towards capital structure decisions was presented by Kraus 
& Litzenberger in 1973. Their basic assumption was that the usage of debt financing 
implies interest payments as well as the repayment of the principal amount and that 
these are usually contractually fixed. However, the repayments have to be allocated by 
using the company’s cash flows which depend on the operational performance (Wolf 
et al., 2011). The rise of company indebtedness leads to an increased risk of insolvency 
resulting in higher costs associated with such potential insolvency (Jaeger, 2012). 
Kraus & Litzenberger (1973) showed that by combining these two mitigating effects, 
an optimal capital structure would exist. It is achieved when the additional positive tax 
effect by issuing new debt is compensated by the increased cost of insolvency. This 
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correlation forms the basis of the static tradeoff theory (Fama & French, 2004; Perret, 
2013). 
Even though Kraus & Litzenberger (1973) were able to present a theoretical approach 
that would support the existence of an optimal capital structure, critique was 
formulated because their empirical research declined the relevance of insolvency cost 
to act as an adequate antipole to the income tax effect (Haugen & Senbet, 1978). 
Empirical studies revealed that firms with similar profiles showed different capital 
structures (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In addition, it was observed that companies still 
used debt financing instruments in periods where interest expenses were not deductible 
from operating income (De Jong, Verbeek & Verwijmeren, 2011; Shyam-Sunder & 
Myers, 1999). This led to the conclusion that further determinants must exist that 
influence the capital structure of the firm and that are not in line with the assumptions 
of a perfect capital market (Meier & Esmatyar, 2015). 
2.2.2 Rational Decisions in Imperfect Capital Markets 
An explanatory framework for determinants that influence capital structure decisions 
in imperfect markets is provided by Jensen & Meckling in 1976. They assess the 
relation between shareholders, debtholders as well as company management and 
information asymmetries amongst those parties. 
2.2.2.1 Asymmetric Information 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) discussed that in financing relationships various interests 
are involved that may differ by the individual party and information asymmetries exist 
between those parties. They introduced two pairs of relationship in their analysis 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 312). The first pair of relationship exists between 
shareholders (principals) of a company and their managers (agent), or between lenders 
(principals) and the company as the borrower respectively its managers (agent) 
(Spremann, 1987). The parties are bound by contractual agreements, where the 
principal mandates an agent to act in the interest of the principal. The problem arises 
in situations where the two parties have different interests and asymmetric information 
exist (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In both cases, the principal cannot directly ensure 
that the agent is always acting in the principal's best interests, particularly when 
activities that are useful to the principal are costly to the agent (bonding costs), and 
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where actions of the agent are costly for the principal to observe (monitoring costs) 
(Kochhar, 1996). Two basic scenarios of these principal-agent problems or dilemmas 
have to be differentiated: 
(a) Prior to enter into a contractual relationship (ex ante): The management of a 
company (agent) could for example present an overoptimistic business plan 
and cash flow projections to a bank or financing partner (principal). The 
management could therefore obtain a larger amount of debt or more attractive 
terms than the bank would be willing to offer in a scenario where the bank 
would have the same information. Because of this information asymmetry the 
bank can never have the same certainty about predicted cash flows as the 
company management and therefore will not be willing to accept a higher 
price for a superior quality or – in terms of a financing relationship – is willing 
to offer lower interest rates to better credit qualities. In theory, this could lead 
to a situation, where firms that are representing such better credit quality will 
not accept the bank offers, but only the remaining lower credit quality profiles 
remain as potential clients for the banks. This effect is known as ‘adverse 
selection’ (Daniel & Titman, 1995; Stiglitz, 1988; Titman & Wessels, 1988). 
(b) After entering into a contractual relationship (ex post): The company (agent) 
could for example present the bank (principal) financial data that are adjusted. 
Management uses for example opportunities to improve balance sheet statistics 
so that banks expect a better economic development of the company as they 
would do if they had the same information as the management. The 
management could optimise calculated interest margin in their financing 
contracts. This would lead to a pricing of the financing contract that is not 
reflecting the factual risk of the firm. Banks would suffer if they are not able 
to change the interest rate payable by the company due to long-term contracts. 
As a consequence, banks would refuse to offer long term contracts with fixed 
interest rates. This effect is described as ‘moral hazard’ problem (Fairchild, 
2005). On the other hand, this would increase the pre-tax profit of such 
company – and in case that this increased profit is not totally compensated by 
higher tax payments – to a growing dividend payment potential to the 
shareholders. This example combines the two pairs of relationships. In the end, 
the manager would simulate a positive development of the firm but not based 
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on his operational or strategic actions, but on interpreting financial information 
that the manager presents to the banks. 
2.2.2.2 Agency Theory and Signalling 
According to the approach of Jensen & Meckling (1976), agency costs – which consist 
of monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures of the agent and 
a residual loss for the remaining divergence between the first two cost aspects – would 
not exist, if a company would be totally financed via internal funds and cash flows. 
Agency cost would therefore occur as soon as the company involves external equity 
or debt funding sources to its capital structure. However, the inclusion of external 
funding sources allows the agent (the company’s management) a better diversification 
of the company’s assets that leads to a further tradeoff between agency cost and 
diversification benefits (Meier & Esmatyar, 2015). In addition, the assumption of 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) did not acknowledge that internal funds are part of the 
shareholders equity and could be paid out via dividends. Therefore, in case a company 
would be completely financed via internal funds, the agency cost of equity would be 
maximised. 
Further research by Jensen & Smith (1984) and Jensen (1986) analyses agency effects 
on the distribution of company internal funds and cash flows. Managers aim for 
retaining those cash flows for further investments rather than to raise new external 
equity which would increase their agency cost. On the contrary, shareholders will 
request dividend payments to avoid that the management could use retained cash flows 
to invest into projects not maximising their value without their control (Meier & 
Esmatyar, 2015). To solve this conflict, Jensen (1986) proposes to raise external debt 
rather than external equity, because interest payments would reduce the company cash 
flows. Reduced cash flows would restrict management leeway and therefore reduce 
the agency cost. However, the increased debt position of a firm would lead to increased 
agency cost between management and financing bank, including rising insolvency cost 
(Jensen, 1986). Two strategies, both initiated by the principal, could mitigate these 
principal-agent problems: 
(a) Screening 
Screening describes an assessment of the credit quality of a company (agent) 
by the potential bank or alternative financing partner (principal) or a third party 
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mandated by the principal. Such an assessment would be the internal credit 
examination or an external rating (Jensen, 1986; Lensink & Tra, 2006). 
(b) Self-selection 
The principal presents financing contracts with different features. The 
alternative selected by the agent allows to draw conclusions about the factual 
credit quality of the agent. The principal could present the agent two financing 
contract alternatives: (a) a contract with lower interest rates but linked to the 
adherence to defined financial covenants, and (b) a contract without financial 
covenants but higher interest rates. The same scenario could be configured by 
introducing collateral to such construct (Jensen, 1986; Wolf et al., 2011). The 
company management will only accept constructs that involve limitations in 
case it is certain about cash flow projections.  
Leland & Pyle (1977) analysed information asymmetries between lenders and 
borrowers and assumed that the borrower knows about the true characteristics and 
quality of his firm or an investment but might not share such information with the 
lenders. Lenders will react to such asymmetric information by increasing interest and 
therefore the cost of capital to the borrowers. As a result, borrowers could mitigate 
such effect by an own financial commitment into the project or the firm showing that 
they are confident about the good quality of the investment to the lenders (Leland & 
Pyle, 1977, p. 371). This signalling approach has been further researched by Ross 
(1977) and forms the third strategy to mitigate principal-agent problems.  
In addition to the signalling approach proposed by Leland & Pyle (1977), the research 
of Ross (1977) showed that the agent could furthermore reveal his credit quality by 
entering into debt financing agreements rather than opting for equity financing. The 
acceptance of fixed service (repayments as well as interest payments or coupons) of a 
debt instrument by the management shows the good credit quality. Otherwise it would 
not have signed such contract that increases financial risk in case the cash flows would 
be volatile and probably do not cover the required debt service (Flannery, 1986; Ross, 
1977). 
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2.2.2.3 Pecking Order Theory 
Following assumptions from the agency theory and the signalling concepts, Myers & 
Majluf present in 1984 their theory that capital structure decisions are based upon a 
ranking of the management’s general willingness which financing source to use, the 
pecking order. According to the pecking order approach, the management will use 
internal funds such as retained earnings first before raising new external funding 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984). Within external funds, additional debt would be more 
preferable than new equity (Fama & French, 2005). Pecking order acknowledges 
transaction cost as well as information asymmetries between management and 
financing partners (Fama & French, 2005; Myers, 1984a). Two underlying drivers for 
such a pecking order are used for explanation.  
The first driver is the assumption that the management prefers the financing source 
that implies the smallest influence on the company’s cash flows (Mateev, Poutziouris 
& Ivanov, 2012). Therefore, internal funds, generated through retained earnings lead 
neither to changes in the income statement nor in the cash flow profile in future years. 
The overall equity of the company increases, but share capital remains stable, meaning 
that dividend expectations do not change (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999). Even 
though this might be acceptable from an income statement-perspective, it is 
questionable on an economic basis, as the existing owners of the firm provided in fact 
new funds to the firm in waiving their dividend right. Therefore, their investment in 
the company raises which will reduce their return if the dividend payments remain 
stable (Chirinko & Singha, 2000). Debt as the second source will influence the 
company’s cash flow through fixed interest payments, but are expected to have a lower 
impact on cash flow compared to the return expectations of new shareholders. 
The second driver for a pecking order is the assumption that a company’s management 
prefers the source that leads to minimum changes in stakeholder structure and deriving 
control mechanisms (Börner & Grichnik, 2003). The usage of internal funds leads to 
no changes of the existing stakeholder structure as it comes from the current owners 
(Perret, 2013; Prasad, Bruton & Merikas, 1997). External debt as the second choice 
will lead to changes in the stakeholder structure, but the level of influence of the 
debtholders could be optimised from a management’s perspective by the contract 
design, such as accepting higher interest rates in return for a financing contract that 
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excludes financial covenants. New external equity ranks last in such a scenario because 
new shareholders will receive same rights as the existing (De Jong et al., 2011; Harris 
& Raviv, 1991).  
The issuance of new equity can be interpreted as a signal of deteriorating operational 
performance expectations by the management, because otherwise it would not use this 
financing source. However, pecking order as a capital structure theory lacks in 
explaining an optimal decision between debt or equity, because equity financing 
resides at the top (internal funds) as well as at the bottom (capital increase) of the 
hierarchy (Jackson, Keune & Salzsieder, 2013). ‘Hierarchy’ or ‘financing hierarchy’ 
in the context of this research means a categorisation of internal and external financing 
sources into successive ranks  with each level subordinate to the one above (Koropp 
et al., 2014; Leary & Roberts, 2010). 
2.2.2.4 Market Timing Theory 
A further theoretical concept that negates the existence of an optimal capital structure 
is the market timing theory, introduced by Baker & Wurgler in 2002. In their view, 
companies are more likely to issue equity when market value is high, compared to 
book value and historical market values, whereas managers would repurchase 
company equity when market values are low. In their results, the capital structure of a 
firm is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market (Baker & 
Wurgler, 2002, p. 29). 
However, market timing theory requires market values for debt and equity, which are 
not known for SMEs and midcap companies as these are predominantly privately held 
(Degryse, de Goeij, & Kappert, 2012). Furthermore, midcap firms are seen not to 
solely focus on a strict shareholder value maximisation, as already discussed in section 
1.2.3. 
In addition, institutional differences between countries exist as investigated by Sautner 
& Spranger in 2009. They researched market-timing effects on financing decisions in 
the US and in Germany and examined that there was no systematic and significant 
influence on financing decisions in larger German listed companies that could be 
explained by market timing theory. One possible explanation was based on different 
shareholder structures as the listed companies in Germany showed a significantly 
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higher level of controlling shareholders compared to US listed companies, where 
shareholdings are spread more widely. They conclude that market timing is unlikely 
in capital markets with concentrated shareholder structures (Sautner & Spranger, 2009, 
p. 247).  
Further empirical research showed that the influence of market timing on capital 
structure decisions has been overrated (Jaeger, 2012, p. 57) and that timing of a 
transaction should be considered to be a further determinant in the decision but not the 
predominantly explanation for the capital structure of a firm (Leary & Roberts, 2005, 
2010). 
Nevertheless, even though a clear shareholder value orientation is questioned and 
publicly listed SMEs or midcap firms are at least rare, the underlying assumption of 
market timing theory that management choses financing by case based on instruments 
available and their price rather than on a defined capital structure remains important. 
A further aspect is presented in the conclusions of Baker & Wurgler's research, that 
equity market timing and capital structure dynamics could be either explained by 
pecking order with rational managers and investors or by involving irrational investors 
and time-varying mispricing (2002, p.27). Research was not able to present a 
consistent theoretical concept that explained all market developments and anomalies, 
but to indicate an advantage for either the one or the other approach (examples for this 
dichotomy in research are e.g. Chirinko & Singha, 2000; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 
1999, a good overview on this development is provided by Harris & Raviv, 1991). 
Empirical studies on capital structure and financing decisions failed in many cases to 
show consistent results for one particular capital structure theory. Research articles 
include a caveat that the results are not distinct (Hovakimian et al., 2001; Lewis et al., 
1999) or that they are to some extend inconsistent (Dutordoir & van de Gucht, 2009).  
Academic research in the last ten years aimed to integrate aspects of different theories 
to allow for a consistent explanation as none of the existing theories is able to provide 
a unified framework. Empirical research that expanded classical pecking order by 
factors such as income taxes which would have been typically attributed to other 
capital structure theories have been published by Fama & French in 2005 and by Leary 
& Roberts in 2010. They had to expand their explanatory framework given the 
developments of the financial crisis and were able to increase accuracy of their models. 
 Capital Structure Theories and Financing Decisions 
 
 
Mark Hill  Page 38 
Mind the Gap 
Other research (Arnold, Lahmann & Reinstädt, 2011; De Jong et al., 2011) followed 
that path. 
2.3 Non-rational Capital Structure Decisions 
Kahneman & Tversky (1974a) explored that neo-classical and neo-institutional 
theoretical concepts were both not able to interpret all investigated anomalies in 
financing decisions. Further research proposed that theories were not able to explain 
financing decisions because of the misleading assumption of the existence of rational 
market participants (Adam, Burg, Scheinert & Streitz, 2014; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1974b; Meier & Esmatyar, 2015). Therefore, non-economic aspects like psychology 
and behaviour of the decision-maker need to be included in assessing financing 
decisions and in explaining investigated anomalies. Table 2.2 presents the main 
literature sources on capital structure decisions that are based on behavioural finance. 
Table 2.2: Literature Summary on Behavioural Capital Structure Decisions 
Author / Research focus Key findings 
Kahneman & Tversky (1974a) 
Conceptual paper 
Introduction of three heuristics, including 
representativeness.  
The authors conclude that heuristics are highly 
economical and usually effective, leading to systematic 
and predictable errors.  
They request further research to provide a better 
understanding of these heuristics and the biases to which 
they lead to improve judgments and decisions under 
uncertainty. 
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) 
Theoretical paper 
Presentation of the prospect theory. Persistent biases 
exist, motivated by psychological factors, influencing 
choices under uncertainty. 
Preferences are seen as a function of decision weights 
that would not necessarily match with probabilities. 
Decision weights tend to overweight small probabilities 
and to underweight moderate to high probabilities. 
Busenitz & Barney (1997) 
Survey by comparing questionnaire results from 
124 start-up entrepreneurs with responses from 95 
managers from large cap firms in the U.S. 
Authors investigated the importance of behavioural 
aspects in strategic management decisions and the 
existence of significant differences in strategic decision 
making.  
Large cap managers can rely on developed policies and 
have access to market information. Entrepreneurs lack 
this information access and base decisions more on own 
experience. 
Source: Own illustration.  
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
Author / Research focus Key findings 
Fama (1998) 
Theoretical paper 
Critique on developed theories regarding behavioural 
models. The author presented two reasons for 
behavioural theory not to persist:  
(a) The discovered anomalies on stock returns tended to 
appear to be as often underreaction by investors as 
overreaction. Post-event continuation of pre-event 
abnormal returns would be about as frequent as post-
event reversal. 
(b) The anomalies would tend to disappear, either by 
improving the methodology of the studies or by focusing 
on long-term returns.  
Shiller (2003) 
Theoretical paper, critique on Fama (1998) 
Behavioural finance has led to a profound deepening of 
knowledge on financial markets as efficient markets 
theory could lead to incorrect interpretations of events 
such as major stock market bubbles. 
Fama’s (1998) first criticism would reflect an incorrect 
view of the psychological underpinnings. The second 
criticism would be also incorrect as the basic anomaly of 
excess volatility seems not to be disproved, but 
graphically reinforced by the assessment of the recent 
global stock markets developments. 
Moreover, the author states that the sole statement that 
anomalies sometimes disappear over time would be no 
evidence that the markets are fully rational. 
Malmendier & Tate (2005) 
Survey based on assessing Forbes 500 CEO 
transactions in their companies’ stock and options 
combined with the analysis of press portrays 
The authors tried to empirically analyse CEO 
overconfidence and its impact on corporate investment 
and identified that management teams permanently 
overestimate their own skills. 
They conclude that existing debt might be an instrument 
to limit overconfident managers as company cash flows 
would be partly restricted for debt repayments. 
Fairchild (2005) 
Theoretical paper 
The author examined the combined effects of 
overconfidence, asymmetric information and moral 
hazard problems on the financing decision by presenting 
two models. 
Fairchild showed that management optimism leads to a 
higher company leverage and to higher insolvency costs.  
Hackbarth (2008) 
Theoretical paper 
Adds to the model by Fairchild (2005) as he showed in a 
model analysis that managers with overoptimistic bias 
tend to choose higher debt levels and issue debt more 
often.  
He differentiates two forms of perception biases: (a) The 
growth perception bias describes managers with overly 
positive views on company growth and therefore future 
revenues or cash flows from investments. (b) The second 
form of perception bias is the risk perception bias, where 
managers underestimate the volatility of future company 
cash flows. 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
Author / Research focus Key findings 
Malmendier, Tate & Yan (2011) 
Empirical analysis of 477 CEOs of publicly-traded 
U.S. firms and their personal investments between 
1980 and 1994 
Results showed that optimistic managers view external 
financing to be unduly costly. 
Optimistic managers believe that their firm is 
undervalued by the market because they overestimate 
their firms’ future cash flows. 
Source: Own illustration. 
Behavioural finance represents an approach that combines traditional finance, 
psychology and sociology in an attempt to explain these anomalies (Ricciardi & 
Simon, 2000). According to Shiller (2003), behavioural finance theory presents a 
contradicting psychological and sociological approach to the efficient market 
hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, behavioural finance is criticised by rational-decision scholars for 
missing robustness (De Bondt, 2002; Fama, 1998) and for not being an integrated or 
unified theory, but offers explanations on a series of individual anomalies 
(Subrahmanyam, 2007, p. 13). However, these central critiques have been also argued 
by research (Brav & Heaton, 2002; Shiller, 2003), especially for an “incorrect view of 
the psychological underpinnings of behavioural finance” (Shiller, 2003, p. 101). Welch 
(2004) found in his research, that corporates in fact did not adjust their individual 
capital structures in response to market and price fluctuations. This “runs counter to 
rational theories of capital structure choice” (Subrahmanyam, 2007, p. 22).  
As behavioural finance investigates numerous heuristics and bias, this research will 
focus on two particular heuristics that are regularly used to explain differences between 
managers and entrepreneurs in financing decisions (e.g. Busenitz & Barney, 1997), 
overconfidence and representativeness. Overviews on the development of behavioural 
finance have been conducted by Sewell (2007), Subrahmanyam (2007) and Fairchild 
(2010), for example. 
2.3.1 Overconfidence 
The phenomenon of optimism or overconfidence has been widely analysed in the 
psychological and sociological area. Feather & Simon (1971) investigated that 
confident individuals attribute a successful decision to their competence and 
capability, whereas a failure is associated with bad luck. Further research by Fischhoff, 
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Slovic & Lichtenstein (1977) revealed that optimistic individuals are overly confident 
in the reliability of the information they base their decision on. They based their results 
on the research by Kahneman & Tversky (1974a), who introduced the overconfidence 
effect in 1974. In their view, the overconfidence bias is primarily identified in relation 
to two different aspects:  
(1) the impact of an individual’s decision or actions to future results or 
developments (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999), and  
(2) the overestimation of the individual’s knowledge or comprehension (Welsh & 
Zellweger, 2010). 
2.3.1.1 Overconfidence in Management Decisions 
Larwood & Whittaker (1977) transferred the overconfidence phenomenon towards 
management decisions. They were able to provide evidence that managers also tend to 
be overconfident. March & Shapira (1987) explain managerial optimism with their 
confidence in being able to control the effects of own decisions. This leads to the 
conclusion that managers will accept higher risks as they assume these risks not to 
become valid. Camerer & Lovallo (1999) assume that company failure is based on 
overconfidence of entrepreneurs. In situations where the success of a business is 
dependent on the skills of the entrepreneur, those entrepreneurs tend to overestimate 
their skills and capabilities compared to their competitors.  
Busenitz & Barney (1997) investigated the importance of behavioural aspects in 
strategic management decisions. They differentiated between managers in large cap 
organisations and entrepreneurs and showed significant differences in strategic 
decision making. Managers in large cap organisations can often rely on developed 
policies and procedures also called “routines” (1997, p.14) as well as on information 
and databases to substantiate their decision-making. On the other hand, entrepreneurs 
usually do not have this access to these information sources or only at relatively high 
cost. 
Heaton (2002) presents evidence that in behavioural finance it is widely accepted that 
managerial optimism leads to the situation that managers overestimate the probability 
of company success whereas they underestimate company failure. 
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Malmendier & Tate (2005) surveyed that management teams permanently 
overestimate their own skills by assuming that overconfident managers are 
overestimating the expected returns of their investment and corporate decisions. One 
of their conclusions was that probably the existing debt might be an instrument to limit 
overconfident managers. In such a scenario, corporate cash is to some extend restricted 
for debt repayments and the ability to raise additional debt to finance new investments 
is dependent on lenders’ willingness. In addition, many financing contracts involve 
limitations on future investments and disposals. 
Malmendier & Tate (2005) began to measure managerial overconfidence and its 
impact on corporate behaviour, based on the existing work by Busenitz & Barney 
(1997), who already examined the differences between entrepreneurs and managers. 
2.3.1.2 Overconfidence in Financing Decisions 
Graham and Harvey (2001) were the first who surveyed CFOs and their financing 
decisions based on behavioural finance aspects. Their attempt was to learn what factors 
decision makers take into account and what the corresponding capital structures are. 
They found “some support for the pecking order and tradeoff capital structure 
hypotheses but little evidence that executives are concerned about asset substitution, 
asymmetric information, transactions costs, free cash flows, or personal taxes” 
(Graham & Harvey, 2001, p. 188). A second research in the following year expanded 
their findings as they admitted that “when it comes to making capital structure 
decisions, corporations rely heavily on practical, informal rules and pay less attention 
to academic advice” (Graham & Harvey, 2002, p. 2). Bertrand & Schoar (2003) further 
developed this attempt as they assessed that CFO behaviour is driven by non-financial 
factors, such as education or relationships. 
Further research performed by Fairchild in 2005 identified that management optimism 
leads to a higher company leverage and to higher insolvency costs. However, the result 
is not necessarily to be seen as a negative impact as they discuss that higher debt levels 
would also trigger higher managerial effort. 
Hackbarth (2008) adds to that research as he showed in a model analysis that managers 
with overoptimistic bias tend to choose higher debt levels and issue debt more often 
compared to otherwise identical unbiased managers. He differentiates two forms of 
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perception biases. The growth perception bias describes managers with overly positive 
views on company growth and therefore future revenues or cash flows from 
investments. These managers assume that the market undervalues their equity and 
therefore assume external financing to be overly costly. They show a preference as 
described in pecking order theory. The second form of perception bias is the risk 
perception bias, where managers underestimate the volatility of future company cash 
flows. They assume that external debt is undervalued by the market and provided at 
inadequately high interest rates. Those managers tend to fund their companies via 
equity and would in fact follow a reverse pecking order. However, both groups of 
managers showed a trend for a higher leverage compared to rational managers as they 
assume their firm to be either more profitable or more robust compared to other 
companies (Meier & Esmatyar, 2015). 
Malmendier, Tate & Yan (2011) showed that optimistic managers view external 
financing to be unduly costly based on the investigation of stock options and stock 
trades of CEOs. Optimistic managers believe that their firm is undervalued by the 
market because they overestimate their firms’ future cash flows.  
Hence, overconfident managers prefer to use cash flow funding or in case they have 
to raise external funding, they prefer debt to equity, since equity prices are more 
sensitive to differences of opinions about future cash flows. Unconditionally, they may 
choose low levels of risky debt relative to available interest tax deductions. As a second 
result, Malmendier et al. (2011) revealed that CEOs with financial depression 
experience are averse to debt and focus excessively on internal finance. They conclude 
that this variation in managers’ personal histories is likely to generate differences in 
their financial decision-making. 
Further academic research on overconfidence and behavioural finance in German 
firms followed (Adam et al., 2014; Koropp et al., 2014; Meier & Esmatyar, 2015) and 
will be discussed in section 3.2. 
2.3.2 Representativeness 
Managers manifest this heuristic in a decision process when they generalize about a 
phenomenon based on only a few observations of a specified phenomenon (Busenitz 
& Barney, 1997, p.16). A wide variety of problems has been developed to test 
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representativeness with studies repeatedly showing that subjects consistently ignore 
base rate information (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Kahneman & Tversky, 1974b). The 
representativeness heuristic describes the tendency to overgeneralise from only a few 
characteristics and observations to generate judgements about the probability of an 
event under uncertainty. Representativeness, as surveyed by Busenitz & Barney (1997) 
is a “willingness of decision-makers to generalize from small, non-random samples 
[...]” (p. 16). According to the researchers, the most common type of small non-random 
sample used as a basis for generalisation is personal experience (p. 16). An important 
aspect to mitigate representativeness would be the inclusion of available market data 
and information as well as taking advice by independent third parties, such as 
accountants, financing advisors, etc. prior to performing a decision process. However, 
this directly interferes with the overconfidence bias, as overconfident and optimistic 
managers assume to have sufficient transparency on financing instruments available 
and the status of the financing markets to execute such a process. As representativeness 
bias is not measurable, only little research is available. However, the intended in-depth 
exploration of this research might provide some helpful insights. 
2.4 Strategic Capital Structure Theory 
Even though Barton & Gordon’s (1987, 1988) strategic capital structure theory does 
not explicitly link to behavioural finance, it must be acknowledged that there is a 
congruence with behavioural finance as it analyses the influence of psychological and 
sociological aspects on “the behaviour of financial practitioners” (Sewell, 2007, p. 1). 
Koropp et al. (2014) found “empirical support for a strategic management approach to 
capital structure choice […] as future financial decision making (financing intention) 
is subject to distinctive personal characteristics (attitudes, perceived norms, perceived 
control) of the decision maker” (p. 321). 
Based on the critique on simplifications of financing decisions to be analysed by the 
common theoretical models, Barton & Gordon (1987) presented their strategic capital 
structure theory. Their aim was to include strategic and behavioural aspects in the 
analysis of a financing decision or in the development of a capital structure theory of 
a firm. Even though Kahneman & Tversky's (1974a, 1979) fundamental work on 
heuristics and biases in management decisions were already published, Barton & 
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Gordon did not borrow from these behavioural finance sources, but combined 
financing theory with Andrews' (1980) theory on risk behaviour and corporate 
strategy. Table 2.3 exhibits an overview of key research on strategic capital structure 
theory. 
Table 2.3: Research on Strategic Capital Structure Theory 
Author / Research focus Key findings 
Barton & Gordon (1987) 
Conceptual paper 
Critique on the oversimplification of quantitative 
research in financial theory. Introduction of strategic 
concepts and presentation of five capital structure 
propositions. Indication for a strategic managerial theory 
of capital structure of a firm which also includes 
management behaviour in its decisions. Requests for 
extensive empirical research to test these propositions. 
Barton & Gordon (1988) 
Analysis of 279 Fortune 500 companies between 
1970 and 1974 
Presentation of contextual variables and hypotheses to 
substantiate their initial theoretical framework. 
Introduced diversification strategy typologies as risk 
mitigations. Overall findings provided support for the 
behavioural explanation of the capital structure decision 
at firm level. Focus on Fortune 500 companies provides 
only support for large cap companies. 
Lowe, Naughton & Taylor (1994) 
Survey based on 176 out of the top 500 Australian 
public companies between 1984 and 1988 
Profitability and earnings risk as two major variables only 
partially support the Barton & Gordon (1998) analysis. 
Nevertheless, acknowledge the importance of including 
strategy as a determinant of the capital structure. 
Introduced the impact of ownership and control to the 
theory and propose to consider alternative strategy 
models. 
Taylor & Lowe (1995) 
Analysis based on the original Barton & Gordon 
setup of 279 Fortune 500 companies between 1970 
and 1974 
Given the weaker support for the Barton & Gordon 
(1998) results in their 1994 survey, Taylor & Lowe 
performed a second analysis by using the original Barton 
& Gordon dataset. Stronger support for the impact of 
profitability, but still only partial support for the 
quantitative elements of strategic capital structure theory. 
Chaganti, DeCarolis & Deeds (1995) 
Survey based on 903 small and independently-
owned member firms of the U.S. National 
Federation of Independent Businesses during a 
series of three surveys in 1985, 1986 and 1987 
Expansion of Barton & Gordon’s (1988) approach 
towards small cap firms and early stage ventures. 
Confirmation of Barton & Gordon’s strategic 
management perspective by their statistical results and 
offered several predictors of capital structure decisions in 
small ventures. 
Prasad, Bruton & Merikas (1997) 
Analysis of 810 U.S. public companies between 
1969 and 1987, whereof 592 companies showed a 
similar systematic risk and were used as final 
sample 
Further substantiated Barton & Gordon’s results by 
mitigating methodological problems in the 1988 
research. Introduction of systematic risk as used in the 
CAPM model. Strong support for the theoretical 
proposition that management influences and controls 
systematic risk through selection of financing structure. 
Ginn, Young & Beekun (1995) 
Investigation of 114 U.S. hospital cases on 
interaction between business strategy and financial 
structure between 1981 and 1985. 
Use the Miles & Snow typology and combine it with 
strategic capital structure theory and the pecking order 
approach. Based on the four variables liquidity, capital 
intensity, return on assets and leverage, the authors found 
evidence for the three dominant strategy types. 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Table 2.3 (continued) 
Author / Research focus Key findings 
Jordan, Lowe & Taylor (1998) 
Survey including 275 U.K. SME firms from the 
FAME database in 1997 
Second research to focus on SME. Combination of 
corporate strategies, as used in research by Barton & 
Gordon (1988) or Lowe et al. (1994) with diversification 
strategies as introduced by Balakrishnan & Fox (1993). 
Only weak support for linkage between capital structure 
and diversification strategies, but stronger support for 
competitive strategies. 
Gleason, Mathur & Mathur (2000) 
Cross-country survey in 14 European countries, 
focussing on 198 retail firms in 1994 
Analysis of culture on capital structure and financing 
decisions and focus on one industry sector to avoid cross-
sector bias. Key finding is that capital structure varies by 
cultural setting. Therefore, results show that agency 
problems may be primarily responsible for corporate 
overleveraging. 
La Rocca, La Rocca & Gerace (2008) Capital structure to be related also to products and 
product market characteristics of the relevant firm. 
Necessity to match corporate strategy, investment plans 
and financing requirements. Capital structure of the firm 
influenced by non-financial and by financial stakeholders 
of the firm, therefore the decision-making is not simply a 
matter of prescriptive principles. 
Source: Own illustration. 
Barton & Gordon state that the capital structure is the result of fundamental decisions 
by the management of a company and therefore must be in line with the overall 
strategic goals of the company. In addition, individual preferences of the management, 
based on their axiology, are influencing the capital structure. Five propositions have 
been formulated by Barton & Gordon: 
1. “Top management’s risk taking propensity will affect the firm’s capital 
structure  
2. Top management’s goals for the firm will affect the firm’s capital structure  
3. Top managers would prefer to finance a firm’s needs from internally generated 
funds rather than from external creditors or even new stockholders  
4. The risk propensity of top management and specific financial context of the 
firm affect the amount of debt lenders are willing to lend and what terms they 
are willing to use  
5. Relevant financial contextual variables moderate the ability of top management 
to select a capital structure for the firm” (Barton & Gordon, 1987, pp. 71-74).  
The first two propositions imply management behaviour aspects (Barton & Gordon, 
1987, p. 74), whereas the third proposition is upon pecking order theory. Proposition 
four implies a maximum level of debt available to a company and therefore could be 
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attributed towards tradeoff theory whereas the fifth proposition implies that financial 
variables affect the management choice of a financing mix for the firm (Barton & 
Gordon, 1987, p. 72). 
Based on these propositions, the existence of a single, shareholder value maximising 
financing structure is rejected (Jaeger, 2012; Schneider, 2010). According to Jaeger, 
most important determinants are the risk attitude of the management as well as 
retaining control which are both included in the corporate strategy (2012, p. 51). A 
corporate strategy or strategic management is defined by Ansoff (1965) and by Nag, 
Hambrick & Chen (2007) to involve the formulation and implementation of major 
goals and initiatives taken by a firm’s top management. The strategy is based on 
consideration of resources and an assessment of the environment in which the 
company operates in (Nag et al., 2007). According to Porter, strategic management 
provides the “overall direction to the enterprise and involves specifying the 
organisation's objectives, developing policies and plans designed to achieve these 
objectives, and then allocating resources to implement the plans” (1996, p. 61). 
Corporate strategy in this thesis is furthermore based on the work of Andrews (1980), 
who “included the debt/equity choice as one of the specific components of the 
corporate strategy of the firm” (Barton & Gordon, 1987, p. 70). Management aims for 
a capital structure that allows maximum control and flexibility. Therefore, limited 
indebtedness is preferred to retain control (Jaeger, 2012). Based on the definition of 
strategic management and Barton & Gordon’s (1987) inclusion in capital structure 
decisions, a financing strategy in this research is the plan and approach to achieve a 
financing structure based on the defined goals of the midcap firm. 
However, key elements of the theory – the strategic and behavioural aspects of the 
management – provide only limited operationalisability (Jaeger, 2012). Nevertheless, 
some of the propositions of the strategic capital structure theory were operationalised 
and therefore empirically tested (La Rocca, La Rocca & Gerace, 2008). Especially the 
third proposition – representing in fact the pecking order theory – allows for an 
operationalisation. Given the fact that taxes are not considered in their propositions, 
Barton & Gordon’s strategic capital structure theory is declining one of the key effects 
of the tradeoff theory (Schneider, 2010). On the other hand, their fourth proposition 
indicates that the willingness of financing partners to provide external debt is 
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influenced by the economic environment the firm and its management envisages. Bank 
loans availability is depending on the probability of default of a firm which leads to 
the calculation of a risk premium on interest rates or even the denial of a loan request. 
This assumption can be assigned to tradeoff theory (Schneider, 2010). 
The research by Barton & Gordon takes a special position in the capital structure 
theory. They are the first that postulate a theory without a quantifiable model backing 
their propositions (Schneider, 2010). The authors explicitly ask for an empirical 
examination of their propositions. In addition, the authors are the first that incorporate 
strategic and behavioural aspects in the centre of the consideration of an optimal 
capital structure.  
The missing quantifiability is forming the major critique on Barton & Gordon’s theory 
not to present an integrated capital structure theory (Schneider, 2010). Therefore, the 
authors convey empirically testable hypotheses based on their five propositions in a 
second research (Barton & Gordon, 1988). They investigated the effect of profitability, 
capital intensity and sales growth on debt levels. The empirical research of Lowe, 
Naughton & Taylor (1994) and Taylor & Lowe (1995) was only able to partially 
support the quantitative results of Barton & Gordon as they failed to reproduce the 
significance levels of the original survey. Additional research (Chaganti, DeCarolis & 
Deeds, 1995; Jordan et al., 1998) expanded the strategic capital structure theory 
towards SMEs.  
An interesting research by Ginn et al. (1995) adopted the Miles & Snow (1978) 
typology to investigate the relationship between general business and financing 
strategy as well as its determinants for U.S. hospitals. They based their research on the 
pecking order theory (Myers, 1984b) as well as on the propositions from strategic 
capital structure theory (Barton & Gordon, 1987, 1988). Two dependent variables 
liquidity and gearing were assessed by several independent variables. Ginn et al. 
(1995) were able to identify consistent results on the influence of the three 
determinants, company size, capital intensity and return on assets on liquidity, but not 
on gearing. They allowed assigning the cases to a certain category according to the 
Miles & Snow typology which will be expanded in section 6.1. However, Ginn et al. 
(1995) proposed to investigate whether these patterns could be also observed in other 
branches. A further limitation of their research was the inability to detect a causal 
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direction between business strategy and financing structure. A certain corporate 
strategy might influence the decision on financing instruments to choose. However, a 
given capital structure might also predetermine the appropriate business strategy of 
that company (Ginn et al., 1995, p. 206). 
Prasad, Bruton & Merikas (1997) presented in another research the quantitative 
evidence of an existing relationship between long-term goals of the firm and its capital 
structure decisions. They also admitted that they were not able to identify which 
strategy influences the other. Another expansion was introduced by research from 
Gleason, Mathur & Mathur (2000), who analysed the effect of cultural aspects on the 
capital structure. 
Further research by La Rocca et al. (2008) showed that in addition to the risk attitude 
and retaining control goals of the management, a “high or low level of debt can 
compromise a firm’s ability to take advantage of strategic options” (p. 15) and 
therefore limit the shareholder value creation. A high level of debt creates in their view 
an argument that this management is also willing to boost productivity to become a 
more aggressive market participant because their perception towards risk is less averse 
than a company with low debt levels. This again combines financing strategy and 
corporate strategy. 
Even though the theoretical approach by Barton & Gordon is still criticised for not 
being entirely testable (Jaeger, 2012) it is a key source for research that focus on non-
economic factors of the capital structure, such as preferences of the management, 
shareholder structure or cultural aspects (Kochhar & Hitt, 1998; Koropp et al., 2014; 
La Rocca et al., 2008). Strategic capital structure theory shows that management 
perception is influencing the financing decision and that financing structure and 
overall business strategy are influencing each other. Current research that tries to 
integrate several theoretical approaches and combine strategic aspects with capital 
structure (e.g. Koropp, Grichnik & Kellermanns, 2013; Koropp et al., 2014; Tappeiner 
et al., 2012) borrows from the approach by Barton & Gordon. However, there has been 
no newer empirical investigation of this approach since the research by Jaeger (2012), 
which will be discussed in more detail in section 3.2. 
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2.5 Business Strategy Typologies and Financing Decision 
Following the investigation that business strategy and financing structure are 
influencing each other, academic research tried to use business strategy typologies to 
categorise financing decisions (Ginn et al., 1995). To allow for a categorisation or 
segmentation of firms, several typologies were developed in academic literature. They 
are mainly based on strategy formulation and organisational or risk behaviour 
(Henschel, 2010). Given the aim of this research to investigate the financing decision 
in midcap firms, the following paragraphs present the development of a set of 
typologies to sort types of financing decisions in midcap firms. 
The literature review on business strategy typologies considers academic sources that 
were either empirically tested or deal with SME and midcap aspects with the intention 
to possibly adapt these approaches within this study. Table 2.4 presents the main 
sources. 
Table 2.4: Research on Business Strategy Typologies 
Author / Research focus Key findings 
D. Miller & Friesen (1978) and D. Miller (1986, 
1996) 
Formulation of strategic archetypes by analysing 
published data from large cap companies, primarily 
U.S. Fortune 500 firms. 
Presentation of ten archetypes deriving from 31 
variables. Particular focus on the interaction of business 
strategy, (organisational) structure and strategy. 
R. E. Miles & Snow (1978, 1984, 2003) 
Analysis of organisational strategies within U.S. 
firms through mail questionnaires and interviews. 
Based on three levels of strategic problems, authors 
suggest four strategy types: Defender, prospector, 
analyser and reactor. 
Mintzberg (1979, 1989) 
Presentation of general typologies for segmenting 
organisations. 
Development of typologies for organisations. The 
general approach consists of six different types, the 
typology for SMEs only involves two types. 
Zahra & Pearce (1990) 
Meta-analysis of 17 empirical studies on the  
Miles & Snow typology between 1980 and 1989. 
Investigation of the main propositions of the Miles & 
Snow (1978) typology and their support as well as 
coverage by past research. Evidence on the propositions 
were mixed. Conceptual and methodological refinements 
were requested. 
Doty, Glick & Huber (1993) 
Analysis of 232 U.S companies from different 
sectors via two mail surveys as part of a larger 
longitudinal project. 
Compare Typologies of Mintzberg (1979) and Miles & 
Snow (1978). By modelling ideal-type organisations. 
Miles & Snow typology predicts organisational 
effectiveness. Mintzberg’s (1979) theory and typology 
needs improvement as theory was refuted by the findings.  
Source: Own illustration. 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
Author / Research focus Key findings 
Ginn, Young & Beekun (1995) 
Investigation of 114 U.S. hospital cases on 
interaction between business strategy and financial 
structure between 1981 and 1985. 
Uses the Miles & Snow typology and combines it with 
the pecking order approach and strategic capital structure 
theory. Based on the four variables liquidity, capital 
intensity, return on assets and leverage, the authors found 
evidence for the three dominant strategy types. 
Gimenez (2000) 
Analysis of 150 SMEs from Brazil on competitive 
strategies through a questionnaire. 
Investigate competitive strategy behaviour of SME 
owner-managers. Additional evidence to support the 
Miles & Snow (1979) typology in SME environments 
including various sectors.  
Schachner et al. (2006) 
Survey of 205 SME’s in Austria and Germany via a 
questionnaire in 2003. 
Family-owned firms are more conservative in delegating 
control rights to employees if led by owner-managers. 
Family firms led by external managers show more 
formalised processes and a higher degree of delegation of 
control. Highest grade of delegation within prospector 
types. 
Source: Own illustration. 
There has been a variety of approaches to assess strategy types, ranging from self-
typing, expert panels, investigator assessment or cluster analysis (Zahra & Pearce, 
1990). All approaches try to identify dimensions of organisational behaviour (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1990, p. 752). These dimensions include the existence of distinct strategy 
types, a performance hierarchy, as some types will outperform others. Hence, an 
environment-strategy link represents a further dimension, as these distinct types must 
exist in different environments. As an additional dimension, an organisational 
behaviour exists that comprises the approaches of firms with different perspectives on 
the competitive environment, the adaptive cycle. This adaptive cycle addresses three 
basic challenges for a company, the entrepreneurial problem, the engineering problem 
and the administrative problem. Whereas the entrepreneurial problem proposes that 
the strategic types identified will differ in the way they define their domain, the 
engineering problem focusses on different approaches towards technology, 
engineering and production. The administrative problem investigates the importance 
of the various functions within a firm and the internal organisation as well as the 
underlying managerial philosophy.  
A first typology was presented by D. Miller & Friesen in 1978. They analysed strategic 
behaviour within a company by examining the dependency on 31 variables that can be 
linked with the dimensions of strategic behaviour. However, Miller & Friesen solely 
focussed on a separate assessment of the variables, primarily by bivariate 
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considerations and were therefore not able to present a holistic framework. As a result 
of their research, they present ten archetypes of firms. Miller provided a more 
comprehensive framework through the introduction of configurations for the 
archetypes by later research (D. Miller, 1986, 1996). 
The usage of a scoring model by Miller & Friesen to identify the relevant configuration 
presented a comprehensive and transparent approach. Nevertheless, their research 
focussed on large cap cases and not on SME or midcap companies. In addition, the 
large number of ten different types and the assessment of up to 31 variables for 
configuration seem not suitable in a midcap context. 
Another typology to evaluate organisational and strategic behaviour was introduced 
by Mintzberg in 1979. His approach was based originally on six different types that 
should be applicable for all company sizes. Mintzberg revised his approach in 1989 by 
presenting two types for small firm classification in particular. He differentiated small 
firms to be either an “entrepreneurial organisation” or an “innovative organisation” 
(Mintzberg, 1989, p. 117). An entrepreneurial organisation is characterised to be 
centric and totally aligned towards the owner-manager who combines all central 
functions or decisions. The innovative organisation on the other hand is described by 
Mintzberg (1989) as a structure that allows to integrate different forms of expertise to 
cope with more complex management problems. 
Both classifications proposed by Mintzberg (1979, 1989) are questioned. According 
to Doty et al. (1993), the classification for SME and midcap companies by using two 
types do not allow for a differentiated typology, whereas the general classification that 
offers six types are not useable. They acknowledged that Mintzberg’s (1979, 1989) 
typology offers a comprehensive description but lacks empirical justification. 
Therefore, they carried out a longitudinal study to compare Mintzberg’s classification 
with the typology proposed by R. E. Miles & Snow (1978). Doty et al. (1993) assessed 
the performance of a broad variety of firms and were not able to distinguish firms that 
followed one of the classifications proposed by Mintzberg (1979, 1989) to be more 
successful compared to those that violated the criteria. They admitted that based on 
their results, the typology proposed by Miles & Snow (1978) provides a better 
classification framework.  
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Miles & Snow offer a set of four types of strategic behaviour (1978, 2003) that are 
named as 
 defender, 
 analyser, 
 prospector, and 
 reactor. 
The first three types provide a dominant typology, whereas the reactor can only 
maintain in a stable environment. In case of a significant change in market, products 
or technology, reactors have to migrate towards one of the three dominant types (Ginn 
et al., 1995; R. E. Miles et al., 1978). Miles & Snow (1979, 2003) present a catalogue 
of criteria that allows for a segmentation, including the adaptive cycle and underlying 
functional problems (see section 6). Their typology has been validated most frequently 
(Schachner et al., 2006) and has been identified to be especially suitable for identifying 
SME and midcap company’s strategic behaviour (Gimenez, 2000). Gimenez was also 
able to assess that the typology by Miles & Snow can be easily adopted to other 
research areas because of its simple and transparent description (2000, p. 237). 
2.6 Summary 
The literature review on capital structure and financing decision theories revealed the 
heterogeneity of the approaches. Furthermore, none of the concepts was able to 
provide a holistic approach being able to explain all developments and anomalies 
observed in financing decisions. 
However, several financial and non-financial determinants have been identified that 
are observed to explain which financing instrument is preferably used or whether a 
financing hierarchy exists. Those determinants include – amongst others – company 
leverage or gearing, equity ratio, company size, age of the company and profitability. 
Further determinants that are linked towards managers and their behaviour are 
education, prior job positions and their experience as well as a general differentiation 
between owner-managers and external managers. Table 2.5 shows the determinants 
and their effect on choosing additional debt as refinancing instrument. 
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Table 2.5: Determinants influencing the Management’s Preference for a new Debt Instrument 
Determinant Tradeoff Agency theory/ 
Signalling 
Pecking order Overconfidence/ 
Representativeness 
Higher 
profitability 
Higher/positive Higher/positive Lower/negative - 
Higher existing 
leverage/gearing 
(lower equity 
ratio) 
Neutral 
(depending on 
insolvency cost 
and tax burden) 
Neutral 
(depending on a 
tradeoff between 
agency cost of 
debt versus 
equity) 
Neutral 
(depending on 
internal funding 
capacity) 
- 
More matured 
company 
Higher/positive Neutral Higher/positive - 
Larger company 
size 
Higher/positive Neutral Higher/positive - 
Owner-manager - - - Higher 
Source: Own illustration. 
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3. Financing Decisions in German Firms and Refinancing of 
Standard Mezzanine 
3.1 Overview 
The different capital structure theories allow to investigate financing decisions from 
various angles. Following the aim of the research, this chapter will primarily focus on 
a review of empirical literature of financing decisions in Germany, particularly in 
midcap firms. The section 3.2 focus on empirical research in Germany. The chapter 
continues in section 3.3 with the review of the existing literature on the refinancing of 
standard mezzanine. The literature review on capital structure theories in chapter 2 and 
on financing decisions in German SME and midcap firms are summarised in section 
3.4 with the formulation of the relevant research questions and propositions. The 
chapter ends with the conclusions in section 3.5. 
3.2 Financing Decisions in Germany 
Financing in German SME and midcap companies differs significantly from other 
countries, given the dominating role of bank lending for German SME and midcap 
firms and the tax penalisation on retained earnings as described in section 1.2.3. Equity 
and debt capital markets were not accessible to those firms until the establishment of 
the specific market segments like the Neuer Markt for new economy companies, which 
collapsed in 2001 (Lichtblau & Utzig, 2002). This dominant bank lending led to the 
situation that research on capital structure and financing decisions were rare prior to 
the changes due to the upcoming regulations under Basel II (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
2012). Table 3.1 displays the main empirical literature on financing decisions in 
Germany. 
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Table 3.1: Literature Summary on Financing Decisions in German Firms 
Author / Research focus Key findings 
Rajan & Zingales (1995) 
Comparative study between 1987 and 1991, 
Analysing 8,000 listed companies in G7-countries 
In all major economies, company size is positively 
correlated with leverage, except for Germany. 
Deutsche Bundesbank (1999) 
Comparative survey of 15,000 French and 8,000 
German non-financial companies between 1987 and 
1995 
French companies show more volatile levels of 
indebtedness compared to German companies. 
Capital structure in German companies varies by 
company size, with SME showing a higher debt level as 
large companies.  
Relationship lending and legal framework in Germany 
allow for a higher debt level of German companies, 
especially SMEs. 
Higher profitability leads to lower indebtedness levels. 
Lichtblau & Utzig (2002) 
Analysis of 22,000 annual reports from German 
companies provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank to 
the European BACH-database between 1995 and 
1999 
Number of bank relationships increases with the size of 
the company.  
Less profitable companies show higher levels of 
indebtedness, could be based on a pecking order 
approach. The core bank principle is economically 
rational for SME and midcap companies as those are able 
to mitigate information asymmetries. 
Börner & Grichnik (2003) 
Combined interviews of 131 midcap firms and 131 
financing institutions in 2002 
65% of companies expect financing environment to 
worsen after the implosion of the dotcom bubble. Internal 
funds represent the most important source of financing, 
followed by external bank debt and leasing (pecking 
order). 
Even though majority of companies expects a changing 
financing environment, alternative forms of financing 
play almost no role. No strategic approach towards 
financing investigated. 
Companies with a weaker operational development see 
bank debt as more important financing source, compared 
to better performing firms. 
Börner et al. (2010) 
Analysis of 10,692 SME and midcap companies 
from the KfW-Mittelstandspanel (postal 
questionnaire) in 2004 
Level of debt financing is significantly dependent on 
company size, company age, ownership structure and 
profitability. 
Legal form of the company is not relevant for the level 
of indebtedness. 
Results emphasize the importance of a deliberate capital 
structure policy for SMEs. 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
Author / Research focus Key findings 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2012) 
Analysis of the financial accounts as parts of the 
German national accounts in the period 1991 to 
2010 
Internal funds are the most important source of funding, 
but showed more cyclicality which can be attributed to 
economic developments. 
Loans are the most important external funding source, 
but bank lending importance reduced through the last two 
economic downturns due to tightening credit standards 
and regulatory effects. 
Alternative financing sources gained importance, with an 
advantage for large cap firms. 
Jaeger (2012) 
Balance sheet data analysis of 93 listed companies 
2000 and 2009 
A higher profitability leads to lower indebtedness, 
supporting pecking order. 
Company age is not a determinant for indebtedness. 
No empirical evidence for economic variables of 
strategic capital structure theory. 
Ampenberger et al. (2013) 
Analysis of 660 listed companies between 1995 and 
2006 
Family firms tend to be more profitable and show lower 
levels of indebtedness than non-family firms. 
Several approaches as tradeoff theory, pecking order and 
agency theory could explain their observation in a 
family-firm context. 
Management board involvement by the founding family 
has a consistently negative influence on leverage. 
Koropp et al. (2014) 
Survey of 118 German family firms in 2010 
Financial decision making in family firms is largely 
influenced by the desire to maintain family control. 
Family firms develop more positive attitudes toward 
internal rather than external financing and to external 
debt rather than external equity. 
Adam et al. (2014) 
Assessment of syndicated and non-syndicated loans 
between 1990 and 2010 
Optimistic CEOs are more likely to issue performance 
sensitive debt (PSD) compared to rational CEOs. 
Optimistic CEOs attribute more risk compensation to 
lenders. 
Managerial optimism does also influence qualitative 
aspects of the debt contract design. 
Meier & Esmatyar (2015) 
Analysis of 192 listed companies between 2002 and 
2014 
Level of indebtedness is higher in companies with 
optimistic management, supports results by Hackbarth 
and Fairchild. 
Companies with optimistic managers show a 
significantly increased insolvency risk, leading to an 
increased cost of equity. 
Source: Own illustration. 
One of the first analysis on financing decisions and capital structure that included data 
from Germany was performed by Rajan & Zingales (1995). They analysed data of 
non-financial firms from G7-countries and showed that in almost every country, an 
increasing company size is correlated with a higher level of indebtedness, except for 
Germany. In their conclusion, they assume that different capital market conditions and 
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an insolvency law in Germany that particularly covers the interest of lenders might be 
a potential explanation for their observation. Insolvency cost being a determinant for 
a financing decision would support tradeoff theory, 
The analysis of the Deutsche Bundesbank in 1999 added to that observation by 
comparing French and German companies across sectors and size levels. They 
investigated the company development between 1987 and 1995 and showed that 
capital structure in German companies varied by company size, with SME showing a 
higher debt level compared to large companies. French companies showed no 
significant differences across size ranges. The investigation demonstrated further that 
firms with higher profitability presented lower debt levels. Even though French 
companies presented more volatile levels of indebtedness compared to German 
companies, they were able to increase their equity ratio in the investigated timeframe 
across company sizes. SMEs in Germany were not able to increase equity ratios 
compared to large cap companies. The Deutsche Bundesbank concluded, that 
relationship lending from the core bank(s) and legal framework in Germany allowed 
for a higher debt level of German companies, especially SMEs. The relationship 
lending would support agency theory, whereas the legal framework – which is linked 
towards insolvency laws – would support tradeoff theory again. 
Lichtblau & Utzig (2002) further researched the influence of the relationship lending 
by core banks on the capital structure of German firms. They detected that the number 
of bank relationships increased with the size of the company. Hence, SMEs have 
intense relationships with few bank partners and show a higher indebtedness compared 
to larger companies. They confirmed the effect that less profitable companies showed 
higher levels of indebtedness and discussed that this could be based on a pecking order 
approach, as those companies do not have sufficient internal funding available for their 
investments. Furthermore, Lichtblau & Utzig demonstrated that relationship lending 
by core banks is economically rational for SME and midcap companies as those are 
able to mitigate information asymmetries via signalling (2002, p. 31). 
The survey by Börner & Grichnik in 2003 was the first research after the implosion of 
the dotcom bubble. They performed a combined survey of 136 midcap firms and 131 
financing institutions on financing options. 65% of companies expected the financing 
environment to worsen. However, they studied that despite a changing financing 
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environment, alternative forms of financing played almost no role. Firms still relied 
on a pecking order approach that favours retained earnings over external bank debt and 
in some cases leasing finance. Mezzanine finance was irrelevant for more than 60% of 
the companies. Given their investigation of a pecking order approach, Börner & 
Grichnik (2003) acknowledged a missing strategic approach towards financing 
decisions and capital structure. Their statement is based on the assumption that pecking 
order does not allow for a design of an optimal capital structure, but just represents a 
necessity to enter new financial instruments or markets as soon as the more preferable 
source is not available to the firm. These would not access this new source by 
themselves, as the approach of a new financing source could be interpreted as a 
negative signal on company or management quality (Börner & Grichnik, 2003; 
Schneider, 2010). In their conclusion, Börner & Grichnik (2003) pointed that a more 
strategic exploitation of new financing sources is seen as a necessary step to avoid an 
increased financing risk following a more restrictive bank lending after the 
introduction of Basel II-regulations. This strategic approach in their view did not 
necessarily meant new instruments, but more active assessment of existing financing 
alternatives (Börner & Grichnik, 2003, p. 689). 
In a second research, Börner, Grichnik & Reize analysed in 2010 data from more than 
10,000 companies from the KfW–Mittelstandspanel. They confirmed again that debt 
financing of German SME and midcap firms depends on company size, age and 
profitability but further revealed that shareholder structure also significantly 
determines debt levels. Companies should enhance transparency to generate access to 
a broader spectrum of refinancing instruments, e.g. by presenting an external rating 
(Börner et al., 2010). They furthermore examined that management and especially 
family shareholders are often reluctant to present detailed financial information on 
their company and therefore limit themselves to existing bank relationships and 
shareholders (Börner et al., 2010; Nohtse, 2012). 
In their 2010 research, Börner et al. reiterate their conclusion on a missing strategic 
approach towards financing decisions as “even companies with good profitability have 
to comply with the requirement for a strategic capital structure policy, to preserve the 
balance between dividend payments and retention of profits and to utilise leverage 
potentials” (p. 248). 
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Research by Deutsche Bundesbank (2012) revealed that internal funds are still the 
most important source of funding, but showed more cyclicality which can be attributed 
to economic developments. Loans represent the most important external funding 
source, but bank lending importance reduced through the last two economic downturns 
due to tightening credit standards and regulatory effects. Alternative financing sources 
gained importance for large cap firms. However capital market-based external 
financing play a subordinated role, except for the time period of the New Economy 
boom. 
Jaeger (2012) analysed 93 listed companies in Germany between 2000 and 2009 and 
tried to identify determinants based on capital structure theories that could explain their 
development. She detected that none of the major capital structure theories was able 
to explain the observations entirely but confirmed the results by Börner et al. (2010) 
and Fama & French (2002) that more profitable firms are less levered. This confirmed 
the pecking order model but contradicted the tradeoff theory. With respect to company 
age, Jaeger (2012) could not support the results of Börner et al. (2010) as this 
determinant was insignificant in explaining debt levels. 
Ampenberger et al. (2013) focused in their research on differences between family 
firms and non-family firms in Germany as well as on the impact of owner-managers 
on indebtedness. They showed that family firms in Germany are more profitable than 
non-family firms and identified that German family firms tend to have less 
indebtedness. According to them, family firms have lower agency costs and thus the 
disciplinary effect of debt as proposed by Jensen (1986) becomes less relevant. This 
explanation is further substantiated as they reveal the lowest debt levels in firms where 
family firm members are present in the management board. Nevertheless, 
Ampenberger et al. propose two further explanations. First, a lower level of 
indebtedness could also act as an indicator that family firms have lower target debt 
ratios as shareholders with their largely undiversified portfolios might emphasize the 
risk of default within their capital (2013, p. 23), which would support tradeoff theory. 
Second, a higher profitability of family firms would allow more funding power from 
retained earnings, which follows pecking order (Ampenberger et al., 2013, p. 24). 
The influence of family shareholders on the financial decision-making process is 
further studied by Koropp et al. in 2014 by focussing on an owner-manager 
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perspective. In addition to a preference for a pecking order approach, they identify 
empirical support for a strategic management approach to capital structure choice 
(Barton & Gordon, 1987, 1988) as future financial decision making (financing 
intention) is subject to distinctive personal characteristics (attitudes, perceived norms 
and control) of the decision maker. 
A current working paper by Adam, Burg, Scheinert & Streitz (2014) showed that 
managerial optimism affects not only the choice between debt and equity, but also 
certain debt design features such as performance-pricing provisions, which specifies 
that the interest rate rises if the borrower’s performance deteriorates. This survey 
focused on companies with stronger credit profiles and wanted to assess whether 
optimistic managers are more likely to issue performance sensitive debt (“PSD”) than 
rational managers. Adam et al. (2014) based their proposition on the assumption that 
optimistic managers persistently overestimate their firms’ future expected cash flows. 
They found evidence, that optimistic managers are indeed more likely to issue PSD 
than rational managers. In addition, optimistic managers “choose contracts with larger 
risk-compensation to lenders, i.e., pricing grids with steeper slopes and more potential 
for interest rate increases in response to performance deterioration” (Adam et al., 2014, 
p. 20). They suggest that “managerial optimism can have a significant impact on a 
firm’s debt contract design, as it does not only affect the choice of the general leverage 
ratio but also has a direct impact on the chosen debt instrument and its riskiness” 
(p.20). 
Newest research by Meier & Esmatyar (2015) examined that managerial optimism 
leads to higher equity risk premiums and to a higher debt level, compared to rational 
managers. These results confirmed the studies by Fairchild (2005) and Hackbarth 
(2008). However, by combining these results with the assumption that owner-
managers tend to be more confident than external managers (Busenitz & Barney, 
1997), this would question the results by Ampenberger (2013) who associated owner-
managers to have less interest in external debt financing. 
3.3 Standard Mezzanine in Germany 
Mezzanine is an umbrella term for several instruments that involve characteristics of 
both, debt and equity. Nevertheless, the international research so far only addresses 
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two forms of mezzanine, convertible bonds as a more debt-like structure, and preferred 
stocks as an equity-like instrument. These two instruments are real hybrid instruments, 
as they can change their characteristics, e.g. by executing the convertible option and 
receive common shares (Knaier, 2004; Rudolph, 2004). One reason for the focus on 
these two hybrid instruments is that they can be issued on regulated capital markets 
and provide a more solid data basis for research (Schneider, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the broad majority of mezzanine products are not listed and cannot be 
found on regulated capital markets, especially in the SME and midcap area. One of the 
typical non-listed mezzanine instruments is the shareholder loan, as discussed in 
section 1.3.1. However, given its long-term (in some cases unlimited) availability to 
the company and its contractual subordination in relation to some or all other debt of 
the firm, it can be considered more to be an equity instrument in terms of insolvency 
risk.  
Before the year 2004, mezzanine was a highly individual instrument, which has been 
tailored to the individual need of the firm (De Ruijter Korver & Ongena, 2008; Knaier, 
2004). However, this individual mezzanine was not accessible to a broad investor base 
as it has not shown the necessary homogeneity to attract liquidity from debt capital 
markets (Brüse, 2011; Raupach, 2004). The development of a standardised and 
replicable mezzanine instrument (as well as its rating process) and its securitisation 
have been the key success factors for this financing product. As this research is 
explicitly focussing on the standard mezzanine, the following review adopts this 
specification. 
Research on standard mezzanine in Germany can be divided into two major areas: 
Market-driven research and academic research. Bearing in mind that the standard 
mezzanine phenomenon started in 2004 and is therefore relatively new in academic 
terms, academic research is limited so far. In addition, standard mezzanine is a national 
phenomenon; therefore international research has not shown much activity. Table 3.2 
illustrates the main research sources and their results on standard mezzanine 
refinancing. 
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Table 3.2: Research Results on the upcoming Standard Mezzanine Refinancing 
 Market-driven research Academic research 
 Lehmann-
Tolkmitt et 
al. (2010) 
Hommel et 
al. (2011) 
PwC  
(2011) 
Brüse  
(2011) 
Nohtse  
(2012) 
Companies 
approached 
380 534 492 508 540 
Companies 
responded 
27 208 110 132 208 
Response rate 8% 39% 22% 26% 39% 
Percentage of 
companies 
that expect to 
face 
difficulties in 
the 
refinancing 
n.a. 5% - 15% 23% - 50% Not explicitly 
analysed 
Up to 35% 
Ranking of 
refinancing 
instruments 
expected to 
replace 
standard 
mezzanine 
1.  Bank debt 
2.  Individual 
mezzanine 
3.  Retained 
earnings 
4.  Equity 
5.  Sale and 
lease back 
 
1.  Retained 
earnings 
2.  Bank debt 
3.  Equity 
 
1.  Retained 
earnings 
2.  Mezzanine 
3.  Bank debt 
4.  External 
equity 
5.  Others 
1.  Retained 
earnings 
2.  Bank debt 
3.  Standard 
mezzanine 
4.  Individual 
mezzanine 
5.  External 
equity 
6. Existing 
shareholders 
1.  Retained 
earnings 
2.  Bank debt  
3.  Others 
Sources: Adapted from Brüse (2011); Hommel et al. (2011); Lehmann-Tolkmitt et al. (2010); Nohtse 
(2012); PwC (2011). 
Market-driven research, provided by banks, advisors and governmental authorities has 
been active during the last few years to analyse the refinancing ability of the existing 
users of standard mezzanine. This has been primarily driven by the fact that there is 
no direct refinancing option, as standard mezzanine is not available anymore by the 
capital market. However, this research string provides important information and 
results that have to be included in the literature review. Table 3.3 summaries the major 
research on standard mezzanine in Germany.  
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Table 3.3: Research on Standard Mezzanine in Germany 
Author / Research focus Key findings 
Market-driven-research 
Lehmann-Tolkmitt, Knöll & Elmers (2010) 
Survey with 27 standard mezzanine issuers between 
April and July 2010 
 
Issuers realised goal of increased financing volume and 
economic equity, but did not improve debt financing 
terms, company rating and new sources of financing.  
Refinancing problem has been underestimated, ca. 75% 
of the issuers will not be able to repay the mezzanine at 
maturity.  
91% are expecting to refinance with new financing 
partners as bank loan availabilities seem to be limited. 
Hommel et al. (2011) 
Analysis of 208 companies using standard 
mezzanine between September and November 2010 
Only 5% to 15% of the issuers are expecting refinancing 
problems. Approx. 40% have already secured 
refinancing.  
Most important factor in choosing the appropriate 
instrument is the preservation of control and shareholder 
rights. Companies can be clustered in two groups 
(Refinancing via debt and via more mezzanine or equity-
like alternatives). 
PwC (2011) 
110 received feedbacks on a questionnaire sent out 
to 492 standard mezzanine issuers between October 
and November 2010 
Issuers have not yet realised the upcoming refinancing 
problem and are expecting internal funds to become the 
major source of refinancing, followed by new mezzanine.  
Risk assessment procedures by banks intensified 
significantly. 
Academic research 
Brüse (2011) 
Survey with 132 corporate feedbacks performed 
between August and September 2009 
 
Internal funds as majority refinancing instrument 
followed by bank debt and new standard mezzanine 
tranches, even though probability of new standard 
mezzanine facilities was unlikely at that time.  
Equity-like characteristics of new financing instrument 
identified as one of the important criterions for choosing 
a refinancing instrument. 
Nohtse (2012) 
Analysis of key financial data from 168 standard 
mezzanine issuers’ annual reports as well as from 
the survey performed by Hommel et al. (2011) on 
the upcoming refinancing 
Pecking order based variables proof more significance on 
the decision for using standard mezzanine than tradeoff 
variables.  
Presented similar results in his thesis as already published 
by Hommel et al. (2011). 
Source: Own illustration, adapted from Nohtse (2012). 
3.3.1 Market-driven Research on Standard Mezzanine in Germany 
The first market-driven research on the upcoming refinancing in Germany was 
performed by Lehmann-Tolkmitt et al. in 2010. This research, mandated and funded 
by a German private bank, was performed through a questionnaire which was sent out 
to 380 standard mezzanine users. Together with other research, who analysed even 
smaller samples of the mezzanine issuers, these first research lack significance given 
their achieved response rates. Nevertheless, all of these first research provided similar 
results as the majority of the approached companies aimed for a refinancing by using 
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a combination of internal cash flows, senior bank debt and new mezzanine tranches 
(Hommel et al., 2011; Lehmann-Tolkmitt et al., 2010). 
Relevant market-driven research have been performed by Hommel et al. (2011) and 
by PwC (2011). Both research tried to cover the complete sample of standard 
mezzanine issuers. Hommel et al. (2011) analysed the degree and volume of the 
refinancing problem and presented a first grouping of the mezzanine issuers whether 
(a) they will use primarily internal cash flows; (b) use external debt in addition to 
internal funds or (c) have to access external equity. A new mezzanine issuance has 
been denied by all participants. This reflects the gradual collapse of the standard 
mezzanine market, even though most issuers provided a positive feedback on the effect 
of standard mezzanine for their company. However, Hommel et al. (2011) do not 
deconstruct the reasons for such collapse. 
PwC (2011) started their research with an in-depth analysis of the structural and 
contractual elements of standard mezzanine and presented key issues that led to the 
collapse of the standard mezzanine market and indicators why the market has not 
recovered. In terms of the refinancing probability, PwC (2011) performed a survey 
through a questionnaire and clusters the companies in three groups as well. In contrast 
to Hommel et al. (2011), PwC infers from the responses, that more than 50% of the 
participants are expecting problems in their refinancing, primarily due to a 
combination of a lack of sufficient internal funds, a more restrictive credit policy from 
their banks and the missing of a new standard mezzanine instrument at comparable 
terms. 
Except for the research by PwC (2011), none of the market-driven research analysed 
the determinants that will drive the financing decision. PwC (2011) solely explored 
that a leverage exceeding a certain level will restrict new financing via debt, again 
supporting the tradeoff concept. 
3.3.2 Academic Research on Standard Mezzanine in Germany 
Brüse (2011) is the first who provides an academic research on the usage of standard 
mezzanine by companies in Germany. He analysed 508 firms who have issued a total 
amount of € 3.9 billion of standard mezzanine between 2004 and 2007 (p. 6). In his 
research, he assessed the development of these companies after the issuance of 
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standard mezzanine tranches by using key financial performance indicators that are 
implemented in Moody’s KMV RiskCalc. Moody’s KMV RiskCalc is a rating tool 
that focuses on the assessment of the risk profile of midcap companies and was 
implemented by several standard mezzanine funds in their rating assessment (PwC, 
2011). Nevertheless, Brüse did not test the significance of these key financial 
performance indicators by using relevant capital market theories. However, he 
provided an analysis whether the usage of standard mezzanine led to differing 
developments of these companies compared to a test group that used classical debt and 
equity financing.  
In a second step, Brüse also differentiated between SMEs and large cap companies and 
shows significant differences between the key financial indicators in these two groups 
(p. 205). In performing this differentiation, he followed Beck’s investigation, that 
larger firms could expand their external financing more easily than SMEs (Beck et al., 
2008; Torpey & Viscione, 1987). 
Companies that have used standard mezzanine more than once were also tested to see 
if an indication for an adverse selection can be identified. He described that especially 
companies that went into insolvency can be characterised as having used a 
disproportionate high volume of mezzanine compared to their company size and risk 
profile. In addition, a significant level of these insolvent standard mezzanine users had 
been frequent issuers. Therefore, an adverse selection effect cannot be eliminated in 
his conclusion (Brüse, 2011, p. 207). 
Further to his quantitative analysis, Brüse introduced a qualitative element through a 
questionnaire using semi-structured questions to inform about his quantitative results 
as well as to receive more background on the financing alternatives that were available 
to these companies. Another reason for this qualitative element was to obtain a 
feedback on the expected ability of the company to receive a refinancing for the 
maturing mezzanine tranche (p. 8).  
Brüse concluded that the usage of standard mezzanine was beneficiary to these 
companies and has led to a positive effect on the corporate capital structure. This result 
is based on the characteristics of the long-term maturity profile as well as the equity-
near structure of standard mezzanine and was substantiated by the quantitative as well 
as the qualitative analysis (Brüse, 2011, p. 301). Combined with the fixed interest 
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payments, this has led to a short-term negative effect on the company’s income 
statement. Nevertheless, in the course of the observation period, positive effects of 
sales growth, cost reduction and cash flows have prevailed (Brüse, 2011, p. 302). 
Brüse’s qualitative research further provided the result that especially SMEs have 
already started to prepare for the upcoming refinancing and that senior bank debt will 
have an important role. However, the primary source of refinancing will be internal 
cash flows of the company (Brüse, 2011, p. 305). This supported the argumentation 
that those SME will follow a pecking order approach. Nevertheless, he expected an 
increased risk for refinancing and for the company itself in the years 2011 to 2014. 
This increased refinancing risk was based on the rising uncertainty in the financial 
markets and on the missing improvements in the standard mezzanine programmes 
(Brüse, 2011, p. 306). It has to be highlighted that at the time of Brüse’s research, it 
was not yet clear whether a return of standard mezzanine programmes would be 
possible (Herweg & Sonn, 2009; Immenkötter & Hess, 2012; KfW Bankengruppe, 
2011b).  
The second research that covered standard mezzanine in Germany was published by 
Nohtse (2012), who was involved in some of the market-driven research publications 
on mezzanine (please refer to section 3.3.1). Nohtse included 540 German standard 
mezzanine issuers in his analysis with a total volume of standard mezzanine of approx. 
€ 4.1 billion and an issuance between 2004 and 2007 (p. 53). This number is 
significantly lower compared to Brüse’s approach but can be explained as Nohtse had 
to exclude all issuers that have not provided a formal prospectus as he needed the 
comprised information to assess the decision to use standard mezzanine. 
In contrast to Brüse (2011), Nohtse did not perform his analysis by using pre-defined 
key financial performance indicators of a rating tool, but accepted variables that are 
common in empirical studies to test capital structure theories (Fama & French, 2005; 
Jaeger, 2012). His research focussed on two key areas which were  
(a) the search for relevant determinants that explain the issuance of standard 
mezzanine, and  
(b) what type of refinancing are standard mezzanine users aiming to achieve.  
Nohtse defined five hypotheses, based on pecking order theory and on tradeoff theory 
to be tested. 
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Another difference to Brüse is that Nohtse’s research was not aiming to analyse the 
impact of standard mezzanine on the economic development of the company after such 
issuance. His goal was to determine the specific decision by a company to use standard 
mezzanine as an element of its capital structure. Therefore, his approach reflected a 
“cross sectional and not a longitudinal research” (Nohtse, 2012, p. 7). 
Nohtse (2012) observed in his conclusion that pecking order hypotheses and tradeoff 
hypotheses both provided partial explanations of his empirical findings. However, he 
stated that the hypotheses that have been based on pecking order theory have provided 
a better explanation of his results. The probability of using standard mezzanine 
increased with a higher leverage of the company, a higher after-tax profit, a less liquid 
internal funds base and less mature business activities (Nohtse, 2012, p. 252). A higher 
leverage could also be explained by tradeoff theory as an indicator for the insolvency 
risk, but the results did not show any tax implications being included in the decision 
whether to issue standard mezzanine. In a first summary, Nohtse admits that “overall, 
companies that used standard mezzanine seem to satisfy a short-term cash need with 
the issuance, as described by DeAngelo et al. (2010) for an increase in share capital” 
(Nohtse, 2012, p. 252). 
With respect to his analysis on the upcoming refinancing, Nohtse was able to 
differentiate three groups of mezzanine issuers. 41% of the involved companies had 
their refinancing already in place in form of internal cash flows or external bank debt 
at the time the research was performed. The second cluster comprised companies that 
were likely to achieve the refinancing via senior debt in form of bank loans. This 
cluster included approx. 25% of the involved companies. The third cluster of approx. 
34% contained those mezzanine issuers which had to find a subordinated or more 
equity-linked refinancing and were expected to face refinancing problems. Linking 
these results with the capital structure theories he tested, Nohtse again found an 
explanation by using a combination of pecking order and tradeoff theory. He was able 
to identify that standard mezzanine issuers will follow a certain financing hierarchy, 
which is explained by pecking order. However, information asymmetries were not a 
basic aspect in choosing a specific financing instrument, but the risk profile of the 
respective company (Nohtse, 2012, p. 224).  
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Based on his research, Nohtse identified two areas for further research need. First of 
all, he proposed additional research on financing decisions, especially in economies 
with a banking-dominated financing environment, to provide a more detailed 
understanding of the capital structure for non-listed companies. His second section for 
further research was linked to his findings on the upcoming refinancing of the standard 
mezzanine and the expectations of the management he described. He recommended 
that the factual refinancing should be contrasted with his findings and the expected 
outcome to provide a better understanding of the financing behaviour of the mezzanine 
issuer (Nohtse, 2012, p. 256). 
These conclusions by Brüse and Nohtse were of particular interest as most of the 
research on capital structure and standard mezzanine in Germany so far is based on the 
predominant economic paradigms in the field of finance. 
Even though many of these research acknowledge the necessity of including non-
economic aspects to provide a better understanding of the financing behaviour of the 
mezzanine issuer (Nohtse, 2012), or by including behavioural elements in their 
research (Brüse, 2011), this area needs further investigation. 
The literature review on financing decisions in midcap firms in Germany revealed that 
the influence of an owner-manager on the level of indebtedness is not yet revealed 
undoubtedly. Given the contradictory results in terms of management behaviour and 
underlying capital market theories, it would be interesting to investigate, whether a 
more differentiated view on manager types could add to this discussion. Based on the 
findings from the literature review on financing decisions in German midcap 
companies, relevant determinants can be refined further. 
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Table 3.4: Determinants influencing the German Midcap Management’s Preference for a new 
Debt Instrument 
Determinant Tradeoff Agency theory/ 
Signalling 
Pecking order Overconfidence/ 
Representativeness 
Higher 
profitability 
Higher/positive Higher/positive Lower/negative - 
Higher existing 
leverage/gearing 
(lower equity 
ratio) 
Neutral 
(depending on 
insolvency cost 
and tax burden) 
Neutral 
(depending on a 
tradeoff between 
agency cost of 
debt versus 
equity) 
Neutral 
(depending on 
internal funding 
capacity) 
- 
More matured 
company 
Higher/positive Neutral Higher/positive - 
Larger company 
size 
[Higher/positive] 
 
Neutral Higher/positive - 
Owner-manager Neutral Lower/negative Lower/negative Higher  
Source: Own illustration. 
3.4 Research Questions and Research Propositions 
The literature review presented the several economic and behavioural research areas 
that are surveying capital structure decisions and form the basis for the present 
research. According to the research objective of this thesis the following research 
questions and resulting research propositions derive. 
3.4.1 Financing Strategy and Determinants for the Decision 
The discussion of the several capital structure theories and the influence of the 
management behaviour on a financing decision highlight the importance of a financing 
strategy to follow. A core element of such financing strategy would be whether it is 
including an optimal debt level or based upon a financing hierarchy to follow.  
3.4.1.1 Existence of a formulated Financing Strategy 
Barton & Gordon’s second proposition for the strategic capital structure theory links 
corporate strategy with a financing strategy as they suggest that “top management’s 
goals for the firm will affect the firm’s capital structure” (1987, p. 71).  
Börner & Grichnik (2003) and Börner et al. (2010) identified that the German midcap 
companies lack this strategic aspect within their financing decisions and this limits the 
 Financing Decisions in German Firms and Refinancing of Standard Mezzanine 
 
 
Mark Hill  Page 71 
Mind the Gap 
development and use of financing alternatives for them. They showed that the 
development of a future-proof financing behaviour of midcap companies does not 
mean the innovation of completely new instruments, but primarily the combination of 
existing financing alternatives (Börner & Grichnik, 2003, p. 689).  
RQ1: How has the management of a midcap corporate chosen a refinancing 
instrument? 
Busenitz & Barney’s assessment identified that management teams in midcap 
companies are lacking the so called “routines” (1997, p.14) and might show a tendency 
for overconfidence as they do not have to perform financing decisions on such a 
frequent and recurring basis as managers in large cap organisations. In addition, 
Speckbacher & Posch (2010) identified that owner-managers tend to see formal 
control systems less important compared to external managers as they are more 
involved in the business decision. 
Adam et al. further support this overconfident behaviour in their research as they 
identify that “managerial optimism can have a significant impact on a firm’s debt 
contract design, as it does not only affect the choice of the general leverage ratio but 
also has a direct impact on the chosen debt instrument and its riskiness” (2014, p.20). 
This bias could be mitigated by using a transparent and formulated financing strategy 
to base financing decisions upon: 
RP1: A formulated financing strategy exists and has been applied to in the 
refinancing process. 
3.4.1.2 Financing Hierarchy 
The financing hierarchy that might be followed by the management team should form 
a core part of such a financing strategy. However, a formulated financing strategy 
could also focus on different aspects, e.g. preferable financing instruments and 
partners, maturity profiles, the inclusion of performance-sensitive debt elements and 
further aspects, such as granting collateral or other financing documentation needs. 
Barton & Gordon (1987) postulated in their third proposition, that the management of 
a company follows a financing hierarchy. Nevertheless, they did not differentiate 
between an external financing via debt, equity or hybrid instruments (p. 72) as they 
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describe both external elements to be more limiting for the management of the firm 
than retaining internal funds. 
Nohtse postulated that his findings could be explained by a combination of tradeoff 
theory and pecking order theory (2012, p. 254) and ascertained that the standard 
mezzanine users followed a pecking order hierarchy in their planned refinancing. 
Therefore, the second research question (RQ2) will have to identify, if Nohtse’s (2012) 
identified planned pecking order approach in the upcoming refinancing has been 
followed in the factual situation: 
RQ2: Has management chosen a refinancing instrument following a certain 
financing hierarchy? 
Börner & Grichnik (2010) identified a clear pecking order approach in their research 
on financing decisions in midcap companies. Koropp et al. (2014) further add in their 
most current research that “if the financial decision maker uses external financing […], 
external equity capital will be acquired after external debt sources are exploited. 
External equity financing is seen as a last resort after sources of debt have been 
exhausted” (p. 320). 
However, the literature review revealed that different capital structure theories have 
varying definitions regarding an ‘optimal’ capital structure (like tradeoff theory or 
strategic capital structure theory), or neglect the existence of an optimal capital 
structure (like pecking order theory and market timing theory). Therefore the 
“optimal” financing structure of a midcap company can be an individual condition 
where the qualitative and quantitative goals of the company investigated are achieved 
in best possible combination. 
RP2: A targeted optimal financing structure exists and refinancing of the 
standard mezzanine has been based on a pecking order approach (internal funds 
first, then external debt, then new equity). 
3.4.1.3 Corporate Strategy and Determination of Financing Instrument 
As already shown in the development of the first research question, Barton & Gordon’s 
second proposition for the strategic capital structure theory links corporate strategy 
with financing (1987, p. 71). Therefore, an interesting aspect to consider is whether 
the corporate strategy or other factors that led to the choice of a specific refinancing 
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instrument explored in the second research proposition are based upon a transparent 
and formulated financing strategy?  
Brüse surveyed in the qualitative section of his PhD thesis, that only 25% of the 
analysed standard mezzanine users already started external discussions on the 
upcoming refinancing or already secured the refinancing (2011, p. 264). Nevertheless, 
almost 83% of the companies expected to have access to more than one refinancing 
option (Brüse, 2011, p. 266). By valuing these results it must be recognised that at the 
time of Brüse’s survey in the year 2009, the standard mezzanine users as well as the 
author included a possible refinancing via new standard mezzanine facilities in their 
consideration. 
In the research by Nohtse (2012), this refinancing option was already negated, given 
the problems occurred with the first shortfalls in raising new standard mezzanine 
facilities (KfW Bankengruppe, 2011b; PwC, 2011). Nohtse recommended to broaden 
the analysis of the factual refinancing by considering the individual company’s 
performance in the years prior and after the refinancing, especially those companies 
that were not successful in a timely refinancing (Nohtse, 2012, p. 256). 
Börner & Grichnik (2003) and Börner et al. (2010) requested in their research that 
midcap companies should enhance transparency to generate access to a broader 
spectrum of refinancing instruments, e.g. by presenting an external rating. They 
examined that management and especially family shareholders are often reluctant to 
present detailed financial information on their company and therefore limit themselves 
to existing bank relationships and shareholders. These are factors that might 
predetermine potential refinancing instruments: 
RQ3: Which other aspects have been the dominant factors in determining the 
chosen financing instrument? 
In addition to the lack of presenting detailed financial information to external 
stakeholders, management behaviour gains momentum. The representativeness bias 
might limit a comprehensive process assessment of potential refinancing instruments 
and terms currently available in the respective financial market (Avgouleas, 2009; 
Busenitz & Barney, 1997). The management of a midcap company does not need to 
perform financing processes on a permanent basis. Usually, major financing 
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instruments have to be refinanced every three to five years, the standard mezzanine 
after seven years. Therefore, there is no need for a management team to permanently 
keep up to date with all relevant financing markets and currently available terms and 
conditions.  
Moreover, overconfidence might further restrict an unbiased process and influences 
company indebtedness, as assessed by Fairchild (2005), Ampenberger (2013) and 
Meier & Esmatyar (2015). It will be interesting to investigate, whether owner-
managers which are described to be more optimistic than external managers (Busenitz 
& Barney, 1997) will perform decisions that lead to a lower indebtedness compared to 
external managers (Ampenberger et al., 2013). Other research assume that optimistic 
managers aim for a higher debt level (Fairchild, 2005; Meier & Esmatyar, 2015). 
Bertrand & Schoar (2003) found that the education and former job experience will 
influence a manager’s decision. Malmendier et al. (2011) add that managers with a 
restructuring experience that involves intensive negotiations with debtholders try to 
avoid external debt. 
In this context, it will be interesting to investigate whether there are significant 
differences between financing processes in firms headed by owner-managers or by 
external management teams. This research tries to explore whether the sole distinction 
between owner-manager and external managers allows to answer these questions or if 
a more detailed management typology would be more suitable, as discussed in section 
2.5. 
Based on the presented differences between owner-managers and external managers 
in their strategic planning and decision-making, several management types might be 
explored. The aim for adopting the Miles & Snow (1978) typology towards financing 
decisions as already performed by Ginn et al. (1995) might allow for further 
investigation of manager types. These results could help in understanding the 
difficulties in explaining financing decisions in German family firms (Ampenberger et 
al., 2013; Koropp et al., 2014). 
This management behaviour can be also linked with Barton & Gordon’s (1987) first 
two propositions of strategic capital structure theory, as they state that a management’s 
perception towards refinancing risk and their strategy will influence the capital 
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structure of the company (p. 71). Ginn et al. (1995) revealed that they were unable to 
detect the causal direction between corporate strategy and financing structure. As a 
consequence, a further research propositions (RP3a) arises: 
RP3a: The corporate strategy and the characteristics of the management team 
influence the determination of the refinancing instrument. 
Barton & Gordon add that “the particular financial condition of the firm, specifically 
as it relates to risk, managerial control, and flexibility, has an effect on management's 
selection of a capital structure” (1987, p. 72). It must be highlighted, that this fifth 
proposition does not state that the financial condition of the firm – as a result of the 
company’s strategy – determines the capital structure, but influences the chosen 
financing mix (Jordan et al., 1998). This can be interpreted by the analysis of key 
financing performance indicators (Adam et al., 2014; Barton & Gordon, 1988) and by 
exploring how the cost of the financing alternatives influenced the decision. 
Ginn et al. (1995) found that the Miles & Snow (1978) business strategy typology 
might be used in identifying financing strategies. They presented several determinants 
that were used to explain liquidity position and gearing of the investigated companies. 
The literature review in chapter 2 and 3 presented several determinants that could be 
used to explain why a certain financing instrument was preferred, such as company 
leverage or gearing, equity ratio, company size, age of the company and profitability. 
This leads to a second research proposition (RP3b) in relation to determining a 
refinancing instrument: 
RP3b: Relevant determinants and indicators influence the selection of the 
refinancing instrument. 
3.4.2 Refinancing Process 
The financing environment and the financial markets were not in favourable conditions 
at the time of the refinancing process, as described in chapter 1. Management had to 
mitigate that there was no direct refinancing option via a new standard mezzanine 
facility, debt capital markets were limited for midcap companies and banks remained 
restrictive in providing additional debt. 
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Given this uncertainty to be anticipated in the refinancing process, management could 
have taken proactive steps to increase the probability of a successful refinancing. This 
would include measures to enhance transparency like an external rating, as proposed 
by Börner et al. (2010), or mandating external advisors to mitigate the described 
behavioural finance bias and heuristics overconfidence and representativeness. 
However, these measures would have to be taken especially in a situation, where 
management anticipates an increased risk based on the deteriorating financing markets 
at the time of the factual refinancing or based on insufficient internal funds to repay 
the standard mezzanine. Therefore, this corresponds again with one of the propositions 
of strategic capital structure theory that “the risk propensity of top management and 
specific financial context of the firm affect the amount of debt lenders are willing to 
lend and what terms they are willing to use” (Barton & Gordon, 1987, p. 72). Research 
question four compiles this: 
RQ4: Has there been an increased refinancing risk by the company in the 
availability of suitable financing instruments during the process? 
In case of such an increased uncertainty, the management team should assess potential 
financing alternatives and generate data to develop a market overview on currently 
available terms and conditions to avoid the representativeness bias. Uncertainty could 
be seen in two different ways. First of all, it represents the general risk of a 
management team to fail to successfully refinance via a new instrument that 
corresponds with the financing strategy and fits within the capital structure.  
RP4a: The management has implemented procedures and measures to facilitate 
a successful completion of the refinancing. 
Second, an increased risk could also occur on a timeline basis in case the refinancing 
process was not started early enough to allow for a decent and well-informed decision 
(Graham & Harvey, 2002; Immenkötter & Hess, 2012). 
RP4b: The management team executed a timely refinancing process to avoid an 
increased refinancing risk. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
The literature review revealed the weakness of the existing research concerning an 
explanatory framework for midcap companies’ financing decisions. The literature on 
financing decisions and capital structure still tries to identify patterns by assessing on 
a primarily economic basis or by introducing behavioural finance aspects and failed so 
far to present a result on whether the firms follow a decent financing strategy. 
Therefore, this research explores, whether a financing strategy exists in German 
midcap companies. If a financing strategy would exist, the next investigation will be 
whether this financing strategy is embedded in the overall business strategy and which 
strategy is informing the other.  
Furthermore, the review showed that several characteristics of midcap companies are 
not in line with assumptions of some of the capital structure theories and therefore 
might not be able to explain the financing decisions in family firms. Midcap firms are 
not publicly listed and have no access to capital markets. They are not solely focussing 
on maximising shareholder value, but also on qualitative aspects such as corporate 
social responsibility. Family shareholders are seen to be risk averse given their largely 
undiversified portfolio and information asymmetries between owners and managers 
are less relevant as companies are either operated by owner-managers or by external 
managers with a direct link between management and family shareholders. 
In addition, the study tries to reveal if German midcap companies followed this 
financing strategy in a specific refinancing situation and to reveal the determinants that 
were key in deciding for the chosen instrument. 
Besides the contribution to the discussion about financing decision and strategy, the 
present research enriches the discussion on differences between manager types by 
introducing a more detailed typology on financing as presented by Ginn et al. (1995).  
This research also expands the existing literature on financing decisions and capital 
structure in German midcap firms by exploring a particular refinancing decision in-
depth and will serve as a basis to prepare adjusted propositions for future research. In 
addition, the in-depth investigation helps in developing a template for building a 
holistic financing strategy and to execute a structured financing process. 
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4. Research Methodology and Methods 
This chapter explains and reflects upon the research strategy and design of this study 
to investigate the developed research questions. The motives and justification for the 
research design are considered in a holistic manner which involves the underlying 
philosophy as well as the description of the methods. Therefore, the chapter starts in 
section 4.1 with the description of the underlying research paradigm and will be 
followed in section 4.2 by a presentation of the research method applied to in this 
study. Section 4.3 introduces the design of the research, including the discussion on 
resulting issues and considerations regarding data quality. The subsequent section 4.4 
illustrates the preparation of the data collection and analysis process and the 
instruments to refine and enhance this process. Section 4.5 presents the data collection 
elements as well as the performed data collection process. The discussion of the data 
analysis tools and process in section 4.6 completes the chapter. 
4.1 Research Paradigm 
This research project is not intending quantitative testing for the developed research 
questions but to investigate the process leading to midcap company management 
decision in a specific refinancing situation and to provide an understanding, whether a 
financing strategy exists and was deployed during this process. Therefore, the research 
focus on qualitative aspects and addresses “practical problems in the real world” 
(Feilzer, 2010, p. 8). Divergent approaches are used to cope with these problems and 
to offer solutions for the different aspects that evolved in formulating the research 
questions (Bryman, British & Mar, 1984; Hesse-Biber, 2010). 
To achieve this research focus, the research paradigm suits best that mitigates the 
constraints imposed by the forced choice dichotomy between an interpretivism and an 
objectivism paradigm (Benton & Craib, 2011; Grix, 2004) and which is open to a 
problem-oriented approach (Scott & Briggs, 2009). Therefore, an epistemology was 
chosen that allows the researcher to look at phenomena from different perspectives 
and to provide an enriched understanding (Morgan, 2007).  
Pragmatism as a research paradigm offers to use a method that allows to adequately 
answer the research questions and to be flexible in investigative techniques as they 
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attempt to address a range of research questions that appear (Feilzer, 2010; 
Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005). Knowledge of objectives or institutions within the 
pragmatism research paradigm arise in the practical relationship that the researcher has 
to these objects (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
As shown in the following sections, this research uses a case study method to conduct 
the research and combines the derived data from the mixed sub-methods deployed for 
the analysis. Other epistemologies that form the basis for mixed-method research tend 
to put the data that derived through different methods alongside each other and discuss 
findings separately. Feilzer (2010) stated that “most empirical mixed methods research 
has not been able to transcend the forced dichotomy of quantitative and qualitative 
data and methods” (p.9) and are still presented as “totally and largely independent of 
each other “ (Bryman, 2007, p. 8). 
4.2 Methodology and Method 
As introduced in the previous section, this research project has a qualitative focus as it 
tries to explore the behaviour of the management within a specific refinancing situation 
and to investigate whether the management followed a formulated financing strategy 
during this process. However, it will also involve exogenous variables to substantiate 
the cognition from the qualitative elements further, as most of the research within the 
field of entrepreneurship and finance have a quantitative-based decision element, such 
as financial ratios to cope with (Crook, Shook, Morris & Madden, 2010). 
Whereas most of the research in the finance area is based upon a deductive approach 
(Leitch, Hill & Harrison, 2009), this project aims to provide a deeper understanding of 
the determinants of the decision process by analysing a specific refinancing issue and 
by focussing on individual cases. This research pursues an inductive approach to allow 
further research to generalise the observations by operationalising the findings and to 
test those towards a broader population (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe & Jackson, 2008). The design includes Nohtse’s (2012) recommendation that 
the factual refinancing should be contrasted with his findings and the expected 
outcome to provide a better understanding of the financing behaviour of the mezzanine 
issuer (p. 256). The overall structure of this chapter follows Yin’s (2008) layout for 
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designing and performing case study research and is outlined in Figure 4.1 below, 
including the relevant sections within the thesis: 
Figure 4.1: The Case Study Approach 
 
Source: Adopted from Yin (2008). 
Case studies are especially useful for asking “why” or “how” choices are made 
(Bettner, Robinson & McGoun, 1994; Schmittat, 2007). As outlined before, case study 
in terms of this research is seen to be a research method, following Yin’s (2008) and 
Flyvbjerg's (2006) definition and not as a methodology, as seen by P. Baxter & Jack, 
(2008) and Hyett, Kenny & Sickson-Swift (2014). Therefore, semi-structured 
interviews, calculation of key financial ratios and document review are the elements 
of the investigation (Schmittat, 2007) or sub-methods (Gillham, 2000a, p. 13) and 
might not be misunderstood to serve as the research method. 
Case study research as a relevant method in the field of finance has gained importance 
in the last years (Ardalan, 2000; Schmittat, 2007), as it enables to collect “very 
extensive and intensive data (documents, interviews, personal observation, etc.)” 
(Bettner et al., 1994, p. 14). Within a case study research, the researcher is analysing 
a situation which involves many variables, but probably a limited number of available 
data (Yin, 2008). Therefore, the researcher is focusing on the comprehension of a 
single case and tries afterwards to abstract these findings towards a broader population. 
However, Bettner et al. (1994) acknowledge that “case study research [...] always 
[includes] too few samples for statistical testing and generalisation as in capital market 
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research. The characteristic value lies in the multifaceted examination of some 
situation [...]” (p.14). Case studies are therefore especially useful when exploring how 
complex decisions are made (Ardalan, 2001; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). 
4.3 Design of the Case Study Analysis 
4.3.1 General Design 
Yin (2008) differentiates two major characteristics that have to be clarified prior to the 
explicit case study design for a research, (a) the number of cases involved in the 
research and (b) the unit(s) of analysis. Figure 4.2 displays the general designs for a 
case study.  
Figure 4.2: Basic Types of Designs for Case Studies 
 
Source: Yin (2008). 
4.3.1.1 Multiple Cases 
This research is based on a multiple-case design as it does neither focus on a critical 
test of a single theory, nor on a rare or unique circumstance or a representative or 
typical case (Yin, 2008, p. 52). Therefore, a multiple-case design was chosen to 
enhance robustness and to allow for a deeper investigation of the companies that used 
standard mezzanine facilities. According to Yin (2008), multiple-case designs have to 
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follow a replication logic (p. 54), that is differentiated into two levels, literal and 
theoretical replication. Cases must therefore be selected carefully to allow for one of 
the two replication logics (M. B. Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013). The literal 
replication aims to explore cases that predict similar results by repeating and 
confirming identified findings and observations. The theoretical replication focuses on 
cases that predict contrasting findings. Through the explanation of these contrasting 
findings, the results will be substantiated (Schmittat, 2007). 
An important step in the replication procedures is the development of a rich theoretical 
framework that forms the basis for generalising towards new cases. Yin presents in his 
discussions of the replication logic that in a situation where cases do not present the 
predicted results (either supporting or contrasting), the underlying theoretical 
assumptions have to be modified via a feedback loop (Yin, 2008, p. 54). 
4.3.1.2 Units of Analysis 
Case studies can follow a holistic or an embedded design, depending on the number of 
analysed units (M. B. Miles et al., 2013). According to Yin (2008) a unit can be for 
example an individual as well as an event or an entity (p. 29). This research uses an 
embedded case study design to investigate the derived research questions and consists 
of three embedded units of analysis. They are a direct result of the developed research 
questions in section 3.4:  
1. The first unit of analysis focus on the exploration of the existence of a 
formulated financing strategy and on how financing decisions are influenced 
by procedures or routines that were defined in a financing strategy and what 
determinants led to the selection of a specific refinancing instrument (section 
3.4.1); 
2. The second unit of analysis investigates the refinancing process and whether 
the financing strategy or routine has been followed during the specific 
refinancing process (section 3.4.2); 
3. Furthermore, the third unit of analysis explores if different management types 
with individual decision patterns can be observed in this research (section 
3.4.1.3).  
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These embedded units of analysis must not be mixed with the “case” itself. The case 
is the refinancing of the standard mezzanine facility within a specific company. Figure 
4.3 displays the structural connection between the units of analysis, the embedded 
research propositions and the relevant sections in the next chapter. 
Figure 4.3. Units of Analysis, Research Propositions and Sections in the Discussion of Results 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
4.3.2 Selection of Cases 
As outlined before, the selection of the cases plays an integral role for the robustness 
of the study. In a first round, cases were identified that predict similar results for the 
literal replication. For this identification, midcap companies were chosen that indicate 
no obvious problems in the upcoming refinancing as outlined in section 1.3.4. These 
are companies that  
(a) were able to increase their operational performance (identified by an 
increased operational margin) since the original standard mezzanine 
financing was obtained to (partially) repay the standard mezzanine facility 
from retained earnings and/or  
(b)  showed a leverage ratio at the time of the refinancing at or below 3.5 times 
EBITDA which is seen as a basis to obtain new external debt for the 
refinancing (Adam et al., 2014; PwC, 2011).  
Case 1, Case 2, Case 5 and Case 6 comply with both criteria, whereas Case 3 was able 
to reduce its debt towards a comfortable leverage ratio but showed a deteriorating 
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operational performance. Nevertheless, given the still positive operational margin this 
case has been also introduced to the literal part of the case study analysis.  
For the theoretical replication, cases were selected that did not comply with the two 
criteria. These are Case 4 and Case 7. Figure 4.4 provides an overview on the cases 
that formed the multiple-case design. 
Figure 4.4: Operational Development of the Cases 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
The researcher advised some of the cases in the refinancing of their standard 
mezzanine instrument. Debt advisors supported four out of the seven cases analysed 
in this research. Cases were numbered to ensure anonymity and have been numbered 
in the sequence of the performance of the semi-structured interviews during the data 
collection phase. The companies analysed in Case 5, Case 6 and Case 7 have not used 
a financial or debt advisor during their refinancing. Therefore, the researcher used a 
gatekeeper for approaching these companies to facilitate access to the respective 
interview partners (Newby, Watson & Woodliff, 2003). Nevertheless, given the 
duration and the depth of these interviews it can be identified that the personal 
involvement of the researcher in the other cases must be seen as an advantage to get a 
more detailed and open feedback from the participants as well as access to extensive 
company information. 
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The cases cover every year of the refinancing window and a broad variety of standard 
mezzanine providers. Case 2 and Case 3 both cover the same standard mezzanine 
programme, whereas Case 4 explores a company that used two different mezzanine 
tranches in 2006 and 2007. Figure 4.5 provides an overview of the selected cases and 
the respective standard mezzanine funds they received their financing facilities from. 
Figure 4.5: Case Overview within the Maturity Profiles of German Standard Mezzanine Funds 
 
Source: Adapted from Brüse (2011) and PwC (2011). 
4.3.3 Case Study Data Quality 
Data quality is an integral issue in case study research. Within the case study method, 
data quality is especially related to validity and reliability (Yin, 2008). Even though 
the term validity is often replaced in qualitative research by the term trustworthiness, 
given the association with the quantitative conceptualisation of the research process 
(P. Baxter & Jack, 2008; Leitch et al., 2009; Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006), the term 
validity will still be used in this study. Generalisability which is also referred to as 
external validity has to be considered with special attention, as case study research 
does not aim to be statistically reliable. Therefore, case study research is not 
generalisable against population, but against theory (Gillham, 2000a). However, case 
study research is still to be seen as robust, given the careful design and the proper use 
of a replication logic (Yin, 2008).  
4.3.3.1 Construct Validity 
A case study research complies with this criterion when the methods used are suitable 
for the aim of the research and allows answering properly the research questions. It 
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has to be ensured that the factual investigation complies with the objectives of the 
research (Yin, 2008). Several strategies can be used to enhance construct validity of a 
research project. The researcher should submit interview content protocols as well as 
calculated ratios and interpretations of those to the interview participants for a formal 
sign-off (Schmittat, 2007). 
Triangulation of the elements of investigation or sub-methods further enhances 
construct validity (M. B. Miles et al., 2013). Whereas outcomes from different 
elements of investigation converge towards a result, the importance and validity of 
such result has to be higher valued. The chain of evidence from the case study report 
and the analysis must be maintained. 
4.3.3.2 Internal Validity 
Internal validity covers the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the cases 
investigated (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). It is therefore important, that the context 
between data collection, conclusions drawn and theories developed is ensured. This 
does also include the discussion of alternative explanations. Yin (2008) acknowledges, 
that internal validity remains a problematic area within the case study method because 
the methods to combine data and propositions are poorly developed. 
4.3.3.3 External Validity 
External validity values how the results of the research can be generalised towards a 
broader population (M. B. Miles et al., 2013). The case study method does not aim to 
achieve a statistical robust generalisability via statistical methods (Gillham, 2000a). 
Furthermore, case study uses replication logic – like in experiments – to allow for 
generalisability through analytical elements (Abernethy, Chua, Luckett & Selto, 
1999). A multiple-case design enhances external validity as results drawn from the 
first cases are used to be substantiated, expanded or contradicted during the 
investigation of the next cases. 
4.3.3.4 Reliability 
Reliability within qualitative research means that other researchers would come to the 
same results by interpreting the data or that the re-investigation of the cases would lead 
to the same results (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Yin (2008) introduces three 
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principles to ensure reliability. The first principle is the usage of multiple sources of 
evidence which in this study is included by the combination of semi-structured 
interviews, the calculation of key financial ratios and an extensive document and 
information analysis. 
The second principle refers to the documentation and organisation of the collected data 
for the study, the creation of a case study database. In this research, a case study 
database was developed that includes the content protocol, basic financial documents 
required for the calculation of the key financial ratios as well as all other received and 
collected documents and information. 
The third principle is to maintain a chain of evidence that allows an external observer 
or researcher to “follow the derivation of any evidence from initial research questions 
to ultimate case study conclusions” (Yin, 2008, p. 122). The chain of evidence should 
allow to trace in either direction, also backwards from conclusions to initial research 
questions (Gillham, 2000a). 
In addition, specific mechanisms were introduced to the research to avoid bias and 
ensure an appropriate ethical environment. Those mechanisms are illustrated in section 
4.4.3. 
The described mechanisms and elements to ensure data quality of the research are 
summarised in Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1: Building in Validity and Reliability in the Research 
Tests Case study tactic Phase of research 
Construct validity  Sign-off of interview content 
protocol by participant 
 Multiple sources of evidence: 
o Semi-structured interviews 
o Financial report analysis 
and ratios 
o Document review 
 Review of draft by participant 
 Data collection 
 
 Data collection 
 
 
 
 
 Write-up phase 
Internal validity  Pattern matching  Data analysis 
External validity  Replication logic (literal and 
theoretical) 
 Research design 
Reliability  Interview content protocol 
 Case study database/document 
folder 
 Data collection 
 Data collection 
Source: Adapted from Yin (2008). 
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To summarise the design of the case study research, Figure 4.6 displays the overall 
layout of the followed approach: 
Figure 4.6: General Case Study Layout 
 
Source: Adapted from Yin (2008). 
4.4 Preparation 
4.4.1 Piloting 
A pilot case has been conducted to test the overall procedure as well as the planned 
design. Even though the pilot study had to be performed with another company than 
originally expected and the time schedule had to be adopted, the data collection 
showed that the expected level of information as well as the availability of 
management teams to participate has been achieved. The first and second level coding 
allowed for a useful deconstruction and later aggregation of the relevant data and 
already showed that data was able to pose answers to the formulated research 
propositions. The pilot study was conducted in June and July 2013 and has been 
included in the main study as Case 1.  
Two areas of further improvement have been identified during the pilot study. The first 
area is a reduction in the number of questions of the interview guidelines as both 
interviews exceeded the envisaged timeframe of approximately 90 minutes up to 120 
minutes by far. The questions were reduced to 23 questions. The second area of 
improvement applied to the sequence of data collection methods. The document 
review and the calculation of the key financial ratios after the interview presented 
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findings that did not match responses from management and therefore required a re-
interview during the sign-off of the interview protocol. 
Given the unanticipated change of interview partners and the time restrictions of the 
pilot study, only one interview was performed during a personal meeting, whereas the 
interview with the CFO of the company of the pilot study was a telephone session.  
4.4.2 Expert Review of the Interview Guideline 
Prior to executing the pilot case, the developed interview guideline was presented to 
several financing advisors that the researcher had access to as well as to the professors 
of the supervisory team of the author. Guidelines were discussed with them for a 
critical review and refinement of the questions (Gillham, 2000b). The feedback from 
the experts led to changes in the order of the questions of the interview guideline as 
well as to the removal or improvement of some of the questions to ensure a consistent 
match with the research questions. The matrix of questions of the interview guideline 
with the underlying research question is provided in Appendix B. 
4.4.3 Potential Study Limitations and Ethical Considerations 
The potential limitations and ethical considerations for this research project have been 
carefully evaluated during the design and planning phase to avoid insufficient and poor 
data. The following areas were identified: 
4.4.3.1 Informed Consent 
As most of the envisaged interview partners will have worked with the researcher 
during his professional career, an uncoerced and voluntary participation is important 
(M. B. Miles et al., 2013). To ensure informed consent, several elements have been 
implemented. These included detailed pre-information on the aim and objective of the 
research, sign-off of the interview content protocol and the calculated key financial 
ratios as well as a re-interview mechanism in case some details might be found during 
the document review phase that were not corresponding to the interview (Gillham, 
2000b). 
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4.4.3.2 Access to Data and to Interview Partners 
As none of the firms that participated in the research is publicly listed, only limited 
data was available via general information tools and databases. In addition, family-
owned businesses tend not to provide confidential information on management 
processes and company guidelines to external persons and researchers. Implemented 
confidentiality mechanisms mitigated this aspect (please refer to the following section 
4.4.3.3). The second aspect was the bond of trust (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008), which 
developed between the company management and the researcher being its advisor 
during the refinancing. Most of the information and documents that are relevant were 
already with the researcher. However, the author did not use these documents but 
asked the management to resubmit the documents that are explicitly relevant for the 
research based on the information request list sent. The management was able to 
decide, whether they want to have an information to be included in the research or not. 
Interviews were scheduled via telephone calls but were held as personal meetings at 
the managements’ offices. For the pilot study, this mechanism could not be complied 
with completely, as presented in section 4.4.1.  
4.4.3.3 Power Differential, Confidentiality and Bias 
The researcher has worked for some of the firms that participated in the research on 
their refinancing, including the pilot study case. It is therefore important to protect the 
interests of the interview partner by ensuring accuracy at the same time. To ensure an 
unbiased process, no case was analysed where a contractual agreement to support in 
the refinancing between the researcher’s employer and the analysed firm was not 
completed at least six months prior the study. The minimum period of six months was 
chosen because this timeframe implies that at least one financial reporting cycle with 
financing partners was completed without the involvement of financial advisors. 
Another element of power differential exists between the two interview partners as 
they interacted during the refinancing process and the Head of Treasury is normally 
reporting to the CFO of the firm. Strict anonymity is therefore required to allow for 
non-politically motivated answers from the interview partner (Harvey, 2011). This is 
ensured in the research design via completely separated interview strings. Each 
interview took place at an individually scheduled meeting with the respective 
interview participant, and no answer from one participant was discussed with the other 
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involved interviewee. Coding and categorisation of the interview content protocols 
delivered a level of aggregation that did not allow for drawing conclusions on an 
individual interview. 
Confidentiality regarding the information received and each analysed refinancing 
decision was ensured by signing a confidentiality agreement and by keeping relevant 
company information and the interview content protocols as well as electronic copies 
in safeguarded lockers and workplace areas of the researcher. These comply with 
German audit firm regulations.  
The personal involvement of the researcher in some of the analysed refinancing 
situations made an unbiased data collection and analysis even more important. 
Therefore, experienced researchers and practitioners reviewed the interview guidelines 
to avoid that the questions pretended a certain trend for an answer, as described in 
section 4.4.2. In addition, the sign-off of the content protocol and the calculated ratios 
granted a further review by the interview partner to ensure unbiased and accurate data 
collection. 
4.4.3.4 Translation 
The interviews were performed in German as this is the native language of all 
interview participants and the interview content protocol as well as almost all 
documents to be analysed were in German. To avoid a distortion of the data and to 
facilitate the analysis these have been conducted in German as well, even though 
language and exact wording were not crucial for the analysis (Bryman & Bell, 2007; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). The interview content protocols as well as directly cited 
statements of the interview participants have been translated during the writing-up 
phase. 
4.5 Data Collection 
Each case study included three elements of data collection. The core element was the 
semi-structured interview with two participants that were responsible for the 
refinancing decision and process within the respective midcap company. These were 
usually the Head of Treasury or the Head of Finance and the CFO or the CEO in cases 
where no formal CFO was installed. The semi-structured interviews were 
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accompanied by a calculation of key financial ratios that formed the basis of the 
original mezzanine financing and supplied additional information on how the financial 
strength changed compared to the refinancing situation. The third sub-method or 
element of data collection was a detailed contract and information review of the 
performed refinancing. These two data collection methods offered further challenging 
or affirmative results to substantiate the statements received during the interviews 
(Molina-Azorín, 2011). 
4.5.1 Semi-structured Interviews 
The two existing PhD dissertations already presented questionnaires on the upcoming 
refinancing of the standard mezzanine in Germany (Brüse, 2011; Nohtse, 2012). In 
addition, several research projects examined the refinancing of these instruments 
(Hommel et al., 2011; PwC, 2011). These research and dissertation projects offered a 
sound basis to formulate the interview guideline. 
The interview guideline was segmented into three parts and consisted of 23 questions 
(section B). In addition, the interview participant received a set of factual questions in 
advance of the interview session to allow for a later segmentation of the analysed 
company (section A). 
Questions in the interview guideline were predominantly formulated in an open way 
to allow as much feedback as possible and to serve as “a guided conversation rather 
than structured queries” (Yin, 2008, p. 106) which is an important source for case study 
information. The semi-structured approach of the interview to use guidelines rather 
than a questionnaire allowed to react individually on interesting aspects that came up 
during the interviews and to enrich the data collection (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008, p. 
143). Table 4.2 links the segments of the interview guideline with the research 
propositions, ensuring the relevance of the questions asked during each interview.  
  
 Research Methodology and Methods 
 
 
Mark Hill  Page 93 
Mind the Gap 
Table 4.2: Sections of the Interview Guideline and related Research Propositions 
Section of the 
interview guideline 
Main topic(s) Related research proposition 
Pre Interview – Basic 
facts 
(Questions 1.1 to 1.7) 
Company descriptors:  
Sales, earnings, employees, 
industry, legal form 
 
Management descriptors:  
Size of management team, 
age, education, prior 
positions 
RP3a: The corporate strategy and the experience 
of the management team influence the 
determination of the refinancing instrument 
Part 1 – Financing 
strategy and financing 
hierarchy 
(Questions 2.1 to 2.9) 
Existence of a financing 
strategy and elements 
 
Form of the financing 
strategy 
 
Financing hierarchy 
RP1: A formulated financing strategy exists and 
has been applied to in the performed refinancing 
process 
 
RP2: A targeted optimal financing structure exists 
and refinancing of the standard mezzanine has 
been based on a pecking order approach (internal 
funds first, then external debt, then new equity). 
 
RP3a: The corporate strategy and the 
characteristics of the management team influence 
the determination of the refinancing instrument  
 
RP3b: Relevant indicators influence the 
determination of the refinancing instrument 
Part 2 – Refinancing 
process and 
procedures 
(Questions 3.1 to 3.9) 
Approach and timing 
 
 
 
Involved parties 
 
Availability of financing 
instruments and markets 
 
Selection and decision 
mechanisms 
RP4b: The management team executed a timely 
refinancing process to avoid an increased 
refinancing risk 
 
 
RP4a: The management has implemented 
procedures and measures to facilitate a successful 
completion of the refinancing 
Part 3 –Post-
refnancing capital 
structure 
(Questions 4.1 to 4.5) 
Change in capital structure 
and/or in financing strategy 
 
Relationship to financing 
parties 
RP2: A targeted optimal financing structure exists 
and refinancing of the standard mezzanine has 
been based on a pecking order approach (internal 
funds first, then external debt, then new equity) 
 
RP4a: The management has implemented 
procedures and measures to facilitate a successful 
completion of the refinancing 
Source: Own illustration.  
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4.5.2 Calculation of Key Financial Ratios 
During the original mezzanine financing process, the mezzanine provider performed 
no internal rating to assess the creditworthiness of the respective company. Most of 
the providers used a standardised and generally accepted external rating tool, Moody’s 
KMV RiskCalc (Brüse, 2011; Hommel et al., 2011; Nohtse, 2012). This purely 
quantitative rating tool focused on historical financial data of the company and 
presented an aggregated rating for each company (Moody’s Investors Service, 2001, 
2006). In most cases, this tool represented the main credit assessment element for the 
mezzanine providers (KfW Bankengruppe, 2011b; PwC, 2011). 
At the time of the refinancing, individual credit assessments have been performed 
based on the chosen financing instrument and/or the financing partner approached. 
However, key financial ratios play an important role in every rating system that a bank 
bases its financing decision upon. To further explore whether there has been an 
increased refinancing risk for the company because of deteriorating financials, the 
original external rating ratios at the time of the mezzanine financing are contrasted 
with the rating ratios that are based on the current financial data prior to the 
refinancing. This allows an overview on how these financial ratios have changed and 
what effect arose for the overall rating. Therefore, each company was asked to submit 
their last financial statement to the researcher and a new calculation of the financial 
ratios, based on the ratios of Moody’s KMV RiskCalc was conducted. The resulting 
ratios as well as the comparison with the original rating ratios provided insights on 
whether a financing strategy was followed that maintained or enhanced the companies 
risk profile. Between the original mezzanine financing risk assessment in the years 
2004 to 2007 and the refinancing assessment in the years 2011 to 2014, major changes 
to the German national accounting standards and the German HGB occurred. 
However, given the limited information provided by the financial reports, manual 
adjustments were not performed to avoid a bias by the researcher. 
Furthermore the calculated ratios were used during the interview to substantiate or 
challenge statements of the interviewee. During the pilot study, this analysis had to be 
performed after the two interview sessions due to the late submission of the company’s 
annual financial statements. A description of Moody’s KMV RiskCalc as well as the 
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calculation methodology for the financial ratios and an anonymised result sheet for the 
pilot study company can be found in Appendix C. 
4.5.3 Document Review 
The third method of data collection was a review of the executed refinancing contract 
as well as other relevant internal documents and protocols that allow for a 
reconstruction of the refinancing process and the following of a defined financing 
strategy. This review did not follow a certain guideline but aimed to identify aspects 
that are relevant for the study. This rather open approach has been chosen because the 
level of documents available varied from case to case. The review was performed in 
advance of the interview session to be able to discuss findings.  
4.5.4 Collection Process 
Each case was conducted sequentially to allow to permanently refine the design as 
outlined in section 4.3. However, the data collection within each case was not 
performed sequentially but rather in parallel to allow for an instant comparison of the 
collected data (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). The collection process of the raw data 
for the Cases 2 to 7 was performed between October 2013 and March 2014, and can 
be separated into three parts per case: 
4.5.4.1 Before the interview 
An introduction call has been held to introduce the researcher, to present the aim of 
the research and to ask for the general availability to participate in the research 
(Harvey, 2011). After the general consent to participate, this call has been followed by 
an introduction pack, which was submitted to the relevant participant one to two weeks 
in advance of the meeting. This introduction pack, which was sent by email, included 
a cover letter, a short presentation outlining the aim and objectives of the research 
project, the first set of factual questions and a prepared confidentiality agreement. 
Furthermore, the introduction pack also included an information request list, 
presenting the relevant documents and information that would be required to perform 
the calculation of the relevant key financial ratios and to gain a deeper understanding 
of the current status of the refinancing process in advance of the interview meeting 
(Gillham, 2000b). Even though the researcher might have access to some of these data 
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already during his advisory role for the company or management team, it is important 
to solely focus on information that is given under this research string and under the 
confidentiality agreement to mitigate confidentiality concerns. All documents of the 
introduction pack can be found in the Appendix A of this research (English 
convenience translations). 
4.5.4.2 During the interview session 
Interviews were performed during personal meetings. At the beginning of each 
interview, an overview of the received information and data was presented to the 
interview partner and the participant was asked again whether he is concerned about 
confidentiality or he is unclear about the aim of the research project. If so, a personal 
explanation would have followed and the interview would have only started if the 
participant felt comfortable to continue. The interviews had a duration between two 
and three hours. Keywords and main testimonies were recorded under the relevant 
guideline question. At the end of each interview session, the participant was asked if 
he accepted a re-interview in case of further questions arising during the analysis 
phase. 
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4.5.4.3 After the interview 
After the interview content protocol was finalised, it was sent to the interview 
participant for a formal sign-off of the protocol. In addition, the calculated key 
financial ratios of the company as well as the calculation method were presented and 
asked for a formal sign-off to ensure factual correctness. Figure 4.7 presents the key 
steps of the data collection process per case. 
Figure 4.7: Overview of the Data Collection Process per Case 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
4.5.5 Document Folder 
The complete correspondence between each interview participant as well as the 
interview content protocols, the information received and the printouts from the rating 
tool were collected in a separate document folder per case (Gillham, 2000a). The folder 
exists as a hardcopy and as an electronic file as well. Both are secured. Each document 
folder is headed by a cover page, which provides a general overview of the case 
complied, the result from the pre-sent factual questions as well as general data. An 
overview of the documents and information received per case as well as the individual 
case summaries can be found in the Appendices D and E. 
4.6 Data Analysis 
The general layout of the data analysis process consisted of two levels, a “within-case 
analysis” as a first step, deconstructing the collected data for the individual case 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; M. B. Miles et al., 2013). As a second level, a “cross-case analysis” 
Overview of the Data Collection Process per Case
Task
First approach (telephone call) ▲
Shipping of email w ith introduction pack
Arranging interview  meetings
Receipt of information and documents
Performance of the Moody’s KMV RiskCalc rating
Interview  session ▲
Compilation of the interview  content protocol
Performance of the contract review
Re-interview  if considered necessary
Shipping of  interview  content protocol and rating results to participant ▲
Receipt of sign-off and finalisation of document folder for the case ▲
▲ = Milestone = Process (1/2 w eek)
1 62
Weeks
4 53
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of all cases was performed to allow to draw for conclusion between cases and across 
cases (Yin, 2008, p. 160). 
4.6.1 Within-Case Analysis 
Each interview content protocol has been transferred into a table after receipt of the 
sign-off (column: name of the interviewee/company, rows: questions and answers) for 
the analysis phase. After the transfer, the content protocol table has been read several 
times, first labels have been identified. These labels have been highlighted within the 
table. These labels do not need to be exactly the same words, but the identical 
reasoning behind it is important. For example, in question 3.2 (“What are key elements 
of this financing strategy?”) one participant responded that “Identification of core 
banks that will provide financing for the company” is a key element of the strategy. 
The second participant of that case answered that “Financing partners to work with 
have been pre-selected per instrument and/or country the company has operations in” 
would be one key element. The words “Financing partners” and “banks” are not 
identical, but the context of their answer shows that they mean similar things.  
This first round descriptive coding allowed for categorisation of similar data 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Miles et al., 2013). Even though the researcher wanted 
to perform initially a deductive coding prior to the interviews, the analysis started with 
an inductive coding to allow for an individual coding during the data collection and 
analysis to ensure that no question will direct an answer towards a specific, already 
existing code. 
The key financial ratios calculated with Moody’s KMV RiskCalc have been linked to 
the respective questions as a cross check. This rating was already performed prior to 
the interview session to be able to react in case of a differing answer. 
The cross-check tried to substantiate the answers given via the financial ratios and their 
development from the initial rating during the mezzanine financing phase and the new 
rating performed during or after the refinancing. As an example, in Case 1 the 
participants both answered question 5.3 (“Has the financing risk profile of the 
company changed significantly?”) in a way, that the risk profile of the company has 
reduced significantly after the completed refinancing. However, the three financial 
ratios that map this factor (Debt Coverage, Leverage/Gearing and Liquidity) indicated 
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an increased risk compared to the rating in 2006, when the mezzanine financing 
started. Therefore, the results were presented and discussed with both participants and 
led to a partial revision of their answer. 
The third level of the within-case analysis was the review of relevant information that 
documented the refinancing decision process. These were primarily the signed 
financing contracts as well as management memos and notes of the involved decision 
makers. These were analysed after the completion of the interviews and tried to further 
substantiate or challenge the answers of the participants. In addition, this document 
analysis allowed a revision of the codes already assigned during the analysis of the 
interview content protocols. 
Having completed this first round of coding and analysis, a second cycle coding has 
been performed to group the codes into categories or themes and to finally reconstruct 
to the related research propositions. As an example, both participants of Case 1 
answered on question 5.1 (“Please describe your capital structure post refinancing”) 
that they were able to refinance the standard mezzanine mainly via external debt and 
with only minimum involvement of the company’s existing liquidity and without any 
shareholder injecting new equity. First round coding identified “external debt”, 
“equity” and “liquidity” as labels. The second cycle coding identified “capital 
structure”, which is a reconstruction of the second research proposition. In fact, the 
answer indicated that in this case, pecking order approach as one of the main 
propositions from strategic capital structure theory has not been considered during the 
refinancing. However, the answer also indicated that in view of the participants, they 
still followed a financing hierarchy which was in their view an optimal solution. 
4.6.2 Cross-Case Analysis 
The reason for a multiple case study approach that allowed a cross-case analysis was 
based on the aim to enhance the generalisability of the findings as well as to provide a 
deeper understanding and a more sophisticated explanation to strengthen the link 
between the refinancing decision and a financing strategy or routine that was deployed. 
It followed a case-oriented approach (Miles et al., 2013) which means that a 
comparative analysis between the cases was performed after carefully evaluating 
causes and effects within each case first. However, each case was deconstructed in a 
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similar way and after the within case analysis, relevant data passages (each answer) 
were isolated and carefully analysed if they allowed for a further aggregation 
throughout the cases (M. B. Miles et al., 2013).  
Each case is displayed in a matrix, which is structured based on the categories and 
themes that have been identified through the second level coding of the within case 
analysis (Gillham, 2000a). For drawing first conclusions, comparisons between the 
cases as well as making contrasts and counting of the identified themes were used. 
These first conclusions were checked with the interview content protocols and notes 
generated during the document review. In case of unclear conclusions, a re-check with 
raw data or with the participants was added and allowed for a revision (Yin, 2008). To 
further substantiate the conclusions, if-then tests were included to allow for an 
investigation of potential connections between categories and themes (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
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5. Results 
This chapter presents the results identified through the data analysis from the 
interviews, the supporting document analysis and the calculation of the Moody’s KMV 
RiskCalc factors as described in the previous chapter. Structured alongside the units 
of analysis defined in section 4.3.1.2, the chapter lays out whether the findings from 
the data collection and analysis will substantiate or falsify the formulated research 
propositions. Section 5.1 illustrates the basic demographic data on the cases explored 
that are important for the further analysis in the following sections. Section 5.2 
presents the analysis and findings on the financing strategy and elements thereof as 
well as on the financing hierarchy. Section 5.3 introduces the outcomes of the analysis 
on the refinancing process and on financing decisions including the determinants, 
which represent the second unit of analysis. The third unit of analysis discusses the 
findings on expected differences between owner-managers and external managers in 
section 5.4. The chapter is summarised in section 5.5. Some of the findings will be 
illustrated by short quotations. 
5.1 Basic Demographic Variables 
The section presents the fundamental data to describe the profiles of the firms 
investigated in this case study, such as age, size, management and ownership structure. 
These basic variables will be combined with the various results from the data analysis 
to identify whether they are dependent on certain variables. 
This research will not make use of the legal form of the company being a demographic 
variable. Legal form of the company has not been investigated to be serving as a 
meaningful variable in midcap firms (e.g. Börner et al., 2010).  
Distribution among company size as presented in Table 5.1 displays that this research 
only includes one company that would be categorised as a SME Type I according to 
the classification shown in section 1.1.3. The others firms are midcap companies to be 
categorised as Type II. In terms of sector, the cases investigated have a focus in more 
traditional industry areas, except for Case 7. The three cases that are grouped in the 
broad manufacturing sector represent significantly different business models and 
subsectors they operate in (engineering, optical industry and transportation) which do 
not allow for a useful comparison. 
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Table 5.1: Industrial Sector and Company Size 
Case Industry sector  
(Q 1.4) 
No. of employees  
(Q 1.2) 
Sales range (€) 
(Q 1.1) 
1 Food 500-1000 250-500m 
2 Automotive 1000-1500 250-500m 
3 General Industrial 100-250 50-150m 
4 Manufacturing <100 50-150m 
5 Manufacturing 500-1000 250-500m 
6 Manufacturing <100 <50m 
7 Media 100-150 50-150m 
Source: Own illustration. 
To explore the operational performance as well as the financing conditions of the cases 
in the year prior to the refinancing, these descriptors are shown in Table 5.2 below. 
The data is contrasted with the financials prior to the original mezzanine financing to 
investigate the development of the firms during the mezzanine financing and to detect 
whether they are in a similar situation compared to the prior financing decision. 
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Table 5.2: Key Financial Data 
  Growth and profitability Indebtedness and capital structure 
Case Last fiscal 
year 
Sales 
growth 
EBITDA-
margin 
EBIT-
margin 
Leverage Gearing Equity 
ratio 
Prior to the original mezzanine financing     
1 2004 -17.20% 10.7% 7.4% 1.89 x 95% 31% 
2 2005 4.42% 8.9% 3.9% 1.71 x 80% 30% 
3 2005 11.09% 12.1% 7.2% 1.36 x 67% 18% 
4 2005 8.75% 6.9% 5.0% 2.78 x 100% 38% 
5 2006 16.62% 5.1% 3.0% 5.03 x 105% 35% 
6 2005 6.12% 7.2% 5.4% 5.58 x 255% 18% 
7 2004 -0.65% 25.7% 13.6% 1.13 x 114% 27% 
Prior to the refinancing    
1 2011 6.71% 11.3% 8.4% 1.68 x 118% 25% 
2 2012 0.59% 9.6% 4.6% 0.83 x 57% 27% 
3 2012 4.72% 6.9% 4.6% 0.86 x 25% 24% 
4 2012 -7.42% 3.7% 1.4% 4.44 x 115% 24% 
5 2013 3.03% 13.8% 11.1% 0.46 x 40% 27% 
6 2012 16.89% 14.7% 12.5% 3.19 x 149% 32% 
7 2011 -3.82% 14.4% 6.5% 1.43 x 88% 32% 
Changes        
1   5.2% 13.4% -0.21 x 25% -19% 
2   8.4% 17.6% -0.88 x -29% -10% 
3   -42.4% -36.1% -0.50 x -63% 31% 
4   -46.6% -71.1% 1.67 x 15% -37% 
5   167.8% 266.7% -4.57 x -62% -22% 
6   105.0% 132.2% -2.39 x -42% 76% 
7   -43.7% -52.4% 0.30 x -22% 18% 
Source: Own illustration. 
Based on the assumptions discussed in section 4.3.2, four cases presented increased 
operational margins as well as reduced indebtedness compared to the mezzanine 
financing decision. These companies are classified as literal replication cases that 
should be able to secure refinancing without significant problems. Cases 3, 4 and 7 
show deteriorating operational performance and profitability. However, Case 3 
considerably reduced its indebtedness to a leverage factor of 0.86x and is envisaged to 
perform a successful refinancing. The remaining Cases 4 and 7 are therefore identified 
 Results 
 
 
Mark Hill  Page 104 
Mind the Gap 
as theoretical replication cases as these had to cope with increasing leverage factors in 
combination with the deteriorating profitability. 
A further group of important demographic variables considers the details on the 
ownership structure. Main variables are assembled in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: Ownership Structure (Q 1.5) 
Case Shareholder structure Shareholder 
generation 
Family 
tree(s) 
Individual 
shareholders 
1 Family-owned and operated business 2-3 3 9 
2 Family-owned/PE as minority shareholder 4 6 15 
3 Family-owned 2 3 3 
4 Family-owned and operated business 1-2 3 3 
5 Holding/Family-owned 3 2 5 
6 Family-owned and operated business 1 1 3 
7 Holding/Family-owned 1-2 1 2 
Source: Own illustration. 
Cases 1, 4 and 6 represent the companies that are led by owner-managers. The cases 
selected show a broad variety in terms of family trees, individual shareholders and age. 
For this research, the company age is not seen as an important variable. It seems more 
interesting to focus on the generation of shareholders that is currently managing the 
business (Tappeiner et al., 2012). Cases 1, 4 and 7 are in a transition process at the 
time of the research as ownership and management responsibility are transferred to the 
next younger generation. Case 2 had to include an external minority shareholder in 
addition to the existing six family trees during the financial crisis to maintain an 
acceptable equity ratio. Case 5 and Case 7 manage their various business activities via 
a holding company. 
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The fourth group of demographic variables focus on manager types and are presented 
in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: Manager Demographics 
 Manager type (Q 1.6) Prior job experience (Q 1.7) 
Case Top Middle Top Middle 
1 Owner-manager External manager None Competitor, Audit firm 
2 External manager External manager Competitor Competitor, Bank 
3 External manager External manager Competitor, Audit firm Bank, Audit firm 
4 Owner-manager Owner-manager None None 
5 External manager External manager Competitor None 
6 Owner-manager Owner-manager None None 
7 External manager External manager None Audit firm 
Source: Own illustration. 
Two of the three companies that are led by owner-managers also involved family 
members on the middle level. None of the owner-managers had a prior external job 
experience. External managers that had no prior external job experience started their 
professional career within the family firm. External managers at CEO/CFO-level with 
prior external job experience were primarily hired from competitors, in the middle 
level from audit firms. 
5.2 Financing Strategy and Elements 
This section illustrates the findings with regard to the existence of a financing strategy, 
which elements are included and the interaction between financing strategy with the 
business strategy. 
5.2.1 Existence of a Financing Strategy and Elements 
The responses on the questions have been heterogeneous regarding the existence of a 
financing strategy within the investigated companies, the elements of such strategy 
and whether it is formulated. However, several elements could be identified in the 
interviews as well as in the document analysis. 
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These elements have been grouped into categories as displayed in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Elements of the Financing Strategy (Q 2.1 and Q 2.2) 
 Fin. 
partners 
Fin. 
instruments 
Principles Financial 
ratios 
Further 
policies 
Description 
of process 
Rank 1 1 3 4 4 4 
No. of responses (max. 14) 11 11 8 5 5 5 
Manager types       
Top level (max. 7) 5 5 5 2 1 3 
Middle level (max. 7) 6 6 3 3 4 2 
Owner-manager (max. 5) 4 3 3 1 1 1 
External manager (max. 9) 7 8 5 4 4 4 
Shareholder generation       
1 (max. 6) 4 4 4 1 1 2 
2 (max. 4) 4 3 1 3 3 2 
3 (max. 2) 2 2 2 - - 1 
4 (max. 2) 1 2 1 1 1 - 
Family trees       
1 (max. 4) 3 3 3 1 1 1 
2 (max. 2) 2 2 2 - - 1 
3 (max. 6) 5 4 2 3 3 3 
>3 (max. 2) 1 2 1 1 1 - 
Literal/theoretical replication      
Literal cases (max. 10) 9 9 6 4 4 3 
Theoretical cases (max. 4) 2 2 2 1 1 2 
Source: Own illustration. 
5.2.1.1 Financing partners/banks 
Eleven out of 14 participants named that a list of relevant or acceptable financing 
partners should be included in a financing strategy of the firm, primarily banks that the 
company should work with. Only four participants explicitly included other financing 
providers in their response. The relation between answers from top management and 
middle management with five to six matches in the respective answers shows that this 
aspect is seen to be important in both levels.  
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5.2.1.2 Instruments 
The inclusion of predetermined financing instruments (or at least categories) in the 
financing strategy was also named by eleven out of 14 participants. Financing 
instruments and financing partners were therefore identified to represent the most 
important elements to be included in a financing strategy based on the analysed cases. 
Table 5.6 presents the instruments used as primary source for the refinancing as well 
as potential additional instruments to maintain the necessary funding. 
Table 5.6: Refinancing Instrument(s) 
Case Is the refinancing 
process 
completed? 
Primary refinancing 
instrument 
Additional refinancing 
instrument(s) 
Other aspects 
1 Yes Syndicated loan Schuldschein1 
State-backed loans on 
subsidiary level 
Integrated 
refinancing 
2 Yes Syndicated loan 
Schuldschein1 
Reverse factoring Integrated 
refinancing 
3 Yes Retained earnings Increase in syndicated loan - 
4 Ongoing Extension of standard 
mezzanine 
Bridge loan 
- - 
5 Yes Midcap bond Revolving credit facility Integrated 
refinancing 
6 Yes Retained earnings 
Bilateral loans 
Working capital financing - 
7 Yes Syndicated loan - Integrated 
refinancing 
Note: 1Schuldschein is a particular German financing instrument and is named as Schuldschein in 
most English documentation. Other translations for a Schuldschein are promissory notes or 
debt certificates. 
Source: Own illustration. 
A significant shift from a bank-dominated relationship lending towards a debt capital 
market financing or towards alternative financing instruments could only be identified 
in Case 5. Three cases used bilateral or syndicated loans as their dominant refinancing 
instrument. Case 3 and Case 6 were able to refinance primarily via retained earnings 
plus additional bank lending. Case 4 had to overcome problems in maintaining a 
suitable refinancing instrument at the time of this research. The management team 
negotiated a temporary prolongation of one mezzanine facility and a bridge loan from 
a bank to repay the second tranche. Together with the observations on financing 
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partners in section 5.2.1.1, this emphasizes the dominance of bank financing as 
primary source for external debt in SMEs and midcap companies, especially in 
Germany (Börner et al., 2010; Johannesen, 2011). Four out of the seven cases used the 
replacement of their standard mezzanine instrument to refinance larger parts of their 
capital structure in an integrated refinancing.  
5.2.1.3 General financing principles 
Eight participants saw ‘general financing principles’ to be an element of the financing 
strategy. This element groups several patterns of answers, such as key terms and 
conditions that should be obtained in every financing process like the composition of 
maturity profiles or the granting of collaterals for the financing. Furthermore, it 
involves answers on a target capital structure of the firm. This target capital structure 
could be either the mixture of debt and equity a company wants to obtain or the legal 
entity where external financing should be raised (e.g. local subsidiary or group holding 
company). As a third pattern, answers on the interaction with financing partners are 
grouped in this element, like information package to be presented or the organisation 
of annual bank meetings. 
General financing principles allowed to identify differences between top management 
and middle management. As shown in Table 5.5, this element could be identified in 
five top management interview content protocols. Therefore, this element is for the top 
management as important as the inclusion of financing instruments or financing 
partners. But only three middle management interview content protocols allowed for 
the identification of general financing principle elements. This is of particular interest, 
because this category includes most of the factors that are important for the interaction 
with the financing partners on a day to day basis during the lifetime of the financing. 
The financing principles will be investigated further in section 5.3.6 as it will be 
revealed that these are used by the management to discipline shareholders and family 
trees. 
5.2.1.4 Key performance/financial ratios 
‘Key performance ratios’ play an integral part in the controlling of the overall 
performance and development of a company (Taylor & Lowe, 1995). They should 
therefore be an element of the overall corporate strategic discussion: 
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Participant 2 (external manager, middle level, literal replication): “Key 
financial ratios that the company / the group uses as KPIs to run the company 
and is willing to accept in financing contracts [are an element of the financing 
strategy] and that derive from the business plan that has been signed-off by the 
management and the shareholders of the company.” 
However, ratios as a quantitative determinant to ensure a certain debt to equity ratio, a 
leverage ratio or a minimum equity ratio were found only in five out of the fourteen 
interview content protocols and only in three of the seven cases. Financial ratios are 
investigated in more detail in section 5.3.5, where the consistency of financial ratios 
and their effect on determining the refinancing instrument will be explored. 
5.2.1.5 Further Policies 
‘Further policies’ like an investment memorandum or hedging principles have been 
named as elements that should be included in a financing strategy. Interestingly, this 
element has been named by four middle management participants and ranks third after 
financing instruments and financing partners.  
Participant 1 (owner-manager, top level, literal replication): “Financing 
strategy follows the overall company strategy (e.g. the new syndicated loan 
agreement includes a dedicated basket for further joint venture financing within 
a specific product sector).” 
However, only one top management interview participant stated that further policies 
represent a relevant aspect of the financing strategy. This result is not surprising as it 
indicates the aim of the middle management that in their view a good financing policy 
includes very detailed and operative elements that serve as guidelines in their day to 
day work.  
5.2.1.6 Process Description 
Five interview participants included an outline on how a typical ‘financing process’ 
should be conducted by the company’s management in their answer on elements of a 
financing strategy. In contrast to further policies, this element seems to be of more 
importance to top management participants. Interestingly, the process description 
element does not concentrate on how the banks are approached and on how the 
negotiation process with external financing partners should be executed. The 
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description is primarily focussing on the internal communication between middle 
management, top management and supervisory bodies of the company. Consequently, 
the process description element has been only named by external managers. This 
undermines the research of Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjöberg & Wiklund (2007) and Busenitz 
& Barney on risk taking and corporate entrepreneurship, as they indicate that owner-
managers “are likely to perceive less risk in a given decision situation than are 
managers” (1997, p. 24) and therefore are not aiming for a transparent documentation 
of the decision process. The financing process will be further investigated in section 
5.3. 
5.2.2 Form of the Financing Strategy 
Interviews as well as the accompanying document analysis have allowed to code five 
categories regarding the degree of formality of a financing strategy. Table 5.7 groups 
the answers identified, starting from the strongest degree of formality to the weakest. 
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Table 5.7: Form of the Financing Strategy (Q 2.3) 
 Explicitly 
formu-
lated 
financing 
strategy 
Partly 
formu-
lated 
(Partly) 
Included 
in other 
formulated 
strategic 
elements 
Comuni-
cated 
and 
agreed 
Minimum 
legal 
require-
ments 
Lived 
experience 
Rank 2 n.a. 3 4 n.a. 1 
No. of responses (max. 14) 4 - 3 2 - 5 
Manager types       
Top level (max. 7) 2 - 1 1 - 3 
Middle level (max. 7) 2 - 2 1 - 2 
Owner-manager (max. 5) - - - 1 - 4 
External manager (max. 9) 4 - 3 1 - 1 
Shareholder generation       
1 (max. 6) - - - 1 - 5 
2 (max. 4) 2 - 1 1 - - 
3 (max. 2) 2 - - - - - 
4 (max. 2) - - 2 - - - 
Family trees       
1 (max. 4) - - - 1 - 3 
2 (max. 2) 2 - - - - - 
3 (max. 6) 2 - 1 1 - 2 
>3 (max. 2) - - 2 - - - 
Literal/theoretical replication      
Literal cases (max. 10) 4 - 3 1 - 2 
Theoretical cases (max. 4) - - - 1 - 3 
Source: Own illustration. 
The highest degree of formality is represented by an integrated documentation that is 
explicitly labelled as a financing strategy and includes elements and/or process 
guidelines as discussed in the previous subsection: 
Participant 6 (external manager, middle level, literal replication): “Financing 
guidelines [are] in place that cover: preferred financing instruments, list of 
relationship banks, allowed hedging instruments and hedging strategies (no 
speculation, but currency and interest hedging as well as selected raw material 
prices).” 
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The next category describes cases where at least parts of the elements of a financing 
strategy were found as written documentation or included in other strategic guidelines: 
Participant 2 (external manager, middle level, literal replication): “Not an 
integrated financing strategy, but core elements such as an investment policy 
(which has been presented to the supervisory board but not yet been approved), 
a hedging memorandum and a handbook on business planning for each 
company of the group that also includes rules on financing and limitations on 
bilateral financing via local bank partners.” 
The third category includes cases, where no explicit documents or guidelines were 
found, but some routines or rules were communicated either via internal memos or via 
protocols of the management and/or supervisory board: 
Participant 3 (external manager, top level, literal replication): “KPI's and target 
ranges are formulated within the general corporate strategy.” 
A fourth category has then been included that would have described cases, where at 
least the legal requirements based on the form of incorporation have been clearly 
adopted in the refinancing situation. For example, within a German incorporation 
(“Aktiengesellschaft”), the management has to ask the supervisory board of the 
company for authorisation prior to execute specific transactions. Entering into 
financing agreements is one of these transactions. The last category – which has been 
labelled as ‘lived experience’ – includes all investigations, where no routines or 
guidelines were found: 
Participant 7 (owner manager, top level, theoretical replication): “[A 
formulated financing strategy is] not necessary as all relevant financing 
functions are covered by family members who are also shareholders.” 
Figure 5.1 portrays the categorised responses. 
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Figure 5.1: Financing Strategy and respective Cases (Q 2.3) 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
Three aspects of the responses have to be highlighted. First of all, the participants in 
Case 1 and in Case 7 provided divergent answers on the degree of formality of the 
financing strategy in their company. However, the top level managers (one owner-
manager and one employed CEO), indicated a less formal financing strategy compared 
to their respective middle-management participants.  
Second, the theoretical replication cases (Case 4 and Case 7) indicated a lower degree 
of formality compared to the literal replication cases, except for Case 6. Case 4 and 
Case 7 both had to cope with deteriorating operational performances measured by a 
reduced EBITDA-margin and were not able to lower their leverage accordingly to 
adopt their financing to such operational development, as presented in section 4.3.2. 
Case 3 on the contrary – also coping with a reduced EBITDA-margin compared to the 
original mezzanine financing – was able to significantly reduce the indebtedness, 
expressed by a lowered leverage ratio. 
The third investigation is that four out of the five responses that were categorised as 
‘lived experience’ came from owner-manager participants. All five respondents are 
active in a company, where the first shareholder generation is active. On the other 
hand, only external managers stated that a formal financing strategy or an inclusion in 
other formulated strategic elements exist. These external managers work in companies 
with more than one family shareholder tree and are at least in the second shareholder 
generation. 
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5.2.3 Financing Hierarchy 
As presented in Table 5.6, cases that were able to (partly) refinance standard 
mezzanine via retained earnings used this internal funding source as primary 
instrument. Therefore, Case 3 and Case 6 added external debt via loans and additional 
working capital financing instruments as refinancing sources.  
Cases that were expected to face no difficulties in refinancing but had only limited 
internal financing sources used external debt as primary resource. Within the external 
debt instruments, syndicated loans and Schuldscheindarlehen were the dominant 
instruments, only Case 5 used a debt capital market instrument in form of a midcap 
bond.  
Figure 5.2 presents the refinancing structure as well as the financing hierarchy per case 
in a pecking-order preference ranking. 
Figure 5.2: Refinancing Structure and Financing Hierarchy 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
External equity, provided by either the owner family or new external shareholders, was 
not identified to be part of the refinancing negotiations in the literal replication cases. 
However, contractual articles that limit dividend payments have been identified in all 
syndicated loan agreements (Case 1, Case 2, Case 3 and Case 7) where at least one 
external manager was involved in the negotiations. These have been designed 
heterogeneously but typically include a mechanism that allows a certain amount or 
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quota of annual net income to be paid out to the shareholders. Excess income or cash 
flows will trigger a mandatory increase of the revenue reserves or an additional 
prepayment of debt in case of available cash flows. Nevertheless, these clauses can 
include a minimum dividend payment to the owner families prior to trigger these 
mandatory payment mechanisms as well. This minimum dividend allowance was 
designed to secure a projectable income stream to the shareholders and to pay 
inheritance and income taxes at shareholder level. By comparing the first drafts of the 
syndicated loan agreement which is provided by the banks with the comments from 
the companies and their advisors, Case 2 and Case 3 pro-actively introduced a dividend 
clause that limits payments to the shareholders.  
Theoretical replication presented in Case 4 and in Case 7 showed a varying picture. 
As already described, Case 4 was unable to find a suitable refinancing structure and 
therefore not able to complete in time. To mitigate the situation, one tranche of the 
standard mezzanine had to be extended. The second tranche – where an extension was 
not possible due to the structure of the mezzanine fund – had to be covered by a bridge 
loan from the bank that introduced this second tranche to the company. The owner 
family in Case 4 was not able to insert additional equity to mitigate a potential shortfall 
in the refinancing. As external debt was limited due to the weakening operational 
performance, external equity provided by third parties was proposed by the financing 
banks. This proposal was rejected by two owners and led to a critical situation, as email 
correspondence and document analysis showed that the negotiations were close to be 
aborted by at least one bank. At the time of the data collection and analysis, no long-
term solution was agreed upon, but the described bridge financing was established. 
Case 7 on the other hand managed to successfully complete a refinancing by using a 
syndicated loan. However, in this case the refinancing bank also represented the core 
bank of the shareholder family which could lead to a potential conflict of interest. Case 
7 presented typical limitations that family firms show in terms of generating funds 
from internal or external equity (Ampenberger et al., 2013; Tappeiner et al., 2012). 
Interviews and document analysis revealed that the banks started the refinancing 
negotiations by asking for a partial equity injection from the shareholders or for a 
limitation on future dividend payments. Both proposals were rejected by the 
management and the shareholders. The final syndicated loan agreement showed a 
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clause that included a minimum dividend mechanism that allowed the shareholders to 
generate a projectable income stream and to pay inheritance and income taxes. 
5.2.4 Financing Structure and Corporate Strategy 
The revealed gap in detecting the causal direction between corporate strategy and 
financing strategy (section 2.4) formed the basis for the investigation of an interlinkage 
between these two. Table 5.8 assembles the feedback from interview participants. 
Table 5.8: Financing Strategy and Corporate Strategy (Q 2.4) 
 Element of the 
corporate 
strategy 
Partly 
interlinked with 
corporate 
strategy 
Determines 
corporate 
strategy 
No connection 
Rank 1 3 n.a. 2 
No. of responses (max. 14) 10 1  3 
Manager types     
Top level (max. 7) 6 - - 1 
Middle level (max. 7) 4 1 - 2 
Owner-manager (max. 5) 4 - - 1 
External manager (max. 9) 6 1 - 2 
Shareholder generation   -  
1 (max. 6) 3 - - 3 
2 (max. 4) 3 1 - - 
3 (max. 2) 2 - - - 
4 (max. 2) 2 - - - 
Family trees     
1 (max. 4) 2 - - 2 
2 (max. 2) 2 - - - 
3 (max. 6) 4 1 - 1 
>3 (max. 2) 2 - - - 
Literal/theoretical replication    
Literal cases (max. 10) 9 1 - - 
Theoretical cases (max. 4) 1 - - 3 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Ten out of the 14 interview participants stated that the financing strategy is an element 
of their business strategy: 
Participant 1 (owner-manager, top level, literal replication): “Financing 
strategy follows the overall company strategy (e.g. the new syndicated loan 
agreement includes a dedicated basket for further joint venture financing within 
a specific product sector).” 
This particular link between strategy and the selected financing instrument will be 
further investigated to see whether contractual elements adopt the strategic elements, 
such as financial covenants (section 5.3.5) or certain limitations in the debt contract 
design (section 5.3.6). 
The view on the interlinkage between the strategies and the causal direction is not 
specific for owner-managers or top level managers, but also shared by external 
managers and by middle managers:  
Participant 6 (external manager, middle level, literal replication): “[The 
financing strategy] derives from the overall company strategy.” 
However, only one out of four participants from theoretical replication cases shared 
this view on the linkage between business strategy and financing strategy: 
Participant 7 (owner-manager, top level, theoretical replication): “Financing 
strategy follows the overall vision of the company to maintain its position as a 
family-owned business with a solid financing structure.” 
This finding is consistent with the results on the form of the financing strategy (section 
5.2.2), where most of the managers from theoretical replication cases located the 
financing strategy in the ‘lived experience’ category. 
Even though that three participants did not share the view of a connection between 
these strategic elements, none of the interviewees indicated that the financing strategy 
would influence or determine the overall business strategy.  
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5.2.5 Summary 
The results from the cases allowed the identification of the existence of a financing 
strategy, as proposed by the first research proposition (RP1). Table 5.9 provides an 
overview of the findings from section 5.2. 
It became obvious that the term ‘financing strategy’ does not describe a clear set of 
elements that it should include. This observation substantiates the assumption of 
Barton & Gordon (1987, 1988), that capital structure decisions do not solely follow a 
shareholder value maximisation principle, but include a broader perspective that is 
based on “the values and goals of the management, in combination with external and 
internal contextual factors which impact the basic concerns of risk and control” 
(Barton & Gordon, 1988, p. 623). Even though the existence of a financing strategy as 
well as elements of such strategy have been identified in the cases explored, a 
heterogeneous set of frameworks was investigated in section 5.2.1.3 that varies by 
case. The varying degree of formality and involved elements in the financing strategy 
of the cases can be linked to different manager types and shareholder set-ups, as 
presented in section 5.2.2.  
The following of a pecking order approach could not be falsified in section 5.2.3 
(RP2). The cases investigated revealed that retained earnings were the favoured 
funding source in the refinancing, if available. Senior debt played the second important 
role in various forms (e.g. syndicated loans, Schuldschein, bilateral loans). Managers 
followed a financing hierarchy as proposed by Börner et al. (2010) and Koropp et al. 
(2014). Based on the described preference for the different funding sources, the 
financing hierarchy follows the same ranking as indicated by the pecking order theory 
and Barton & Gordon’s (1987, 1988) third proposition. 
Besides the support for a pecking order approach of the cases examined, aspects were 
explored that could be explained by other capital structure theories. Even though six 
out of the seven cases achieved a refinancing via debt instruments, not all aspects are 
attributable to a pecking order. Case 4 received temporary debt and mezzanine 
financing. Banks requested an equity injection by the shareholders and forced the 
company to think about solutions that could include a minority equity provider. Based 
on its deteriorating profitability, this case was not able to refinance via retained 
earnings or external debt. The reduced profitability caused a tax-reducing financing 
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instrument like a loan being less important. Banks were not willing to offer additional 
debt facilities because of the increased operational risk that leads to higher cost of 
insolvency, resulting in higher interest rates or in refusing the request. Therefore, in 
this case, an optimal capital structure could be anticipated and the current financing 
did not represent the optimal capital structure for Case 4. This could be explained by 
tradeoff theory. 
The mixed investigation regarding the potential explanation by various capital 
structure theories is supporting the results by Brüse (2011) and Nohtse (2012) with 
regard to standard mezzanine refinancing as well as by Ampenberger et al. (2013) with 
regard to financing decisions in German family firms. 
Furthermore, the identified dividend limitations in the financing contracts could be 
based upon asymmetric information. Management uses the financing to discipline the 
shareholders. Even though research primarily sees external debt to act as disciplining 
element for company management (Malmendier & Tate, 2005), the observation relates 
to a principal-agent-problem between shareholders and management. Consequently, it 
was observed in cases with external management (Case 2, Case 3 and Case 7), or with 
one external manager and a complex shareholder structure (Case 1). 
Asymmetric information between banks and management could be anticipated in 
cases, where the management did not perform a request for proposal. Case 6 and Case 
7 – both being smaller cases in terms of sales and by number of employees – primarily 
discussed the refinancing with their core bank. This would follow the analysis of 
Lichtblau & Utzig (2002), that for smaller firms a relationship lending could be a 
rational decision to mitigate information asymmetries with financing partners. 
Finally, the participant feedback on the research proposition RP3a could not disprove 
the existence of an interlinkage between corporate strategy and financing strategy. The 
participants that acknowledged the interlinkage between the two strategies consistently 
stated that the overall business strategy influences the financing strategy. This result 
supports Barton & Gordon’s (1987) first two propositions of strategic capital structure 
theory and adds to the research of Ginn et al. (1995). 
Feedback allowed to explore a causal direction in the investigated cases. However, the 
results so far do not allow to investigate whether there are differences based upon 
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education and former job experience as proposed by Bertrand & Schoar (2003) and by 
Malmendier et al. (2011). 
Table 5.9: Findings on Research Propositions from Section 5.2 
Research proposition Aspect Finding 
RP1: A formulated financing 
strategy exists and has been 
applied to in the refinancing 
process. 
Confirmation of 
existing research 
Existence of a financing strategy that is based on the 
goals and the strategy for the firm (Barton & Gordon, 
1987). 
Financing strategy represents not a clear set of 
elements, but varies from case by case, based on 
different manager types and shareholder set-ups 
(Meier & Esmatyar, 2015). 
Owner-managers and firms that involve a little number 
of family trees or shareholders show a less formulated 
or integrated financing strategy and are less strict in 
following this strategy (Speckbacher & Posch, 2010). 
 Contradictory 
findings 
None 
 New/additional 
findings 
Elements of the financing strategy might not primarily 
been driven by a differentiation between owner-
managers and external managers, but relating to a 
more complex strategic approach 
 Limitations None 
RP2: A targeted optimal 
financing structure exists and 
refinancing of the standard 
mezzanine has been based on 
a pecking order approach. 
Confirmation of 
existing research 
Financing decision was based on a pecking order 
approach (Barton & Gordon, 1987; Börner et al., 2010; 
Brüse, 2011; Koropp et al., 2014; Nohtse, 2012). 
Further elements would support tradeoff theory or 
findings on asymmetric information/agency theory 
(Ampenberger et al., 2013; Brüse, 2011), but could not 
be proved in the cross-case analysis. 
 Contradictory 
findings 
None 
 New/additional 
findings 
None 
 Limitations None 
RP3a: The corporate strategy 
and the characteristics of the 
management team influence 
the determination of the 
refinancing instrument. 
Confirmation of 
existing research 
Existence of an interlinkage between corporate 
strategy and financing strategy (Barton & Gordon, 
1987; Ginn et al., 1995). 
 
 Contradictory 
findings 
None 
 New/additional 
findings 
Causal direction between business strategy and 
financing strategy (Ginn et al., 1995): Overall 
corporate strategy influences the financing strategy. 
 Limitations Not observable, if differences based upon education or 
former job experience (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; 
Malmendier & Tate, 2005). 
Source: Own illustration. 
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5.3 Refinancing Process 
Following the discussion on the overall existence of a financing strategy and hierarchy, 
the subsequent section will investigate the process executed and the decisions taken in 
the refinancing of the standard mezzanine instrument. Several categories have been 
identified through the coding process and are forming the main topics for this section. 
5.3.1 Approach and Timing 
Given the awareness of the companies regarding potential refinancing difficulties as 
outlined in section 1.3.4 it is interesting to explore, whether the companies pro-actively 
started their refinancing process to avoid a financing gap. Therefore, the research 
assessed which party initiated the refinancing process and compares the findings with 
the process of the original standard mezzanine financing. The results on the initiator 
of the original mezzanine financing process were homogenous. Twelve out of the 14 
interviewees stated that the process was initiated by one or more relationship bank(s), 
only Case 2 approached directly banks for presenting financing alternatives. During 
the refinancing process, a varying picture could be observed, assembled in Table 5.10 
below. 
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Table 5.10: Initiator of the Refinancing Process (Q 3.2) 
 Relationship 
bank(s) 
Mezzanine 
lenders 
Other 
(potential) 
financing 
partners 
Advisors Pro-actively 
initiated by 
the 
company 
Rank 1 3 n.a. n.a. 1 
No. of responses (max. 14) 6 2 - - 6 
Manager types      
Top level (max. 7) 3 1 - - 3 
Middle level (max. 7) 3 1 - - 3 
Owner-manager (max. 5) 3 2 - - - 
External manager (max. 9) 3 - - - 6 
Shareholder generation      
1 (max. 6) 2 2 - - 2 
2 (max. 4) 4 - - - - 
3 (max. 2) - - - - 2 
4 (max. 2) - - - - 2 
Family trees      
1 (max. 4) 2 - - - 2 
2 (max. 2) - - - - 2 
3 (max. 6) 4 2 - - - 
>3 (max. 2) - - - - 2 
Literal/theoretical replication     
Literal cases (max. 10) 6 - - - 4 
Theoretical cases (max. 4) - 2 - - 2 
Source: Own illustration. 
The level of activity has significantly changed during the refinancing process. Only 
three cases were still waiting to be approached by relationship banks and Case 4 was 
directly approached by the mezzanine lender to mitigate the identified refinancing risk.  
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However, only external managers pro-actively initiated the refinancing process. 
Owner-managers stated that they were either approached by relationship banks or by 
mezzanine lenders. In addition, the cases that were approached by external parties were 
in the first or second shareholder generation, whereas the pro-active cases were 
primarily more matured. 
Probably even more interesting, none of the relationship banks approached the 
theoretical replication cases, which would have been expected as these firms were 
facing a higher refinancing risk: 
Participant 8 (owner-manager, middle level, theoretical replication): “The 
existing mezzanine providers [approached the firm] in Spring 2013 after 
review of financial reporting for year-end 2012 and a potential covenant default 
by year-end 2013 (based on the presented budget for 2013) given the 
development in the sector that all clients of the company are acting in 
(transportation and logistics).” 
Banks must have been aware of the operational situation, as they were already existing 
lenders prior to the refinancing. Figure 5.3 displays this change in initiating the 
financing process. 
Figure 5.3: Initiator of the Process (Q 2.8 and Q 3.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Participant 6 (external manager, middle level, literal replication): “Prior 
contacts via consultants and researcher that were performing studies on the 
upcoming refinancing led to an early internal start of the refinancing process” 
The other responses show that there was a routine in place, that led to this pro-active 
initiative. Nevertheless, none of the investigated cases showed in the interview content 
protocols or in the document analysis the design of a pre-defined procedure or process 
that had to be followed. It remains unclear, whether this routine or process was a 
singular event, based on the specific refinancing situation, or whether it was an 
established process that will also be maintained in further financing situations. 
From a strategic perspective, the timely start of the financing process is important to 
ensure a completion prior to the maturity of the instrument to be refinanced. Therefore, 
the research also investigated how many months prior to the repayment of the standard 
mezzanine the process started. Table 5.11 visualises the duration indicated by the 
interview participants. 
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Table 5.11: Duration of the Refinancing Process (Q 3.1 and Q 3.7) 
 Process duration 
Months 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
No. of responses (max. 14)      6  2    6 
Manager types             
Top level (max. 7)      3  1    3 
Middle level (max. 7)      3  1    3 
Owner-manager (max. 5)      5       
External manager (max. 9)      1  2    6 
Shareholder generation             
1 (max. 6)      4  2     
2 (max. 4)      2      2 
3 (max. 2)            2 
4 (max. 2)            2 
Family trees             
1 (max. 4)      2  2     
2 (max. 2)            2 
3 (max. 6)      4      2 
>3 (max. 2)            2 
Literal/theoretical replication            
Literal cases (max. 10)      4      6 
Theoretical cases (max. 4)      2  2     
Source: Own illustration. 
Three cases started their refinancing process six months prior to the maturity date of 
the standard mezzanine, whereas four cases started eight or even 12 months in 
advance. Case 2 and Case 3 added that prior to the start of the execution, an internal 
preparation phase was conducted, where process documents were prepared and 
potential financing partners discussed. However, five cases did not introduce an 
internal preparation phase, this underpinnes the results from the explored approach in 
the previous paragraphs, where four cases were adressed by existing financing 
partners. Figure 5.4 illustrates the duration of the refinancing process. 
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Figure 5.4: Duration of the Refinancing Process (Q 3.1 and Q 3.7) 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
The importance of the timely execution becomes even more obvious by combining the 
responses regarding the duration (Q 3.1) with the answers on the successful completion 
of the process within that timeframe (Q 3.7). Case 1 and Case 4 both had to admit that 
they introduced a bridge financing before the originally envisaged refinancing was 
completed. Case 4 in fact had to ask for an extension of one mezzanine facility in 
addition to the bridge loan. This indicates that the timely and successful completion is 
not primarily depending on the operational performance of the company at the time of 
the refinancing. It is more a question of duly starting into the process. In addition, only 
Case 6 was able to complete the refinancing within the six months period. A reason 
for that could be the financing instrument obtained. As shown in Table 5.6, Case 6 
refinanced via bilateral loans combined with retained earnings. Bilateral loans involve 
little documentation compared to syndicated loan agreements or debt capital market 
instruments, such as bonds or Schuldscheindarlehen. Furthermore, this instrument 
involves only one financing party, whereas bank consortiums consisted of three to nine 
banks for syndicated loans in this research. This leads to the assumption, that a 
refinancing process must be considered to take longer than six months in execution. 
In addition, it will be crucial to explore, if the processes were only started too late or 
if there were other constraints that led to the increased refinancing risk.  
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Interestingly, all cases that aimed for a refinancing wihtin a timeframe of six months 
are led by owner-managers. External managers started the refinancing process eight or 
12 months prior to the maturity. 
5.3.2 Involved Parties 
After the investigation of the overall executed process and the initiators, the role of the 
parties involved will be explored in more detail. 
Even though banks have played a prominent role in the recommendation of the 
standard mezzanine financing, the cases investigated still relied on bank proposals for 
the refinancing (Q 3.2). This has been also identified in cases, where the company pro-
actively initiated the refinancing process. The request for a refinancing proposal in the 
pro-active cases was primarily sent out to banks that already had a prior client 
relationship with the company or were at least in a regular dialogue with them. 
However, a significant change was explored in terms of advisors involved in the 
process. During the original mezzanine financing, only legal advisors were mandated 
in four of the cases at a rather later stage in the process to support in the negotiation of 
the mezzanine financing agreement (Q 2.9). In addition, two cases consulted the 
company’s auditor with regard to the expected classification of the standard mezzanine 
instrument to be qualified as economic equity.  
During the refinancing process, only Case 7 abstained from involving a legal advisor 
in the process (Q 3.5). In all other cases, an external legal counsel was introduced in 
the negotiation phase. Even more interesting is the involvement of financial advisors, 
who provided independent advise to the company with respect to the presented 
refinancing proposals and supported in four cases in the negotiations with the financing 
parties. In none of the original mezzanine financings, such a financing advisor 
participated. In Case 1, Case 3 and Case 4, additional specialists were included in the 
process, such as Due Diligence advisors on request of the banks in Case 3 to get an 
additional view on the current market developments. Figure 5.5 displays this 
investigation: 
  
 Results 
 
 
Mark Hill  Page 128 
Mind the Gap 
Figure 5.5: Involved external Parties (Q 2.9 and Q 3.5) 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
This development may reflect that the refinancing risk perception of the companies 
changed, compared to the original financing process. However, the finding could be 
based on two different factors: 
1. Independent financial advisors have been involved to support the internal 
capacities as they supply additional deep and broad know-how on financing 
markets, on recent developments and trends as well as on terms and conditions 
currently to be achieved in the market compared to a company management, 
that probably runs a financing process every three to five years, 
2. The mutual trust is weakened between the company’s management and those 
banks that proposed the original mezzanine financing and are involved again 
in the refinancing process because of the perceived difficulties with the 
standard mezzanine instrument. 
To further investigate this trend, it will be interesting to see how the companies 
assessed the availability of financing instruments and markets. 
5.3.3 Availability of Financing Instruments and Markets 
The review of the documents made available by the companies showed that there was 
no process to assess alternative financing instruments. Companies solely relied on the 
financing instruments presented by the banks or – in the pro-active cases – to ask for 
a proposal based on a pre-defined structure. This pre-defined structure was explicitly 
requested by the companies to ensure the ability to compare the proposals made by the 
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banks. However, this approach avoided the option to allow for a broader and more 
open assessment of potential alternatives. In addition, the invitation letter sent out by 
the pro-active companies did not involve a clause that asked for alternative ideas. This 
option to present alternative structures or ideas would have allowed a back-testing for 
the company whether other instruments should be considered in this or potential future 
financing processes. In Case 1, Case 3 and Case 5, some bank proposals included 
alternative structures but only Case 5 considered the alternative in their written 
comparison of the proposals that formed the decision basis. 
The finding in terms of the instruments continues in the analysis of the management’s 
approach to assess the constitution of relevant financing markets. All cases 
investigated relied in the first instance on their own appraisal combined with the 
market overviews provided by the banks in their proposals. However, in none of the 
cases external market reports, analysis or other material was identified to be used to 
substantiate the internal appraisal. 
Independent financial advisors that could deliver such market overviews have only 
been involved in the preparation phase of the process in Case 2. In Case 1, Case 3 and 
in Case 4 the financial advisor was involved either at a later stage where the banks and 
the financing instrument were already selected (Case 1 and Case 3), or where no 
alterantive was accessible due to the uncertain company situation (Case 4). Financial 
advisors have been involved to support internal capacities and to provide market 
insights (Case 1 and Case 2) as well as in situations where the relationship to the bank 
partners was humbled (Case 4). 
5.3.4 Selection and Decision Mechanisms 
Continuing the investigation on elements of the financing strategy in section 5.2.1, 
determinants need to be further explored that drove the financing decision. This also 
includes the investigation whether the financing strategy was followed during the 
specific refinancing event. 
5.3.4.1 Selection of the Refinancing Instrument 
To explore the determinants for choosing a specific financing instrument, the 
comparison of the determinants is important that triggered the selection during the 
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original mezzanine financing with those that formed the basis for the selection at the 
refinancing. The Table 5.12 visualises the relevant determinants in the mezzanine 
financing decision. 
Table 5.12: Determinants for choosing the Mezzanine Financing (Q 2.7) 
 Strength-
ening 
economic 
equity 
Attractive 
conditions 
Avoid 
sharehol-
der 
dilution 
Increase 
indepen-
dence/ 
enter new 
markets 
Mitigate 
shortfall 
in bank 
lending 
Rank 1 2 3 3 5 
No. of responses (max. 14) 11 5 4 4 2 
Manager types      
Top level (max. 7) 5 2 2 1 1 
Middle level (max. 7) 6 3 2 3 1 
Owner-manager (max. 5) 3 2 2 1 - 
External manager (max. 9) 8 3 2 3 2 
Shareholder generation      
1 (max. 6) 5 3 1 - 1 
2 (max. 4) 2 1 3 3 1 
3 (max. 2) 2 - - 1 - 
4 (max. 2) 2 1 - - - 
Family trees      
1 (max. 4) 4 1 1 - 1 
2 (max. 2) 2 - - 1 - 
3 (max. 6) 3 3 3 3 1 
>3 (max. 2) 2 1 - - - 
Literal/theoretical replication     
Literal cases (max. 10) 8 2 4 4 1 
Theoretical cases (max. 4) 3 3 - - 1 
Source: Own illustration. 
At the time of the original mezzanine financing, the most important aspect to choose 
this type of instrument was to ‘strengthen the economic equity’ of the company as this 
aspect has been identified in eleven answers. Given the fact that most cases had to cope 
with operational challenges after the implosion of the dotcom-bubble in the years 2002 
to 2004 (Brüse, 2011; Nohtse, 2012). 
The aspect ‘attractive conditions’ ranked second with five answers identified. This 
determinant groups answers that characterised the standard mezzanine pricing being 
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attractive compared to individual mezzanine yields and required returns for minority 
equity investors. Furthermore, this determinant includes the answers that highlight the 
tax reducing effect caused by the interest payment for standard mezzanine. Both 
determinants are connected with tradeoff theory, as the loss-absorption effect of 
company equity and the positive effect of a strong equity position on the company’s 
rating will reside in lower insolvency cost for a potential financing partner. The second 
determinant ‘attractive conditions’ also indicates the following of tradeoff theory as 
companies are looking for beneficial interest margins and repayment profiles. They 
show the existence of an optimal capital structure which the company aims to achieve 
via the mezzanine instrument.  
Three further determinants were identified to be important. These determinants 
grouped the answers that pronounced either the avoidance of the dilution of the current 
shareholders or that were looking to enter into new markets to increase independence 
from existing financing partners. Whereas the determinant ‘avoid shareholder dilution’ 
is attributed to pecking order, the last two determinants ‘mitigate shortfall in bank 
lending’ and ‘increase independence’ are assigned to different capital structure 
theories. A shortfall in bank lending would occur in case of an increased probability 
of default of the firm. This has been particular true in Case 4. This determinant would 
be attributable again to tradeoff theory. The ‘increase independence’ determinant 
would allow for two explanations. The first explanation is again based on tradeoff 
theory. The independence from banks and therefore the diversification of financing 
sources reduces the financial risk of a company and, therefore, the probability of 
default. The second explanation relates to asymmetric information and agency theory. 
Given the fact, that predominantly literal replication cases indicated this determinant, 
a reason could be to broaden the network of financing partners that are less demanding 
regarding the provision of company information. More detail will be provided in the 
interpretation of the determinants regarding the refinancing. 
All determinants have been identified almost equally distributed among responses 
from top and middle management participants, except for the increased 
independence/entrance into new markets, which was detected in three answers from 
middle management participants, but only in one top manager content protocol. 
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Another finding to be mentioned is that three out of the five responses for the attractive 
conditions determinant are from theoretical replication cases. 
By contrasting these results with the determinants that were predominant for choosing 
the refinancing instrument, a significant shift can be stated. Table 5.13 illustrates the 
determinants identified. 
Table 5.13: Determinants for choosing the Refinancing Instrument (Q 3.4) 
 Increase 
indepen-
dence/ 
enter new 
markets 
Availabi-
lity in 
further 
refinan-
cing 
Contrac-
tual 
optimisa-
tion 
Avoid 
sharehol-
der 
dilution 
Attractive 
conditions 
Lack of 
alternative 
Rank 1 2 2 4 5 5 
No. of responses (max. 14) 7 6 6 5 3 3 
Manager types       
Top level (max. 7) 4 3 4 3 1 1 
Middle level (max. 7) 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Owner-manager (max. 5) 4 2 2 - - 2 
External manager (max. 9) 3 4 4 5 3 1 
Shareholder generation       
1 (max. 6) 3 4 - 1 - 3 
2 (max. 4) 1 2 3 2 1 - 
3 (max. 2) 2 - 1 - 2 - 
4 (max. 2) 1 - 2 2 - - 
Family trees       
1 (max. 4) 2 2 - 1 - 1 
2 (max. 2) 2 - 1 - 2 - 
3 (max. 6) 2 4 3 2 1 2 
>3 (max. 2) 1 - 2 2 - - 
Literal/theoretical replication      
Literal cases (max. 10) 6 2 6 4 3 - 
Theoretical cases (max. 4) 1 4 - 1 - 3 
Source: Own illustration. 
The dominant determinant from the original mezzanine decision ‘strengthening the 
economic equity’ was not identified in a single response for the refinancing. The literal 
replication cases were all in a solid financial situation and able to refinance without a 
request to further bolster the equity ratio to obtain other sources of funding. 
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The determinant ‘increase independence’ became the most important aspect during the 
refinancing: 
Participant 1 (owner-manager, top level, literal replication): “Broadening of 
lender base (expanding core banks and potentially new debt lenders such as 
pension funds, insurance companies and small banks via debt capital market 
products).” 
Given the fact that six out of the seven responses that indicate ‘increase independence’ 
are literal replication cases, this could support both explanations from the previous 
page. Based on the experience that the standard mezzanine instrument disappeared 
from the market, determinants become more relevant that avoid dependency from a 
single financing instrument or few partners: 
Participant 10 (external manager, middle level, literal replication): “Request 
from the management explicitly included a challenge of alternative financing 
sources in addition to 'classical' bank financing.” 
This would support trade-off theory. However, the document analysis showed that in 
Case 1, Case 2, Case 3 and Case 5, financing instruments had differing regulations 
regarding information requirements from lenders. In all four cases, ‘increase 
independence’ was indicated. By contrasting the information requirements included in 
the respective bank loan agreements with those in the Schuldscheindarlehen or the 
midcap bond, the debt capital market instruments required less detailed information 
and on a less frequent basis. As an example, in Case 1 the firm had to provide quarterly 
financial reports on consolidated and on unconsolidated basis, including several 
additional information. In the Schuldschein documentation, only consolidated 
financial reports had to be presented on an annual basis. 
The ‘avoidance of shareholder dilution’ is still under the top four responses. Even 
though this determinant can be attributed to pecking order, it could be also explained 
by the aim of family shareholders to maintain independence even though this would 
lead to a decision that would not follow a strict shareholder value approach (Koropp 
et al., 2014; Tappeiner et al., 2012). By following this string, the determinants 
‘strengthen economic equity’ and ‘increase independence’ – both assigned to different 
capital structure theories – could be also grouped with ‘avoidance of shareholder 
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dilution’ as all determinants are aiming in conclusion for a financing instrument that 
does not impact family shareholdings. Interestingly, this determinant was identified in 
external manager responses only. The data analysis allowed not for a clear 
investigation, whether the determinant was not named by owner-managers because the 
avoidance of shareholder dilution was so clear that it did not needed to be mentioned 
or whether it was not of importance to them. 
In the theoretical replication Cases 4 and 7 answers were identified that were grouped 
either in the categories ‘availability in a further refinancing’ or ‘lack of alternatives’. 
This is of interest, as these two cases should have performed a particularly decent 
process in obtaining alternative solutions. But in addition to the rather short duration 
of their process (see section 5.3.1) these cases did not pro-actively identify or try to 
mitigate the refinancing risk caused by a lack of alternatives. 
The new category ‘optimisation of contractual elements’ grouped themes, that allowed 
the companies more flexibility, avoided the provision of collateral for the new 
financing or the inclusion of financial covenants in the new financing contracts. Figure 
5.6 demonstrates this development by comparing the relevant determinants in the two 
decision situations: 
Figure 5.6: Comparison of the Determinants (Q 2.7 and Q 3.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
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attractive conditions’) played a reduced role in the decision of the refinancing 
instrument. 
As already indicated in section 2.2.2.4, market timing theory was not acknowledged 
by research to explain capital structure decisions in SME and midcap companies. 
However, market timing theory presented the underlying assumption that management 
performs financing decisions on an individual basis and on financing instruments 
available at that decision rather than on a defined capital structure. This assumption 
could be supported by the identified determinants ‘lack of alternatives’ and ‘attractive 
conditions’ However, in none of the cases investigated and neither in the original 
mezzanine financing decision, nor in the refinancing decision, these two determinants 
were the dominant determinants. In particular, the determinants ‘strengthen the 
economic equity’ and ‘avoid shareholder dilution’ neglect the following of a market 
timing approach as management did not focus on the price of the financing alternative. 
Based on the results, the cases investigated seem not to follow a particular capital 
structure theory in their financing strategy except for the already investigated 
preference ranking under pecking order. Cases rather seem to accentuate determinants 
based on their current situation as well as on available funding sources. 
5.3.4.2 Internal Decision Process 
In addition to the timing of the refinancing, the internal decision process is of interest. 
By analysing the bank proposals for the refinancing, none of the documents included 
a timeline or process description that illustrated potential internal approval processes 
or milestones that had to be taken into account, except for the date of the envisaged 
signing of the financing agreements. Only in Case 3, a detailed update of the process 
timeline was developed by the middle management of the company and the bank added 
the internal approval processes to the schedule such as submission dates for the 
supervisory board. In all other cases later updates provided either by banks or by 
financial advisors involved, still missed that connection between external financing 
milestones and internal approval aspects. This missing processual element in the 
financing decision routine led to processes, where in some cases the middle 
management informed the top management only on a sporadic basis or where the 
supervisory board was informed by the management upon request only. 
 Results 
 
 
Mark Hill  Page 136 
Mind the Gap 
These absent interlinkages resulted in significant delays in Case 1 and Case 7. The 
document and protocol analysis in Case 1 revealed that the decision on the preferred 
financing solution took eight weeks after the submission of the evaluation of the bank 
proposals to the supervisory board of the firm. The reasoning behind this delay is that 
the regular supervisory board meeting was already scheduled for the calendar year and 
the company management and the advisors missed to inform the supervisory board on 
the required approval in advance. A second situation for the missing interlinkage and 
resulting delays could be observed during the signing of the financing contracts. Banks 
and advisors did not highlight the requirement that the managing directors of local 
subsidiaries of the company had to sign the financing agreements as well as these 
subsidiaries had to be included as guarantors. Two of the local managing directors 
were not accessible at the signing date because of annual leave. Therefore, the signing 
of the agreements had to be postponed which led to increased financing costs for the 
company. 
These processual gaps that caused delays in the process were observed in further cases. 
Case 2 and Case 5 showed a missing coordination between banks, management and 
supervisory board. In Case 2, a scheduled supervisory board meeting had to be 
cancelled because the date was not communicated to the advisors and therefore the 
proposals from the banks were not received yet. In Case 7, the missing communication 
of the planned signing date of the syndicated loan agreement led to a similar situation 
as in Case 1, as not all persons relevant for the signing were informed and did not 
attend the meeting. Again, the signing had to be postponed. Interestingly, the other 
theoretical replication case presented a different picture. Decisions in Case 4 were 
taken immediately via circular resolution after being presented by the banks or legal 
advisors. 
The involvement of external advisors did not show a significant improvement of this 
processual gap. Financial advisors and lawyers carefully supervised the external 
process and milestones, but left all internal processes with the company’s 
management. In fact, the optimistic presentation of the upcoming refinancing process 
by the advisor in Case 1 and Case 4 can be seen as one element that led to a shortfall 
in timely completing the refinancing. The advisor – or the banks as well – should have 
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highlighted this upcoming shortfall in advance to avoid an increased refinancing risk 
for the company. 
All cases that faced delays in their financing process (Case 1, Case 2, Case 5 and Case 
7) involve external managers on both levels, except for Case 1, where an external 
manager is active at middle level. There is no clear explanation for the phenomenon, 
as none of the basic descriptors allows for a clear attribution and the reasons for the 
delay vary by case. 
A second investigation relates to the depth of information presented to the supervisory 
board and the shareholders. A variety of these information packs and approval 
submissions were explored. In some cases, only summaries aggregated on three to five 
slides (Case 5, Case 6 und Case 7) were distributed. These included information on 
instrument, tranches, maturity profile and pricing as well as on financing partners and 
an outlook on the upcoming next steps. An education effect could be attributed, as only 
one of the six managers had a prior job experience. In other cases, management 
presented formal submissions that consisted of more than 20 pages, providing a decent 
analysis and comparison of the proposals received.  
5.3.5 Financial indicators 
Feedback from interview participants revealed that corporate strategy influences 
financing strategy (section 5.2.4) and research proposition RP3b stated, that indicators 
will influence the selection of the refinancing instrument. The results in section 5.2.1.4 
showed that key performance and financial ratios are an element of the financing 
strategy, even though it was not seen as one of the most important elements. Therefore 
this section explores from document analysis (a) if the financial ratios have been a 
decision parameter of the management and/or (b) if they were a limitating factor from 
a bank perspective. Table 5.14 displays the financial covenants used in the existing 
financing contracts of the cases after the performed (or envisaged) refinancing: 
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Table 5.14: Refinancing Instrument and Financial Covenants 
Case Primary refinancing 
instrument(s) 
Financial covenants in the existing/new financing 
contracts 
1 Syndicated loan Leverage (Net financial debt / adj. EBITDA) 
2 Syndicated loan 
Schuldschein 
Leverage (Net financial debt / adj. EBITDA) 
Interest rate coverage 
Minimum economic equity ratio 
3 Retained earnings Leverage (Net financial debt / adj. EBITDA) 
Minimum equity ratio 
4 Extension of standard mezzanine 
Bridge loan 
Leverage (Net financial debt / adj. EBITDA) 
Minimum economic equity ratio 
5 midcap bond Leverage (Net financial debt / adj. EBITDA) 
6 Retained earnings 
Bilateral loans 
Leverage (various definitions) 
Minimum economic equity ratio 
7 Syndicated loan Leverage (Net financial debt / adj. EBITDA) 
Source: Own illustration. 
A leverage ratio – defined accordingly with section 1.3.4 – was identified in every case 
to be included. A minimum economic equity ratio was furthermore included in four 
out of the seven cases. These two important ratios for financing contracts could not be 
identified in any interview but only in the supporting financing documents from the 
cases. No differences were observable between owner-manager and external manager 
cases. In addition, literal and theoretical cases did not differ in terms of financial ratios 
found in the documents.  
However, these two ratios are named by banks and companies to be the most common 
financial ratio in financing contracts (Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, 2009, 
2014). In particular, the leverage ratio was not only used as a limitation that could 
trigger an event of default in case the company would exceed the agreed level. This 
event of default could lead to a mandatory repayment of the financing. It was also 
identified in every case to be included in the documentation as a measure to calculate 
the interest margin of the respective instrument. This inclusion of a leverage to 
calculate a margin grid qualifies the instrument as performance sensitive debt 
corresponding to the investigation by Adam et al. in 2014. Case 5 and Case 6 must be 
differentiated from the other cases, since these used a midcap bond or bilateral loans 
respectively as primary external source of refinancing. However, even in these two 
cases, a leverage ratio was included as maximum level of indebtedness for the 
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company which would trigger a mandatory prepayment event in case of an 
exceedance.  
Coming back to performance sensitive debt, it appears that the included margin grid 
might not be a result of management optimism or management behaviour, as indicated 
by Adam et al. (2014), but depending on the chosen refinancing instrument. Margin 
grids were included in every syndicated loan agreement as well as in the syndicated 
bridge loan in Case 4. However, neither in any of the Schuldschein agreements nor in 
a reverse factoring nor in a bilateral loan agreement, a performance sensitive 
component was identified. Leverage steps within the margin grid and step-ups per 
margin grid were also quite homogeneous. 
By contrasting financial ratios used in the overall corporate strategy with ratios that 
were found in the existing financing strategy – or respective elements – it became 
obvious that in none of the cases financing ratios were included in the general 
corporate strategy. The general corporate strategy only includes performance ratios, 
whereas the three investigated financing strategies included ratios on financing, such 
as a minimum equity ratio to maintain, or liquidity ratios. Table 5.15 summarises the 
ratios identified. 
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Table 5.15: Key Financial Ratios and Financial Covenants 
Case Key performance ratios in 
the corporate strategy 
Key financial ratios in the 
financing strategy (or 
guidelines) 
Financial covenants in the 
existing/new financing 
contracts 
1 Profitability: Minimum 
consolidated EBITDA-Margin of 
10.0% 
Financing: Minimum equity ratio Leverage (Net financial debt / adj. 
EBITDA) 
2 Profitability: Minimum ROCE of 
18.0% 
Profitability: Return on Sales 
(EAT / Sales): > 4.0% 
Liquidity: Free cash flow / Sales: 
3.5% to 4.0% 
Liquidity: Minimum cash position 
of € 150 Mio. plus minimum 
undrawn revolving credit facilities 
of € 400 Mio.  
Financing: Minimum equity ratio 
Liquidity: Free cash flow / Sales: 
3.5% to 4.0% 
Liquidity: Minimum cash position 
of € 150 Mio. plus minimum 
undrawn revolving credit facilities 
of € 400 Mio. 
Leverage (Net financial debt / adj. 
EBITDA) 
Interest rate coverage 
Minimum economic equity ratio 
3 Profitability: consolidated ROCE 
of 9.0% 
Profitability: Minimum EBIT 
level of € 70 Mio. 
Financing: Minimum equity ratio 
of 30.0% 
Financing: Leverage (Net debt / 
EBITDA) < 3.5x 
Leverage (Net financial debt / adj. 
EBITDA) 
Minimum equity ratio 
4 Profitability: Minimum EBIT-
Margin 
None Leverage (Net financial debt / adj. 
EBITDA) 
Minimum economic equity ratio 
5 Profitability: Minimum EBITDA-
Margin 
None Leverage (Net financial debt / adj. 
EBITDA) 
6 Not commented Not commented Leverage (various definitions) 
Minimum economic equity ratio 
7 Profitability: Minimum EBITDA-
Margin 
Profitability: Minimum EAT-
Margin 
None Leverage (Net financial debt / adj. 
EBITDA) 
Source: Own illustration. 
Comparing the financial ratios from the financing strategy with the financial ratios 
used as covenants to be included in the financing contracts, only Case 2 and Case 3 
show a partial linkage between the two elements. In all other cases, financial ratios 
were used in the financing agreements as covenants without any feedback towards the 
financing strategy. This further indicates that these ratios are introduced by the 
financing partners rather than actively being used by the company to establish a direct 
connection between financing strategy and financing contracts. However, it must be 
recognised that such financial covenant would lead to a mandatory repayment event 
and represents an obligation for the company. In addition, the profitability ratios are 
indirectly connected to the financial ratios and the financial covenants. In Case 1, a 
reduced EBITDA-margin caused by a decreasing profitability would directly lead to 
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an increased leverage in the financing contract. Therefore, this is a limitation factor for 
the management as it is dependent from external partners in case the financial ratios 
are not met. 
By exploring the determinants that drove the refinancing decision, an interaction with 
financial indicators was explored. Especially the leverage ratio was investigated to be 
included as financial covenant in every case and independent from the chosen 
refinancing instrument. Financial covenants serve as an instrument to mitigate 
information asymmetries, as these are reported on a regular basis to the lenders and 
many financing contracts include mandatory prepayments (see section 5.3.5) in case 
these financial covenants exceed certain levels. They allow banks to get information 
on deteriorating economic conditions earlier, as firms are motivated to enter into 
discussion with the banks prior to such incident. 
5.3.6 Debt Contract Design 
As presented in section 5.3.5, the proposition of Adam et al. (2014) that optimistic or 
overconfident managers are more likely to enter into a PSD agreement and to accept 
more aggressive margin grids could not be substantiated by this research. However, 
Adam et al. summarise in their conclusion that “managerial optimism […] does not 
only affect the choice of the general leverage ratio but it also has a direct impact on 
the chosen debt instrument and its riskiness” (2014, p.20). This means that they see 
two additional levels to be explored,  
(a) the determination of the instrument itself, and  
(b) the design of relevant conditions and the risk potential associated with such 
design.  
With regard to the determination of the refinancing instrument, this research was not 
able to exclude such a management behaviour even though the management did not 
pro-actively decide which instrument to choose in the cases analysed. Furthermore, 
the results in section 5.3.4.1 showed that the management relied on the proposals made 
by potential financing partners and on the feedback from the financing advisors if 
involved in the process. 
By focussing on the design of the debt contracts, this research examined which 
paragraphs were of particular importance for the management and the shareholders of 
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the respective cases. The document analysis contrasted the first drafts of the financing 
agreements with the executed versions. In addition, the research explored further 
information and documents that were made available, such as internal memos and 
email correspondence. These information were supplied in the Cases 1 to 5. The 
following conditions – summarised in Table 5.16 – were assumed to be the most 
intensively negotiated in the cases researched. 
Table 5.16: Crucial Debt Contract Design Negotiation Aspects 
Case Dividend payouts Information 
requirements and 
reporting 
Covenant structure 
and definitions 
Transferability of 
the financing 
instrument 
1  Minimum dividend 
payment to allow for 
tax payments at 
personal level of 
shareholders 
 Maximum dividend 
payment of 75% of 
annual net income 
 
 Allowance to submit 
consolidated 
financial reports 
within 210 days after 
end of fiscal year due 
to implementation of 
new reporting 
system; banks 
requested 180 days 
 Discussion of 
breadth of 
information provided 
on consolidated level 
as well as on level of 
individual borrower; 
templates to be 
included in the 
financing contracts 
 Limitation to one 
financial covenant 
(Leverage); banks 
requested three 
covenants 
 Significant 
adjustments to the 
definitions of net 
financial debt and to 
consolidated EBITDA 
because of 
unavailability of some 
consolidated figures 
on a quarterly basis  
 More flexibility in the 
threshold to license 
group trademarks to 
external parties 
 Transferability for 
banks restricted (no 
sale of debt tranches 
to hedge funds, 
CLOs, pension 
funds, other banks) 
 Strict limitation to 
information provided 
to European central 
Bank for refinancing 
purposes 
2  Maximum dividend 
payment of 50% of 
annual net income or 
personal tax 
requirements plus 
25% of net income 
-  Adjustments to the 
financial covenants 
due to individual 
circumstances (EU 
antitrust investigation) 
 More flexibility in the 
thresholds for sales of 
company assets and 
intergroup loans 
- 
3 - -  Adjustments to the 
financial covenants 
because of changes in 
the reporting standards 
 Hedging requirements 
for variable interest 
tranches to be lowered 
 Transferability for 
banks restricted (no 
sale of debt tranches 
to hedge funds, 
CLOs) without prior 
written consent of 
the company 
Source: Own illustration.  
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Table 5.16 (continued) 
Case Dividend payouts Information 
requirements and 
reporting 
Covenant structure 
and definitions 
Transferability of 
the financing 
instrument 
4  Maximum dividend 
payment to the 
shareholders, based 
on excess cash flow 
definition 
 Extent of financial 
information to be 
provided; negotiation 
of standard tables 
and schedules in 
accordance with 
existing tools and 
platforms used 
 Adjustment of 
financial covenants to 
meet restructuring 
requirements 
 More flexibility in the 
thresholds for asset 
sales and group 
reorganisations 
 Transferability for 
banks restricted (no 
sale of debt tranches 
to hedge funds, 
CLOs) without prior 
written consent of 
the company 
5 -  Reduced reporting 
requirements on 
quarterly and annual 
basis based on 
reporting standards 
and tools currently 
used in the company 
 Reduction to one 
financial covenant 
(Leverage); banks 
requested two 
covenants 
 Increased thresholds 
for asset sales, group 
reorganisations and 
external licensing 
- 
Source: Own illustration. 
The key aspect identified is that the company management tried to mitigate risk 
towards two directions. The negotiations showed a trend to enhance operational 
flexibility for the firms and its management compared to the first draft provided by the 
financing partners. In some cases, the discussions were identified to be intense and 
negotiations were held because of differences. These differences included for example 
discussions whether asset sales would be prohibited with certain exceptions or if they 
would be generally permitted but restricted up to a certain amount or level.  
The second interesting direction for a risk mitigation aspect was the aim of the 
management in several cases to use restrictions in the financing documents to manage 
shareholder expectations or to discipline shareholder influence. This can be observed 
especially in the dividend payout restrictions, where the company management acted 
accordingly to existing dividend policy or previous routines. However, the 
management accepted limitations on dividend payments for receiving more favourable 
thresholds in the covenant sections or for obtaining a limitation that the banks are not 
allowed to sell the loans or notes to third parties (“transferability”). 
Coming back on the first research proposition RP1, differences in the degree of 
formality of the financing strategy can be observed between owner-managers and 
external managers as shown in Table 5.7 and Figure 5.1. Nevertheless, this finding 
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supports the proposition of Speckbacher & Posch (2010) that formal control systems 
are seen to be less important for owner-managers. 
These investigations presented in the prior paragraphs allow to discuss information 
asymmetries in principal agent situations, as introduced in section 5.3.5. The dilemma 
in the relationship between the principal (bank) and the agent (company management) 
seems to be mitigated via reporting requirements and covenant inclusion in the 
financing agreements. However, the situation in the second pair of relationships 
between the principal now being the shareholder(s) and the management acting as 
agent again appear to be problematic. The behaviour of the management to negotiate 
the financing contract to direct the shareholders of the companies was explored in all 
cases that are either owned by multiple family trees or an increasing range of 
shareholders, or where no owner-manager is involved in the management. In addition, 
this phenomenon was neither explored in Case 3 nor in Case 5, where a formulated 
financing strategy was identified.  
All syndicated loan agreements as well as the Schuldscheindarlehen and the midcap 
bond documentations included limitations on future investments, maximum 
indebtedness and asset disposals. The financing contracts therefore limit managers in 
operational flexibility and cash flow distribution, as proposed by Malmendier & Tate 
in 2005 (see section 2.3.1.1). But existing debt served in the cases investigated not 
only as an instrument to limit overconfident managers. The financing instrument was 
used by management to limit shareholder influence on company cash flows and on 
operational decisions. They offered a stricter monitoring on dividends to receive 
limitations from banks and investors on transferability of their share in the loan/note 
and/or an increased headroom for disposals. 
Only minimal differences were observable between owner-managers and external 
managers as the owner-managers were more focussing on the avoidance of 
transferability in Case 1 and Case 4. It has to be acknowledged that only five out of 
the seven cases provided more detailed information on the contract negotiations. 
Nevertheless, the results by Adam et al. (2014) on optimistic managers to accept more 
aggressive terms and conditions in debt contracts could not be substantiated by this 
study. 
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5.3.7 Summary 
Companies have reacted since the original mezzanine financing decision. Three cases 
pro-actively approached potential refinancing partners, but remained within a banking 
environment and did not explore further funding sources as proposed by Börner et al. 
(2010). Three cases aimed for a refinancing within a timeframe of six months, with 
two companies in need for a bridge solution as they failed to achieve the refinancing 
in that period. All cases that aimed for this refinancing period are led by owner-
managers. This finding supports the assumption, that owner-managers are overly 
optimistic in managing their process (Speckbacher & Posch, 2010). 
The results regarding the cases exploring financing alternatives available to the firm 
and current market conditions in sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4 reemphasise the analysis by 
Börner et al. (2010) that midcap companies are still lacking to assess suitable 
alternatives to reduce dependency from bank lending. Even in a situation of 
deteriorating financing markets, management teams showed only limited ability to 
initiate measures to avoid a refinancing risk as assumed in research proposition RP4a. 
Management teams did not recognise an external rating to serve as a signalling 
instrument to enhance transparency towards potential financing parties and to expand 
the financing alternatives as proposed by Börner et al. (2010). Even the theoretical 
replication cases (Case 4 and Case 7) did not use an external rating to mitigate their 
difficulties in the refinancing. However, an external rating was included in Case 5, 
where the chosen financing instrument requested such an element. Nevertheless, the 
pro-active cases presented an information package to the approached banks that allow 
for a credit assessment. 
The cases that pro-actively started the refinancing process remained within their 
banking universe. Only external managers performed a pro-active approach. This 
result again leads to the question, whether this can be seen as an indicator for owner-
managers being overly optimistic in assuming that banks will provide suitable 
solutions and approach the firm early enough. 
Furthermore, the involvement of financial advisors researched in section 5.3.2 seemed 
not to significantly enhance a broader pre-investigation by the company or an in-depth 
assessment of financing market alternatives prior to executing the refinancing process. 
This was presumed in research proposition RP4a. The results on the importance of an 
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external financial advisor are mixed. External financing advisors have been involved 
in some cases to support internal capacities and to provide market insights. In Case 4, 
the cause for mandating a financial advisor was to moderate the negotiations with the 
banks as the relationship was humbled and mutual trust was weakened. In Case 2, the 
financial advisor was introduced in a later stage to support negotiations with the 
lenders. However, refinancing instrument and banks were already selected by the 
company. 
One of the investigated aspects that led to a delay in a financing process was a lack of 
communication between management and shareholders, represented through the 
supervisory board. In particular, a missing coordination between the external financing 
process and the internal decision and approval processes was identified that led to 
significant delays in executing the refinancing. In contrast to the cases that envisaged 
an overly optimistic timeframe and a missing pro-active approach, the communication 
delay was observed in cases where external manager were involved only. 
The findings on the determinants that drove the decision for the financing instrument 
showed a shift compared to the original mezzanine financing. Determinants that were 
dominant in the standard mezzanine financing seemed not to be relevant in the 
refinancing anymore. This might be seen as an indicator that even though a financing 
strategy and a financing hierarchy exist, the detailed determinants change. Therefore, 
different capital structure theories that are attributed to several determinants could 
provide stronger or weaker explanations per decision or manager type (Ampenberger 
et al., 2013). 
Present research explored that manager types in both manager groups showed a shift 
in the determinants relevant for the refinancing compared to the original mezzanine 
financing which supports an experience effect. This result again supports Barton & 
Gordon (1987) and their proposition that a management’s perception towards risk and 
their strategy will influence the capital structure decisions of the company. 
By exploring the determinants, an interaction with financial indicators in the cases was 
investigated. Especially the leverage ratio was investigated to be included as financial 
covenant in every case and independent from the chosen refinancing instrument. By 
comparing the financial covenants included in the financing agreements with the 
financial ratios in the financing strategy or guidelines of the cases, a missing link was 
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identified. Only Case 3 included a leverage in the financing ratios that should serve as 
strategic financial indicator to manage the capital structure. However, not a single case 
included a financial ratio in the overall company strategy which is comprehensible in 
cases, where an additional financing strategy or financing guideline exist. 
Findings on financial indicators lead to the conclusion that these have been primarily 
introduced by external financing partners to serve (a) as a factor to limit raising further 
debt beyond acceptable levels to avoid an increased risk of default. The second 
conclusion is that (b) the financial ratios serve as a basis to calculate a risk-adjusted 
interest margin for the financing instrument. Both findings would support tradeoff 
theory. The margin grid leads to a risk-adjusted pricing of the financing instrument 
which motivates the management to increase profitability and therefore reduce 
financing cost.  
With regard to performance sensitive debt, the effect of overconfident managers to be 
more likely to issue PSD because they persistently overestimate future cash flows as 
proposed by Adam et al. (2014) could not be supported by the findings from the cases. 
The primarily reason for accepting pricing grids in the financing as well as the levels 
of such pricing grid was based on the chosen financing instrument itself as every 
syndicated loan included pricing grids. With regard to the determination of the 
refinancing instrument, this research was not able to exclude such a management 
behaviour even though the management did not pro-actively decide which instrument 
to choose in the cases analysed. Table 5.17 displays the additional findings from the 
current section, these have been highlighted. 
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Table 5.17: Findings on Research Propositions from Section 5.3 
Research proposition Aspect Finding 
RP1: A formulated financing 
strategy exists and has been 
applied to in the refinancing 
process. 
Confirmation of 
existing research 
Existence of a financing strategy that is based on the 
goals and the strategy for the firm (Barton & Gordon, 
1987). 
Financing strategy represents not a clear set of 
elements, but varies from case by case, based on 
different manager types and shareholder set-ups 
(Meier & Esmatyar, 2015). 
Owner-managers and firms that involve a little number 
of family trees or shareholders show a less formulated 
or integrated financing strategy and are less strict in 
following this strategy (Speckbacher & Posch, 2010). 
Most cases investigated lack the exploration of 
financing alternatives (Börner et al., 2010).  
 Contradictory 
findings 
None 
 New/additional 
findings 
Elements of the financing strategy might not primarily 
been driven by a differentiation between owner-
managers and external managers, but relating to a 
more complex strategic approach 
 Limitations None 
RP2: A targeted optimal 
financing structure exists and 
refinancing of the standard 
mezzanine has been based on 
a pecking order approach. 
Confirmation of 
existing research 
Financing decision was based on a pecking order 
approach (Barton & Gordon, 1987; Börner et al., 2010; 
Brüse, 2011; Koropp et al., 2014; Nohtse, 2012). 
Further elements would support tradeoff theory or 
findings on asymmetric information/agency theory 
(Ampenberger et al., 2013; Brüse, 2011), but could not 
be proved in the cross-case analysis. 
 Contradictory 
findings 
None 
 New/additional 
findings 
None 
 Limitations None 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Table 5.17 (continued) 
Research proposition Aspect Finding 
RP3a: The corporate strategy 
and the characteristics of the 
management team influence 
the determination of the 
refinancing instrument. 
Confirmation of 
existing research 
Existence of an interlinkage between corporate 
strategy and financing strategy (Barton & Gordon, 
1987; Ginn et al., 1995). 
Principal-agent problems identified between 
shareholders and managers. Managers use the 
financing agreements as an instrument to limit 
shareholder influence on the company. 
 Contradictory 
findings 
No support that owner-managers prefer 
performance-sensitive debt that includes variable 
interest margins linked with company leverage 
(Adam et al., 2014). 
 New/additional 
findings 
Inclusion of performance-sensitive elements is 
solely based on the chosen financing instrument. 
Causal direction between business strategy and 
financing strategy (Ginn et al., 1995): Overall 
corporate strategy influences the financing strategy. 
 Limitations Not observable, if differences based upon education or 
former job experience (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; 
Malmendier & Tate, 2005). 
RP3b: Relevant determinants 
and indicators influence the 
selection of the refinancing 
instrument. 
Confirmation of 
existing research 
Financial ratios affect the availability of financing 
instruments to the company (Barton & Gordon, 
1988; Jordan et al., 1998). 
 Contradictory 
findings 
Missing interlinkage between ratios in the overall 
company strategy as performance indicators, the 
financial ratios in the financing strategy and 
financial ratios included in the financing 
agreements.  
 New/additional 
findings 
The avoidance of a future refinancing risk as well 
as an increased independence determined the 
selection, not the cost of the alternative. 
Accentuation of determinants by company 
management show no clear link towards a single 
capital structure theory. 
 Limitations Current interest rate developments might humble 
the findings on the cost of financing being less 
relevant and should be explored in different 
financing conditions, especially in financing 
markets where margin spread are broader across 
rating categories. 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Table 5.17 (continued) 
Research proposition Aspect Finding 
RP4a: The management has 
implemented procedures and 
measures to facilitate a 
successful completion of the 
refinancing. 
Confirmation of 
existing research 
None 
 Contradictory 
findings 
Only in selected cases, measures were detected. 
These include an internal preparation phase and 
the involvement of financial advisors. 
External rating or further transparency-enhancing 
elements have not been identified. 
 New/additional 
findings 
Only external managers initiated a pro-active 
approach  
 Limitations None 
RP4b: The management team 
executed a timely refinancing 
process to avoid an increased 
refinancing risk. 
Confirmation of 
existing research 
None 
 Contradictory 
findings 
Brüse’s (2011) investigation that the companies 
already started a refinancing process or are 
thinking about the refinancing was not identified 
throughout all cases. Three cases (primarily owner-
managers) started the refinancing process too short 
in advance to secure a timely refinancing. 
Management not to assume an internal preparation 
phase. 
Primarily fact for unexpected process delays not a 
deteriorating market environment, but missing 
coordination between internal and external 
processes, especially timely involvement of the 
supervisory board by the management. 
Internal delays (primarily in cases with external 
managers) endangered the timely completion of the 
process. 
 New/additional 
findings 
None 
 Limitations None 
Source: Own illustration. 
5.4 Differences between Owner-Managers and External Managers 
As discussed in the previous sections, several situations indicated different approaches 
from owner-managers and external managers. However, the study of the refinancing 
process showed that not only optimistic owner-managers might be responsible for 
delays in the process. The research was not able to explore differences in the 
determinants that lead to the selection of a financing instrument. Based on the 
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investigations so far, the following paragraphs will explore potential differences 
between owner-managers and external managers within (a) the influence on the 
financing strategy and (b) the impact on the timely execution of the financing process. 
5.4.1 Influence on the Financing Strategy 
This research does not only focus on the management at the top executive level, but 
also on the operational management level, which is typically responsible for the 
execution of the refinancing process and the negotiations with the financing partners. 
The flat hierarchy and consensus between top managers and employees, as proposed 
by Reinemann (2011) could be identified in most cases studied with regard to the view 
on the financing strategy. Table 5.18 links the management and shareholder structure 
with the financing strategy identified. 
Table 5.18: Management and Shareholder Structure and Financing Strategy 
Case Form of the financing 
strategy 
Interview partners Shareholder 
generation 
Sales range (€) 
1 Partly formulated/ 
Communicated and agreed 
Top:  Owner-manager 
Middle:  External manager 
2-3 250-500m 
2 Communicated and agreed Top: External manager 
Middle: External manager 
4 250-500m 
3 Formulated Top: External manager 
Middle: External manager 
2 50-150m 
4 “Lived experience” Top: Owner-manager 
Middle:  Owner-manager 
1-2 50-150m 
5 Formulated Top: External manager 
Middle:  External manager 
3 250-500m 
6 “Lived experience” Top: Owner-manager 
Middle:  Owner-manager 
1 <50m 
7 Communicated and agreed/ 
“Lived experience” 
Top: External manager 
Middle: External manager 
1-2 50-150m 
Source: Own illustration. 
The two cases that presented an explicitly formulated financing strategy were managed 
by external managers on top as well as on middle management level. In addition, with 
Case 1 and Case 2 being identified as the cases where the financing strategy was either 
partly formulated, included in other strategic elements or at least a communicated and 
agreed element only one owner-manager at the top level was recognised.  
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Theoretical replication cases were detected in the less formulated categories in terms 
of financing strategy (see section 5.2.2). This less formulated strategy could be 
allocated in the owner-manager area (Case 4 and Case 6). On the other hand, Case 7 
that is also identified to follow a ‘lived experience’ approach towards financing is 
managed by external managers. 
A second explanation relates to shareholder generation and company size, both 
determinants that were identified in capital structure theories. The firms that indicated 
a ‘lived experience’ are all found in the smaller two categories in terms of company 
size. However, Case 3 presents a ‘formulated strategy’ by ranging in the same 
category. Looking at the shareholder generation in the cases investigated reveals that 
a distinction exists. Starting with the second shareholder generation, a more formulated 
approach is followed and at least guidelines or routines are established. Therefore, 
younger companies explored (not to be misunderstood to be start-ups) are lacking a 
formulated approach. They are predominantly smaller in terms of sales and found to 
be led by owner-managers. 
5.4.2 Impact on the Financing and Decision Process 
A different picture can be found by matching the management structure with the 
duration of the refinancing process discussed in section 5.3.1 and allowed for a more 
detailed exploration of behavioural aspects. 
5.4.2.1 Overconfidence 
The three cases that aimed to execute a refinancing within a period of six months (Case 
1, Case 4 and Case 6) were all led by owner-managers with the already presented result 
that two of these three cases had to use an intermediate step to avoid an increased risk 
of insolvency.  
Except for the middle management participant in Case 1, none of the responsible 
managers had a prior external job position where relevant experience from financing 
processes or decisions in other firms could be gained.  
Financial advisors that were mandated in the first four cases were not able to mitigate 
this process risk component in Case 1 and Case 4. These mitigation factors could have 
been for example (a) to highlight the importance of an internal preparation prior to 
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start the refinancing process or (b) to explain typical pitfalls within a financing process. 
On the other hand, Case 2 and Case 3 who explicitly added an internal preparation 
phase in advance are managed by external managers on top and on middle level. 
Therefore, an overconfidence bias could be assumed in the cases, where owner-
managers are responsible at top management level. Even an external middle manager 
in Case 1 was not able to identify or influence that bias. Cases that were managed by 
external managers assumed a more realistic duration of the refinancing process. But 
even in these cases, not every company included an appropriate internal preparation 
phase for such refinancing. 
A different situation was identified when studying the cases that had to cope with 
delays caused by internal issues in section 5.3.4.2. Table 5.19 links the delays 
identified with manager type and form of the financing strategy. 
Table 5.19: Financing Strategy, Manager Type and internal Delays 
Case Form of the financing 
strategy 
Interview partners Delay(s) 
1 Partly formulated/ 
Communicated and agreed 
Top:  Owner-manager 
Middle:  External manager 
 Missed to setup supervisory board 
meeting to approve financing proposals 
 Missed to align managers in 
subsidiaries to inform about the signing 
process 
2 Communicated and agreed Top: External manager 
Middle: External manager 
 Managers and advisors missed to 
coordinate internal board meetings and 
milestone for the external process 
5 Formulated Top: External manager 
Middle:  External manager 
 Managers missed to coordinate internal 
board meetings and milestone for the 
external process 
7 Communicated and agreed/ 
“Lived experience” 
Top: External manager 
Middle: External manager 
 Missed to align managers in 
subsidiaries to inform about the signing 
process 
Source: Own illustration. 
Delays in the process were only found in cases, where external managers were 
involved. Three out of the four cases with internal process delays were led by external 
managers. Some of the managers had prior external job experience. A potential 
explanation could be that owner-managers have a more direct link to the shareholders 
(Ampenberger et al., 2013). An overconfidence effect is not directly observable, but 
could only be indicated in external manager cases. 
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No other variables served as a potential explanation for this observation, as these 
delays were found in literal as well as in theoretical replication cases. They were also 
detected in cases across shareholder generations and company size. 
5.4.2.2 Representativeness 
The second heuristic, representativeness, is explored in the financing process 
(a) via mechanisms that the management team executed in order to obtain an 
overview on the financing markets prior to executing the own refinancing and  
(b) by assessing options to limit information asymmetries with the potential 
external financing partners by providing an external rating or other 
instruments. 
Enhancing transparency towards external financing partners via instruments like an 
external rating has already been identified to be primarily driven by the preferred 
financing instrument and only found in Case 5. No external rating initiative was 
investigated in cases, where syndicated loans or bilateral loans were used as primary 
refinancing instrument. An external quality assessment for Schuldscheindarlehen can 
be achieved by the application at the European Central Bank. These loans can be used 
by the investor to be pledged for refinancing purposes. Therefore, the proposal by 
Börner et al., (2010) that the management should use an external rating pro-actively is 
still missed in this refinancing situation. 
An assessment of the conditions in the financing markets by inviting several financing 
partners to present solutions or by introducing financial advisors was performed by 
Case 1 to Case 4 and Case 6. However, only in Case 4 the financial advisor introduced 
new banks or other financing partners to the company. In the other cases, the company 
management already developed a list of banks to be invited to present refinancing 
proposals, primarily consisting of existing lenders or banks that already had a prior 
lending relationship to the firm. The inclusion of external financing advisors is 
therefore seen primarily not to introduce new financing partners to the companies or 
to present alternative financing sources. They supported in the execution of the 
process, assisted in the negotiation phase of the refinancing and benchmarked terms 
and conditions offered by the banks. 
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All cases investigated were primarily relying to personal experience and proposals 
from banks which could indicate a representativeness bias across all cases. Two 
exceptions have to be considered. (a) Cases that involve financial advisors to 
benchmark terms and to support in the negotiation tried to mitigate this bias at least in 
a later stage in the process. (b) Following the results from Lichtblau & Utzig (2002), 
the focus on relationship lending in Case 6 and Case 7 can be seen as rational as these 
firms mitigate asymmetric information problems. They avoid costly measures to 
overcome these asymmetries by continuing a long-standing relationship with their core 
bank(s).  
5.4.3 Summary 
Overconfidence and representativeness biases were not clearly attributable to owner-
managers in all situations. The classification might be more complex than to solely 
differentiate between the shareholding impact and to focus on behaviour. In addition, 
only some determinants linked with specific capital structure theories were 
explainable. Probably a more strategic management typology can present a 
comprehensive framework for categorising midcap firms and their strategic approach 
towards financing. The basis for that assumption is that if business strategy influences 
financing strategy and if business planning connects with financing planning, could 
this approach also works towards financing decisions? 
 Types of Financing Practices 
 
 
Mark Hill  Page 156 
Mind the Gap 
6. Types of Financing Practices 
The results of the research showed a mixed picture regarding relevant determinants 
that allow to assign a case to base its financing decision upon a certain capital structure 
theory. Identified inefficiencies in the financing strategy, in delays of the financing 
process and differences in the terms and conditions of the financing agreements could 
not be attributed to be in particular an issue for owner-managers. It seems that 
management characteristics differ amongst cases as indicated by research proposition 
RP3a. Therefore, this chapter introduces a financing strategy typology which allows 
for a broader categorisation of manager types, financing strategies and processes. This 
approach follows the investigation that the managers in the cases explored 
predominantly stated that the financing strategy of a firm follows the business strategy 
or is an element of the business strategy. Section 6.1 provides a short overview on the 
business strategy typology chosen. Relevant elements of the typology will be 
transposed towards a financing strategy typology in section 6.2. The cases investigated 
in this research will then be categorised following the typology in section 6.3. 
6.1 From Business Strategy to Financing Strategy 
The typology for financing practices is based on the approach by Miles & Snow (1978, 
1984), as presented in section 2.5. The Miles & Snow typology was originally 
developed to cluster business strategy types. However, the approach has been adopted 
by various academic areas to generate useful typologies, e.g. in risk management 
practices (Henschel, 2010; Smallman, 1996) or to differentiate innovation strategies 
(Gimenez, 2000). Ginn et al. (1995) used the Miles & Snow typology to segment 
financing strategies in U.S. hospitals. Their approach linked the strategy types with 
certain financial determinants that were used in assessing a pecking order hierarchy. 
The results of this study showed again that identified determinants in section 5.3.4 and 
section 5.3.5 could support elements of several capital structure theories in addition to 
a pecking order concept. These findings are consistent with the mixed results by Brüse 
(2011) and Nohtse (2012) on the upcoming refinancing of the standard mezzanine. In 
addition, the behavioural biases explored in section 5.4.2 presented mixed results and 
were not solely allocated to owner-managers. 
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As this research performed an in-depth investigation on financing strategy and 
financing processes in midcap companies, the sole focus on financial determinants 
would not be useful in developing a basic typology of midcap companies. 
Interview findings indicate a dependency between business strategy and financing 
strategy. The results from this study identified that a causal direction from business 
strategy to influence financing strategy is seen by most participants (see section 5.2.4).  
Based on this dependency and the causal direction, the research transfers basic 
characteristics that Miles & Snow (1978) assign to their types towards financing 
strategy and financing process. 
6.2 Adoption of the Typology 
Miles & Snow (1978) introduce four types to categorise operational performance, as 
already presented in section 2.5: 
 Reactor, 
 Defender, 
 Prospector, and 
 Analyser. 
The types ‘defender’, ‘prospector’ and ‘analyser’ are labelled by Miles & Snow to be 
dominant types. These types can be proactive in their environment (R. E. Miles et al., 
1978, p. 557) and can achieve a successful long-term performance. The ‘reactor’ type 
responds inappropriately to developments and can only exist in stable environments. 
Miles & Snow (1978) state that the reactor represents a residual strategy when none of 
the dominant types can be assigned. The reactor needs to adopt in a changing 
environment, converting towards one of the three dominant strategy types, or 
disappears. Therefore, the further aspects are focussing on the three dominant types, 
following the original approach by Miles & Snow (1978). 
6.2.1 Defender 
The defender management type aims for a stable environment. The manager 
aggressively tries to prevent competitors from entering their market “by ignoring 
developments and trends outside of their domain” (R. E. Miles et al., 1978, p. 551) at 
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the same time. Table 6.1 presents the relevant defender characteristics by Miles & 
Snow and their adoption in a financing strategy typology. 
Table 6.1: Financing Strategy and Determinants of the Defender 
Strategic approach and 
organisation 
Main determinants and 
instruments 
Processual consideration 
Business strategy   
 Niche player 
 Operates in a stable domain 
 Tendency to ignore 
developments 
 Some product development but 
closely related to current goods 
or services 
 Manager promotions from 
within 
 Cost-efficient technology 
 Single core technology 
 Maintain strict control 
 Intensive planning cycle 
 Limited environmental 
scanning 
 Centralised control and 
information systems 
Transposition to financing strategy   
 No formal strategy required as 
control remains with top 
manager 
 Financing partners and 
financing instruments most 
important elements 
 Intensive relation to core banks 
 Conservative/reluctant towards 
financial innovations 
 Owner-managers or external 
managers without prior 
external job(s) 
 Strengthen economic equity 
 Attractive conditions 
 Mitigate shortfall in bank 
lending (core bank principle to 
mitigate principal-agent 
conflicts) 
 Availability in further 
refinancing 
 Instruments: Bank lending with 
potential add-ons 
 Internal process management 
 Financial advisors to support 
internal work or to review 
proposals 
 No prior market assessment, 
primarily relies on proposals 
from existing financing 
partners 
 Limited preference for 
providing detailed information 
or to enhance transparency 
Financial characteristics of corresponding cases (Case 6, Case 7, prior to the refinancing) 
 Growth and profitability  
(minimum to maximum): 
o Sales growth: neg. to 16.9% 
o EBITDA-margin: 14.4% to 14.7% 
o EBIT-margin: 6.5% to 12.5% 
 Indebtedness and capital structure  
(minimum to maximum): 
o Leverage: 1.43x to 3.19x 
o Gearing: 88% to 149% 
o Equity ratio: 32% in both cases 
Source: Own illustration, adapted from Miles & Snow (1978, p. 552) 
Business strategy and determinants 
The defender follows a business strategy that is based upon a stable market and product 
environment. This type is not aiming to introduce new products to the market or react 
to innovations, but to optimise his products and market position. The defender 
develops cost-effective technologies to maximise profits in this stable environment 
and solely focus on one core technology. In terms of process, the defender manager 
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maintains strict control at top level to secure effectiveness and to direct product 
developments. This management type requires intense business planning, but without 
decent environmental scans as the defender focus on his own products and in his stable 
market. Based on this management approach, control and information systems are 
managed centrally. The defender prefers to rely to internal managers, either owner-
managers or external managers that made their career within the firm and are familiar 
with routines, products and procedures. 
Financing strategy and determinants 
Based on the centralised control and decision routines, no formal financing strategy is 
needed as only few people act as decision makers. The defender acts in a stable 
financing environment, which leads to an intense relationship to core bank(s). 
Therefore, financing partners and financing instruments are the main elements in the 
financing organisation. Financial innovations are seen as being risky and costly as 
these might require new internal procedures or because there is no experience with 
such products. The aim for cost-effectiveness makes attractive conditions and 
strengthening the economic equity to achieve an optimal credit assessment the most 
important determinants. The defender must avoid a shortfall in bank lending as he 
relies in particular on relationship banks. This management type provides those to the 
core banks, but is reluctant to provide detailed information to further parties. This is 
seen to be costly and in addition these information are at risk to leak and might be 
made available to competitors. Given this dependency on bank loans, a further core 
determinant for selecting a financing instrument is the availability in a future 
refinancing, in particular after the experience with standard mezzanine. Defenders 
prefer bank lending, supplemented with additional bank instruments, such as leasing. 
Financing Process 
The defender wants to control the financing process and maintains the project 
management. Financial advisors are seen to be costly and only to provide limited added 
value, given the stable relationship with core banks. In case financial advisors are 
involved, they solely have a role as a sparring partner, supporting internal work or 
reviewing bank proposals. The defender avoids a prior market assessment, primarily 
relies on proposals from existing financing partners. As already described, the 
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defender shows only limited preference for providing detailed information or to 
enhance transparency. 
6.2.2 Prospector 
The prospector type is described to be in many determinants the opposite of the 
defender. However, the prospector is presenting a clear and consistent pattern, like the 
defender. Prospectors act in a more dynamic environment. Core competence of the 
prospector is that this type identifies new opportunities fast and can rapidly respond to 
trends through innovation and adoption. The prospector is not primarily aiming for 
highest profitability levels, but for market share and competitive advantage. Table 6.2 
groups the relevant characteristics of a prospector type. 
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Table 6.2: Financing Strategy and Determinants of the Prospector 
Strategic approach and 
organisation 
Main determinants and 
instruments 
Processual consideration 
Business strategy   
 Entering and developing new 
markets 
 Operates in a dynamic 
environment 
 Fast responder to new 
developments and innovations 
 Manager promotions from 
within as well as external hires 
 High-end and flexible 
technologies 
 Multiple technologies or 
services 
 Low degree of formalisation 
 Proactive planning cycle 
 Intensive research and 
development combined with 
environmental scanning 
 Decentralised control and 
information systems 
Transposition to financing strategy   
 Little to some strategy to allow 
for reaction to developments 
 Financing partners, general 
financing principles and further 
policies most important 
elements 
 Open to alternative financing 
partners and financial 
innovations 
 No clear preference for 
manager type: Owner-
managers, external managers 
with or without prior external 
job(s) 
 Attractive conditions 
 Increase independence/ enter 
new markets 
 Contractual optimisation 
 Instruments: Bank lending, 
debt capital market financings, 
alternative and innovative 
financings 
 Internal or external process 
management 
 Financial advisors to manage 
process and/or support in 
negotiations 
 External market assessment 
 Willingness to enhance 
transparency and to provide 
information, in some cases 
problems due to decentralised 
information systems 
Financial characteristics of corresponding cases (Case 1, Case 4, Case 5, prior to the refinancing) 
 Growth and profitability  
(minimum to maximum): 
o Sales growth: neg. to 6.71% 
o EBITDA-margin: 3.7% to 13.8% 
o EBIT-margin: 1.4% to 11.1% 
 Indebtedness and capital structure  
(minimum to maximum): 
o Leverage: 0.46x to 4.44x 
o Gearing: 40% to 118% 
o Equity ratio: 24% to 27% 
Source: Own illustration, adapted from Miles & Snow (1978, p. 554) 
Business strategy and determinants 
The prospector seeks for additional profits by product and market innovation 
strategies. This manager operates in a dynamic environment by developing new 
products and creating new markets. He is particular successful in highly competitive 
environments as his organisation is aligned to respond quickly to new developments. 
This type seeks always for the manager that presents the best set-up (experience, 
education and knowhow, network, etc.) for the respective task. The prospector is 
therefore indifferent in hiring external managers or to promote internal candidates. 
Given the competitive and innovative structure, the prospector organisation develops 
 Types of Financing Practices 
 
 
Mark Hill  Page 162 
Mind the Gap 
and maintains multiple technologies or services that are flexible and can be adopted. 
This reactive and flexible structure is not very formalised and involves a proactive 
business planning. A core challenge for the prospector is to anticipate trends and 
innovations which requires intensive research and development combined with 
environmental scanning. The adaptive organisation of the prospector further requires 
a decentralised information system. 
Financing strategy and determinants 
An integrated formulated financing strategy would limit the prospector to respond 
immediately to new developments and financing opportunities. Therefore, this 
manager type only involves necessary parts of a financing strategy to keep a consistent 
structure by avoiding inflexible processes. General financing principles as a 
framework, further policies like a hedging memorandum or an investment policy and 
financing partners are the core strategic elements of the prospector. The type is 
interested in obtaining alternative financing solutions and financial innovations that 
support his competitive advantage. As for the product portfolio, the prospector aims to 
increase independence from financing partners and to enter new markets. He avoids 
limitations and seeks contractual optimisation. Even though this manager type is 
interested in achieving attractive conditions, he would trade this determinant for 
gaining more flexibility. 
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Financing Process 
As for the preferred manager type, the prospector mandates financial advisors to 
moderate complex financing processes or to support in contract negotiations. 
Therefore, he is indifferent whether an internal or an external process management is 
installed. Prior to the process, a market assessment will be conducted, but no particular 
internal preparation phase is necessary. The prospector is flexible in providing 
information or to enhance transparency via external measures to achieve the preferred 
financing solution. The decentralised structure of information systems hinders in some 
cases a comprehensive information transfer. 
6.2.3 Analyser 
This management type resides between the defender and the prospector. An analyser 
manager combines characteristics from both types to maximise profitability based on 
a given risk appetite. Even though this combination of the ‘best of both worlds’ allows 
the analyser to react to market developments but not commit the same market entrance 
risks as the prospector, this type also faces individual risks and challenges. These occur 
in the complex structure the analyser type built in achieving a balanced strategy that 
involves all relevant determinants. The Table 6.3 below groups the main 
characteristics of the analyser type. 
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Table 6.3: Financing Strategy and Determinants of the Analyser 
Strategic approach and 
organisation 
Main determinants and 
instruments 
Processual consideration 
Business strategy   
 Developing existing and 
entering in new markets 
 Can operate in dynamic and 
stable environments 
 Identifies and reacts to new 
developments and innovations 
 Manager promotions based on 
assessment process 
 Balanced product-market 
development 
 Dual technological core (stable 
and flexible component) 
 Middle to high degree of 
formalisation 
 Intensive planning cycle 
 Some research and 
development combined with 
environmental scanning 
 Moderate centralised 
controlling and information 
systems 
Transposition to financing strategy   
 Formal strategy to allow for 
clear structures in complex 
environments and to react on 
developments 
 Financing instruments, general 
financing principles and 
description of process most 
important elements 
 Several relationship banks, 
willingness to expand bank 
financing towards established 
alternatives 
 Preference for external 
managers with prior experience  
 Contractual optimisation 
 Avoidance of shareholder 
dilution 
 Availability in further 
refinancing 
 Instruments: Bank lending, 
debt capital market financings, 
selected alternative financings 
 Prefer internal process 
management with external 
support 
 Financial advisors to support 
process and/or in negotiations 
 Limited external market 
assessment 
 Willingness to enhance 
transparency and to provide 
information 
Financial characteristics of corresponding cases (Case 2, Case 3, prior to the refinancing) 
 Growth and profitability  
(minimum to maximum): 
o Sales growth: 0.59% to 4.72% 
o EBITDA-margin: 6.9% to 9.6% 
o EBIT-margin: 4.6% in both cases 
 Indebtedness and capital structure  
(minimum to maximum): 
o Leverage: 0.83x to 0.86x 
o Gearing: 25% to 57% 
o Equity ratio: 24% to 27% 
Source: Own illustration, adapted from Miles & Snow (1978, p. 556). 
Business strategy and determinants 
The analyser can develop existing markets and products (like the defender) and enter 
into new markets if this seems appropriate. This management type operates in different 
environments and can react to new developments. However, he is not the driver for 
innovation like the prospector. This type aims to hire external and experienced 
managers to introduce further know-how to the team. An analyser opts for a balanced 
mix of products and markets to be able to react to developments. This strategy type 
shows the highest level of formalism to manage the complexity of the strategy, 
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including an intense business planning cycle. Like the prospector, the analyser 
performs research and environmental scanning. But these aspects are not as strong as 
in the previous type, as the analyser still aims to be cost-effective. The information 
system is centralised, but allows for some flexibility. 
Financing strategy and determinants 
The typology requires the highest degree of formulated financing strategy to ensure 
clear structures and decisions in the complex environment and to react to developments 
at the same time. Therefore, financing instruments, general financing principles and a 
process description are core elements. The analyser keeps relationships with several 
banks or financing partners and is willing to expand bank financing towards 
alternatives. However, he is not aiming for latest and innovative trends, but for proved 
and established alternatives that suit his needs. 
The analyser aims for contractual optimisation, in particular for flexibility and in 
maintaining control over cash flows and operational decisions. As this manager 
combines stability with flexibility, he tries to avoid a shareholder dilution as long as a 
new shareholder would not provide additional merits. Preferred financing instruments 
are bank loans and established debt capital market products like a Schuldschein or 
other private placement instruments. 
Financing Process 
The analyser prefers an internal process management with external support by a 
financial advisor for process management and negotiations. An internal preparation 
phase and a market assessment are supported if seen as a rational element to enhance 
the decision basis. Transparency towards financing partners and the submission of 
information packages is supported in case this will lead to better results. 
6.3 Example Cases and Type Description 
To illustrate the financing strategy typology developed in the previous section, typical 
cases will be discussed, based on the identified results. 
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6.3.1 Defender Type: Case 6 and Case 7 
Due to the performed refinancing and the investigated financing process, Case 6 and 
Case 7 are dedicated to be a defender type. 
Strategic approach and organisation 
Case 6 is a manufacturing company active in the optical industry sector. The firm is 
family-owned and operated and presented annual sales of up to € 50 million in the 
fiscal year prior to the refinancing. Both interview participants acknowledged that a 
financing strategy should be an element of the overall corporate strategy. In terms of 
formality, both indicated that there is no need for a formulated financing strategy as 
all decisions are taken by the owners. The participants stated that they are aiming for 
a broad financing base that relies on bilateral bank loans with up to ten partners, 
primarily small and regional savings banks and cooperative banks. The company used 
retained earnings and an expansion in their existing bilateral bank loan facilities to 
fund the refinancing of standard mezzanine. 
Case 7 is managed by external managers on middle and on top level. The external 
management team was installed by the owner family several years ago during a 
succession reorganisation. The top manager was with the firm throughout his career, 
the middle manager had a prior job position with an audit firm. The company operates 
in the media sector and had annual sales between € 50 million and € 150 million in the 
fiscal year prior to the refinancing. Operational performance had been under constant 
pressure in the last years due to intense competition and aftermaths from the financial 
crisis. The interview participants stated that there is no formal financing policy in 
place, but a verbal agreement with the shareholder family. During the refinancing, the 
passing of the old shareholder led to a structural reorganisation and required additional 
aspects to be considered. The two inheritors needed a minimum dividend in the next 
years to be able to pay inheritance taxes, even in a deteriorating operational situation 
of the company. Refinancing was performed via a renewal of the syndicated loan 
agreement. Core success factor in view of the participants was that the core bank that 
led the syndicated loan consortium is also the core bank of the shareholder family. The 
core bank therefore had a full picture on firm and shareholder requirements. 
 Types of Financing Practices 
 
 
Mark Hill  Page 167 
Mind the Gap 
Case 6 and Case 7 were both identified to present a less formulated or even a ‘lived 
experience’ form of financing strategy (see section 5.2.2). Participants from both cases 
presented answers in their interviews that financing partners and financing instruments 
are core elements in their strategic approach. In addition, both cases heavily relied 
towards their existing core banks, by renewing the existing syndicated loans in Case 7 
or by new bilateral loans from existing banks combined with retained earnings in Case 
6 (see section 5.2.1.2). No new or innovative financing instruments were considered 
during the refinancing. 
Main determinants and instruments 
Case 6 was able to maintain a strong equity ratio and achieved attractive financing 
conditions as well as suitable add-on instruments for working capital needs. 
The managers in Case 7 had to negotiate a minimum dividend clause with banks to 
comply with upcoming tax payments on individual shareholder level. During the 
negotiations, the managers accepted a mechanism that a certain amount of earnings 
need to be retained until a certain equity ratio is reached again. However, they also 
receive the required minimum dividend clause. 
Processual consideration 
Case 6 was approached by several core banks six months prior to the maturity of the 
standard mezzanine and successfully completed the refinancing within ten weeks. 
In Case 7, the discussions of the standard mezzanine refinancing started eight months 
prior to the maturity as the management had to renegotiate the overall syndicated loan 
agreement caused by the passing of the old shareholder. 
Both cases did not involve any financial advisor in the process and did not perform 
any market assessment as both were either approached by their banks (Case 6) or 
forced to start negotiations based on other circumstances (Case 7). 
Financial Characteristics 
The cases that were assigned to the defender type show the highest profitability 
margins of the investigated cases. This would correspond with the aim of defender 
managers to enhance cost-efficiency. Interestingly, the defender Case 6 also presented 
the highest sales growth which would have been more a characteristic for a prospector. 
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However, capital structure and indebtedness showed highest equity ratios of all cases 
explored. This could be seen as an indication that defender types want to present stable 
balance sheet ratios to be able to cope with unexpected events as they are performing 
limited analysis on market and product trends only. The broad range of leverage shows 
the importance of bank loans for those two cases as funding source. 
6.3.2 Prospector Type: Case 1, Case 4 and Case 5 
Strategic approach and organisation 
Case 1 is a family-owned and operated company in the food industry with annual sales 
ranging between € 250 million and € 500 million prior to the refinancing. The company 
recently entered Asian markets and currently changes its product structure to respond 
to customer demand. Interview participants explained that the firm follows a financing 
strategy which is not formally written down in a single document. The financing 
strategy is included in several documents such as guidelines and memoranda. The 
strategy includes a core bank policy. A shareholder agreement excludes the ability to 
raise equity from external investors and limits the ability to sell equity outside the 
existing family. 
Case 4 operates in the logistic manufacturing area. The company is family-owned and 
family shareholders are acting on top and middle management level. In the fiscal year 
prior to the refinancing, the company achieved annual sales between € 50 million and 
€ 150 million. Both managers have no external job experience. The interview 
participants stated that the company does not have a financing strategy but is in no 
need for such a strategy, as the managers also represent the majority of the 
shareholders. Nevertheless, there are two limitating factors. Equity must be kept within 
the owner family which limits the ability to raise additional equity funds. Furthermore, 
the company aims to comply with the financial covenant that is included in the bank 
loan agreement.  
The third case that has been assigned to the prospector type area is Case 5. Being an 
international manufacturing and engineering company with annual sales between € 
250 million and € 500 million, Case 5 is operated by an external management team. 
The company implemented formulated financing guidelines for the group. These 
guidelines include a list of preferred bank partners to work with as well as key terms 
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and conditions to be considered in negotiations. The company planned an IPO back in 
2002, but stopped the process as capital markets were not available at that time.  
Based on a proposal from one bank, Case 5 started to evaluate refinancing options 12 
months prior to the maturity. This bank proposal preferred a refinancing via a midcap 
bond. The company invited several potential banks to assess market conditions and 
decided to execute the proposed midcap bond refinancing, combined with a new 
revolving credit line. The midcap bond was not used solely to refinance standard 
mezzanine, but also major parts of the existing senior bank loans. Even though interest 
expenses increased, the interview participants indicated that they were able to achieve 
contractual optimisation for the company. These optimisation items included the 
reduction of financial covenants to comply, the limitation of information rights for 
financing partners as well as to ease the repayment profile for the firm. 
The three cases identified vary significantly in terms of formality of their financing 
strategy. But even Case 5 had a financing strategy in place that allowed to react quickly 
on new and innovative financing concepts. Case 4 – being a theoretical replication  
case – nevertheless showed flexibility as they were discussing to include individual 
mezzanine or even an external minority shareholder to mitigate their failed refinancing 
approach. 
Main determinants and instruments 
All three cases aimed to generate or enhance flexibility towards existing bank 
financing. It could be either achieved via optimisation of loan contracts or by exploring 
new funding sources. In addition, attractive conditions were amongst the frequently 
identified responses. The three prospector cases refinanced via a variety of funding 
sources and with several types of financing partners. 
Processual consideration 
Case 1 and Case 4 both aimed for a rather short refinancing process of six months and 
were both not able to complete the financing within that timeframe. Case 1 had to use 
a bridge loan from banks that afterwards provided the long-term refinancing via 
syndicated loans and an additional Schuldschein. The managers involved a financial 
advisor to support in the later negotiations. Major reasons for the delay were problems 
in generating the required information for the banks in time based on their various and 
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unconnected information systems as well as communication gaps between managers 
and shareholders. 
Case 4 had to mitigate a more severe refinancing risk as banks were not able to support 
the refinancing based on the declining operational performance. One mezzanine 
provider extended the financing and the second mezzanine tranche was temporarily 
refinanced via a bank bridge loan. The management therefore used advisors to present 
alternative funding solutions and started negotiations with individual mezzanine 
providers. The inclusion of external equity was also discussed. This prompt adoption 
of their approach by involving alternative instruments, performance of a market 
assessment and the involvement of external advisors has been the reasons, why Case 
4 is still seen to be more connected with a prospector typology and not as a defender. 
Their need for a bridge financing was primarily caused by a late start of the process 
that is related to the low degree of formality and the underestimating of the bank 
financing ability. 
Financial Characteristics 
The three assigned prospector cases included the strongest sales growth (Case 1), but 
also with Case 4 a firm with negative sales growth in the year prior to the refinancing. 
Profitability margins presented the largest spread compared to the other two 
typologies. This could be seen as an indicator for the focus of prospector types on 
gaining market share and competitive advantage through innovation and technology 
rather than to optimise cost-efficiency. The analysis of the cases further revealed more 
aggressive capital structure ratios in terms of higher leverage and lower equity ratio, 
but still with large spreads between the cases. These more aggressive ratios could be 
seen again in connection with the strive for development and innovation rather than to 
focus on efficiency and profitability. 
6.3.3 Analyser Type: Case 2 and Case 3 
Strategic approach and organisation 
The company investigated in Case 2 is an automotive company with annual sales 
ranging between € 250 million and € 500 million. The majority of the firm is owned 
by the founding family, a private equity house holds a minority stake. No integrated 
formulated financing strategy exists, but several elements were identified. These 
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elements have been agreed between managers and shareholders and include a target 
capital structure of the firm, preferred financing instruments and key financial ratios. 
The elements are seen to be included in the overall company strategy. Both managers 
acting as interview participants are external managers with prior job experience. 
In Case 3, both interview participants were external managers that have prior job 
experience. The company started its operations in the power and utility sector and 
expanded into further areas. The family-owned company had annual sales between  
€ 50 million and € 150 million prior to the refinancing. The company faced intensive 
competition, like Case 4 and Case 7. However, the company reacted to that 
development by reducing operational cost and reduce indebtedness.  
Main determinants and instruments 
Both cases aim to avoid a shareholder dilution, even though Case 2 was forced to 
increase the equity ratio during the financial crisis by involving an external 
shareholder. The cases refinanced their standard mezzanine by either using retained 
earnings and increase their syndicated loan (Case 3), or by a combination of syndicated 
loans and the placement of a Schuldschein (Case 2). They strived for contractual 
optimisation elements in their financing negotiations. However, Case 3 had to accept 
that further information were requested by lenders to gain a better understanding on 
the market challenges. Nevertheless, Case 3 was able to negotiate financial covenants 
that were adjusted to their needs. 
Case 2 also had to present more detailed information to the financing partners as an 
EU antitrust investigation started during the negotiation phase. As for the previous 
case, management of Case 2 could achieve significant contractual adjustments that 
reflected potential outcomes of the antitrust investigation. 
Processual consideration 
The cases both mandated external advisors to support the process and started an 
internal preparation phase prior to the refinancing process. The processes were started 
approximately 12 months prior to the maturity. In Case 2, circumstances occurred that 
led to a delay in the process (see section 5.3.4.2), but could be mitigated. 
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Financial Characteristics 
The two analyser cases both showed growth and profitability margins with lower 
spreads compared to the other two types. In all three ratios, Case 2 and Case 3 do not 
present maximum or minimum values across cases. This could be seen as an indicator 
for an analyser type who combines aspects of the previous two cases and avoids 
extreme levels. An interesting finding is that the two cases assigned to the analyser 
type present leverage and gearing ratios that are even below the ratios of a defender. 
A possible explanation could be that analyser managers are open to other funding 
sources – like the inclusion of minority equity during the financial crisis in Case 2 – 
and therefore do not rely primarily on bank loans in general. 
6.4 Summary 
The proposed financing typology shows that financing strategy has a different 
importance to the different manager types. This was investigated in terms of form as 
well as in terms of core elements to be involved. In addition, the types have individual 
approaches towards the financing process. Inefficiencies were explored across these 
types that relate in particular to delays caused by inadequate communication and 
insufficient alignment between internal procedures and the timeline for the 
refinancing. Furthermore, many participants across the typology acknowledge the 
importance of a financing strategy but seem not to be aware of elements that such 
financing strategy could include. These aspects will be reflected in the practical 
implications. 
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7. Practical Implications 
The presented financing strategy typology and the attribution of the cases explored to 
one of the types based on the characteristics of the financing decision led to the 
question how a template for a financing strategy and a prototype of a financing process 
would look like. Even though the different types of financing practices will put a 
varying amount of effort in setting up a financing strategy, a template that outlines the 
potential elements as well as underlying financing principles and examples could help 
in mitigating the identified inefficiencies in the decision process. 
Based on the main findings presented and the intense exploration of the cases, the 
identified differences between form and elements of a midcap financing strategy 
across all types lead to the formulation of this template for a holistic financing strategy. 
It is not aiming to represent an ideal or optimal financing strategy that derived through 
research, but wants to present what elements could be included. Section 7.1 presents 
the main categories of a financing strategy. The following section 7.2 lays out the 
financing principles that could be involved per category in more detail. Section 7.3 
completes the chapter by introducing a prototype financing process with a particular 
focus on the identified inefficiencies from the processes investigated, in particular the 
internal preparation phase that was missed in five cases and the missing interaction 
between management and supervisory board or shareholders. 
7.1 Potential Structure of a Financing Strategy 
This framework derived by the exploration of the cases and consists of four core 
elements. Starting from the described interlinkage with the overall corporate strategy 
and deriving key performance indicators, this holistic framework also includes 
strategic financial requirements each company should define. A further component of 
such financing strategy is the careful evaluation of suitable financing instruments and 
partners to work with. The fourth core element is the definition of a basic financing 
process for the company, combining internal preparation phase, external execution 
phase and the inclusion of internal approval requirements in such a process. Figure 7.1 
presents this template for a midcap financing strategy.  
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Figure 7.1: Components of a Holistic Financing Strategy  
 
Source: Own illustration. 
Business strategy and key performance indicators 
The research revealed a causal direction from business strategy towards financing 
strategy. The first element of a financing strategy should therefore be the consideration 
of the overall strategic goals of the firm to be adequately reflected in the financing 
strategy. Financial and performance ratios can be used as a connecting element 
between those two strategies. This interlinkage was only partially explored in the 
research. 
Strategic financial requirements 
Business strategy for the firm leads to an investment strategy and is reflected in the 
business plan of the firm. These items must be responded to in the financing strategy 
to ensure an appropriate funding for the business plan and to cope with expected 
growth. For example, a fast growing prospector company might include a strategic 
plan to expand towards equity capital markets and plan an IPO, such as Case 5 did in 
2002. 
Financing instruments and partners 
The two elements that were identified in most interviews were financing instruments 
and partners. It is seen to be crucial to define what financing instruments suit the needs 
3 Financing Instruments and Partners 4 Financing Process
Definition of requirements for a (potential) financing 
instrument
■ Definition of a portfolio of suitable financing 
instruments and a target share within the overall 
financing mix
■ Exclusion criteria for certain instruments or financing 
markets
Definition of requirements for a (potential) financing 
partner
■ Minimum criteria for a (potential) financing partner
■ Definition of disqualification criteria
Development of a target financing process
■ Development of an ideal financing process that can 
be applied to in every upcoming financing situation
– Definition of milestones to be achieved by the 
company management
– Templates for evaluating and presenting offers 
from potential financing partners
– Development of a maturity profile for the existing 
financing instruments to deduct adequate starting 
points for upcoming financing processes
1
Business Strategy and Key Performance 
Indicators
2 Strategic Financial Requirements
Interlinkage with business strategy
■ Consideration of the overall strategic goals
■ Definition of financing structure
Introduction of key performance indicators
■ Usage of measurable key performance indicators for 
the corporate controlling and definition of levels
– Performance ratios
– Financial ratios
Definition of financing needs
■ Quantification of the goals and measures identified 
from the business strategy, e.g.
– Strategic investments and other financing needs 
resulting from the strategic financial budget/plan
– Development towards capital markets
■ Dividend policy
■ Limitation of (personal) liabilities
Financing Strategy of a 
Midcap Company
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of the firm and financing partners to work with. Even in a defender environment, where 
bank lending still is the major source of external financing, management should be 
considering pros and cons of alternative sources. For example, in case that a 
management is averse about debt funds or hedge funds becoming financing partners, 
the company should be careful towards viewing all capital market instruments as 
suitable forms. 
Financing process 
The revealed inefficiencies in the process to be a major risk factor in obtaining a 
suitable refinancing solution in the envisaged timeframe points the importance of 
implementing a clear and consistent process. The financing process should highlight 
the different phases of such a process and could start by introducing an internal 
preparation phase. Relevant milestones need to be specified and communicated to all 
relevant parties. But even prior to that communication, all relevant parties need to be 
identified and introduced to the process to avoid the delays identified in section 5.3.4.2. 
A second item could be the development of templates for evaluating and presenting 
offers from potential financing partners to allow for an informed and prompt approval 
by decision-makers at all company levels. The third item could be the strategic 
development of a company-wide maturity profile for the existing financing 
instruments to deduct adequate starting points for upcoming financing processes. 
7.2 Elements of the Financing Strategy: The Financing Principles 
Each core element can be further detailed by underlying ‘financing principles’. These 
resulting financing principles are based on the main findings presented in the previous 
sections and weaknesses observed as well as on the documents analysed. These 
financing principles were compiled to serve  
(a) as a basic template for midcap companies in establishing their integrated 
financing strategy, and 
(b) as a basis to develop variables that might be able to test the findings in a broader 
questionnaire survey. 
These financing principles should not be understood as a single and comprehensive 
framework, but to be seen as a model kit where midcap companies can combine, adopt, 
change or add to meet individual requirements. Table 7.1 presents the developed 
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financing principles, which core element of the financing strategy they relate to and 
explanations or examples for each financing principle. 
Table 7.1: Recommendations and Examples for the Development of Financing Principles 
Element of 
financing 
strategy Financing principle Examples / explanation 
1. Business 
strategy 
and key 
perfor-
mance 
indicators 
a. Financing 
structure 
 
 Financing at level of [holding company / subsidiaries / special 
finance vehicle] to cope with the overall strategic plan of the 
company, e.g. diversification or internationalisation strategies 
 Ensure optimal utilisation of financing capabilities of the 
overall company / group by centralising / decentralising the 
financing function 
 Inclusion of requirements for special financing situations, such 
as subsidised loans 
 b. Limitation of 
financial risks 
 
 Mitigation of the following potential risk factors 
 Credit risks 
 Pricing and volatility risks 
 Liquidity risks 
 Mitigation of these risk factors by adopting an appropriate 
hedging strategy 
 c. Financial ratios 
 
 Leverage (defined as Net debt to EBITDA) not exceeding 
[x.x]times EBITDA 
 Minimum equity ratios of [xx.x]% 
 [other / sector specific ratios] 
 Inclusion of defined events that allow for a temporary shortfall 
in these ratios, e.g. because of unplanned additional investment 
needs or special events and mechanisms to return to the defined 
ratios 
 d. Profitability and 
performance 
ratios 
 ROCE of [xx.x]% at company level 
 Target minimum cash flow 
 Target EBIT(DA) or respective margins 
 [other / sector specific ratios] 
 Benchmarking with competitors 
 e. Flexibility  No limitations or restrictions of financing capacity at holding 
level caused by financing activities at subsidiary level 
 Definition of minimum funding reserve for unexpected events 
or unplanned additional investment needs, benchmarking with 
competitors 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Table 7.1 (continued) 
Element of 
Financing 
Strategy Financing Principle Examples / Explanation 
2. Strategic 
financial 
require-
ments 
a. Securing the 
funding base 
 Basis is the strategic company planning / budget 
 Definition of financing needs and timing for such needs to 
avoid shortfall in financing strategic investments or general 
corporate needs 
 Definition of minimum available funding reserve to be obtained 
during the horizon of the strategic corporate planning 
 b. Dividend policy  Definition of general dividend principles (sometimes already 
included in the company’s articles of association); e.g. 
Limitation on annual dividends as long as the minimum equity 
ratio is located below the target ratio or the Leverage exceeds a 
certain range 
 Careful evaluation of different forms of organisation and impact 
on general dividend layout 
 c. Limitation of 
(personal) 
liabilities 
 Definition of general rules and limitations for liabilities for the 
company that external financing partners typically envisage 
 Regulation on potential personal liabilities of the owners / 
shareholders, depending on the form of the respective 
organisation e.g. limited partnerships 
3. Financing 
instru-
ments and 
partners 
a. Mixture of 
instruments and 
maturities 
 The company‘s financing should [be a diversified portfolio of 
instruments / be based on long-term bilateral bank financing / 
syndicated loan facilities / capital market instruments] 
 The maturity profile of the financing mix reflects the nature of 
the business 
 The instruments chosen avoid significant refinancing risks 
based on single refinancing events 
 All financings should include a maturity profile that is adequate 
to the respective usage of the funds / investment 
 b. Optimisation of 
funding cost 
 Finding a financing portfolio that optimises (but not necessarily 
minimises) the cost of funding for the company by maintaining 
the other financing principles 
 c. Collateral  Definition of collaterals that are available to secure external 
debt / negative pledge 
 d. Relationship to 
banks / financing 
partners 
 Definition of core or relationship banks and depth of 
relationship, e.g. new financing business at company or group 
level only to be discussed with defined core banks 
 Criteria for defining a bank as core or relationship bank, such as 
rating, regional presence and focus, competence in relevant 
products and services 
 e. Potential new 
financing 
partners and 
investors 
 Definition of criteria for accepting a new financing partner such 
as leasing companies, pension funds or insurance companies 
 Disqualification criteria – especially with regard to capital 
market instruments – e.g. no hedge funds, no financing partners 
with a jurisdiction outside the EU, no sovereign funds 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Table 7.1 (continued) 
Element of 
Financing 
Strategy Financing Principle Examples / Explanation 
4. Financing 
process 
 
a. Exemplary 
financing process 
 Development of an exemplary financing process that includes 
all key milestones; starting from internal preparation, covering 
selection and approach of identified potential financing 
partners, selection and negotiation process until funding of the 
new financing instrument 
 Maintain a stringent financing process with a timely execution 
to avoid refinancing risks 
 b. Templates  Design of templates for executing the financing process as well 
as for the selection and internal approval process(es) 
 c. Maturity 
overview 
 Establish a company-wide banking ledger that avoids any 
unexpected refinancing event to occur as well as to be able to 
execute the developed exemplary financing process 
Source: Own illustration. 
7.3 Prototype of a Financing Process 
To continue the fourth principle of a financing strategy, a prototype or template for a 
financing process has been developed. Figure 7.2 displays the phases as well as core 
processual steps. 
Figure 7.2: Phases of a Financing Process 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
 Negotiation of offers 
 Fixing of conditions ahead of final 
contract awarding
 Negotiation of documentation 
 Signing
 Fulfilment of conditions precedent
 Funding
 Distribution of information package 
to potential financing partners
 Management presentation or Q&A 
sessions
 Review of received indicative term 
sheets or proposals
 Recommendation for preferred 
solution (s)
 Preparation of information package 
(business plan, annual reports, 
loan book, indicative term sheets)
 Formulation of an invitation letter
 Shortlisting of financing partners to 
be provided with information pack
 Preparation of management 
presentation for Q&A sessions or 
roadshow with potential partners
 Identification of financial goals and 
priorities
 Determination of approach and 
timing based on conditions of 
financial markets 
 Definition of appropriate depth 
information provided during the 
process
 Consideration of existing relations 
with banks and investors
 Identification of appropriate banks 
and / or investors to address during 
the process
I. Analysis of financing markets 
and determination of approach
II. Preparation
III. Market approach and 
dialogue
IV. Negotiation and 
documentation
External phase: Approach, negotiation and documentationInternal preparation phase
Permanent coordination of all relevant internal and external parties
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7.3.1 Internal preparation phase 
The developed financing strategy typology showed that not all three types are 
concerned about an internal preparation phase. However, consistent planning and a 
market assessment would have helped in executing a process without the investigated 
interruptions and delays.  
Analysis of financing markets and determination of approach 
The first step in preparing for a financing decision is to identify the goal and priorities 
to be achieved. This links to the elements and determinants of the financing strategy. 
After this internal assessment, an external market assessment could be considered to 
detect which financing might be suitable in current market conditions. Following these 
investigations, the information requirements by potential financing partners should be 
assumed and mirrored with available packages based on the implemented information 
systems. The last step is the determination of potential financing partners that seem 
suitable to the company and its financing needs. This determination involves an 
assessment of the existing relations with banks and investors. 
Preparation 
The second step relates to the preparation of the documents that are required during 
the financing process. In a pro-active approach, a request letter should act as a cover 
for the documents provided. This request letter should outline the intended financing 
purpose, envisaged structure and core milestones to comply with. Financing partners 
should indicate, if they see any obstacles in meeting the milestones. The shipped 
documents should include a comprehensive set of information to allow a potential 
financing partner to perform an internal risk assessment. Latest annual reports and the 
current business plan of the company are mandatory, if not already provided to existing 
lenders. Market and industry surveys could be added to help potential financing 
partners to back test the business plan. A helpful tool could be the preparation of a 
‘loan book’ or ‘bank memorandum’ that compiles all relevant company, market and 
financial information as well as details on the planned financing. 
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7.3.2 External phase: Approach, Negotiation and Documentation 
The second phase starts with the communication to potential financing partners. It 
further involves the complete selection phase as well as the negotiation and 
documentation process until the funding of the instrument. 
Market approach and dialogue 
The shipment of the information package and probably a prior introduction call with 
potential financing partners, kicks-off the external process phase. After the review of 
the submitted information, financing partners typically expect a communication 
platform with the company to answer questions that occurred, receive more insights 
on the business and the strategy and to get a feeling for the capability of the 
management team. Such a platform differs amongst financing instruments and 
investors. For example, in a bank loan financing, the management typically holds a 
personal bank meeting with the leading bank(s) and performs a management 
presentation. On the other hand, a more debt capital market oriented product like the 
placement of a Schuldschein normally requires multilayer communication. It starts 
with a personal meeting with potential lead banks and their analysts. These analysts 
prepare a credit research that will be shipped later to the potential investors of the 
Schuldschein. In a second phase, a telephone conference is held by the company with 
potential investors or even a personal roadshow to core investors is undertaken. 
Following this communication phase, banks and investors are expected to submit their 
proposals and the management has to conduct an assessment process to select the 
appropriate solution. In many cases, the assessment reveals that the combination of 
several instruments will meet best the company needs. Therefore the indicative 
detailed timetable that is shown in Figure 7.3 includes a combined financing process 
by obtaining a syndicated bank loan in addition to place a Schuldschein. 
Negotiation and Documentation 
The last step in the financing process is the negotiation and documentation phase. Most 
of the delays investigated in this research happened in this last phase of the process 
(see section 5.3.4.2), except for starting too late into the process (see section 5.3.1). 
The phase contains the – sometimes intense – negotiations with the selected financing 
partners in particular with respect to the contract design and limitations included (see 
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section 5.3.6). A critical element is the careful preparation of the signing and funding 
process, in particular to coordinate all relevant parties to be involved. The detailed 
example financing process in Figure 7.3 highlights internal approval elements to 
emphasize the importance of combining the external process with the various 
situations, where internal presentations and approvals are necessary. 
 
  Practical Implications 
 
 
Mark Hill  Page 182 
Mind the Gap 
Figure 7.3: Exemplary detailed Financing Process 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
Indicative timetable for a financing process
Phase Task
Development of the financing structure
Basic management decision on appropriate financing instrument(s) ▲
Compilation of list of potential financing partners
Preparation of the information package ("Infopack")
Development of indicative term sheets
Presentation of approach to the supervisory board and approval ▲
Shipping of invitation and Infopack to selected financing partners
Proposals from financing partners (including terms & conditions)
Analysis of bank proposals
Presentation of analysis and recommendations to the supervisory board ▲
Selection of preferred banks for the consortium
Negotiation of terms & conditions
Internal credit processes of financing partners
Q&A sessions with analysts
Credit approval and commitment letter from financing partners ▲
Negotiation of financing agreements
Approval from supervisory board on final drafts of the agreements ▲
Signing of financing agreements ▲
Completion of last conditions precedent
Funding / pay-out of loan ▲
Selection of preferred banks for arranging the note
Negotiation of terms & conditions for the promissory note agreement
Approval from supervisory board on final drafts of the agreement ▲
Credit research - Analysis and Q&A
Credit research - discussion of draft versions and finalisation
Bookbuilding phase
Credit approval processes of investors approached
Roadshow/telephone conference with investors
Closing of the orderbook ▲
Presentation of potential allocation to the supervisory board and approval ▲
Allocation ▲
Pricing ▲
Funding ▲
= Process (1/2 week) ▲  = Milestone
30 31
Month 8
32
Phase 1 
Internal 
preparation
Phase 2 
Request for 
proposal
27 28 29
Phase 3a 
Syndicated 
loan
Phase 3b 
Promissory 
note
22 23 24 25 2616 17 18 19 20 2110 11 12 13 14 154 5 6 7 8 91 2 3
Month 7Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5 Month 6
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8. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The chapter presents a summary of the essential findings of the present investigation 
in section 8.1. The section 8.2 discusses the limitations of the research approach and 
indicates the need for further research in section 8.3. 
8.1 The Midcap Financing Decision 
The main purpose of this thesis was to investigate the current status of the financing 
decision in German midcap firms. It explored what elements determine such a decision 
by focusing on the underlying financing strategy of the respective cases and the 
financing process executed. The study observed characteristics of the cases’ 
management in the refinancing decision and different types of managers and 
shareholder had an influence on the financing decision (see section 1.4). In particular, 
the focus of this research to study the refinancing decisions of the maturing standard 
mezzanine facilities allowed to detect cases that all had to solve a comparable 
financing task.  
8.1.1 Financing Strategy 
The study revealed that a homogeneous financing strategy could not be explored. The 
financing strategy differs by case in terms of structure and in terms of form. Several 
core elements were observable across cases but with individual accentuation (see 
section 5.2.1). 
A preference for a certain financing hierarchy could be identified in the cases, 
following a pecking order approach. However, several determinants indicate that other 
capital structure theories provide partial explanation for the financing decision, in 
particular tradeoff theory and agency theory. Some of the determinants could be 
explained by more than one capital structure theory. Furthermore, the determinants 
that influence a financing decision vary across the individual decisions. The 
contrasting of the determinants that influenced the original standard mezzanine 
financing with the refinancing decision showed that the importance of the individual 
factors shifted. In addition, qualitative aspects are seen to be also important in the 
financing decisions, such as maintaining independence and avoid dilution of the family 
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shareholders. Therefore this research indicates that in the cases explored, existing 
financing strategies do not consist of one clear set of elements, but differ by 
management type and level of family shareholder involvement. However, the 
distinction between owner-managers and external managers in the cases explored was 
not able to present consistent investigations. The developed financing strategy 
typology helped in categorising the cases as well as the respective form and elements 
of the financing strategy.  
8.1.2 Financing Process 
The heterogeneity that was explored in the financing strategy was also investigated in 
the executed financing process. The cases showed partially a more pro-active approach 
in the refinancing process compared to the original standard mezzanine financing. 
However, the management did not perform a market assessment that would have 
allowed for the identification of potential suitable alternative instruments. Cases that 
were seen to face a more problematic refinancing were still approached by lenders 
first.  
Further to not actively starting the refinancing, two additional process inefficiencies 
were identified. The first was that the management assumed a duration of the process 
that turned out to be too short, and where in some cases banks or mezzanine lenders 
had to provide temporary solutions to mitigate a shortfall in the refinancing. The 
second inefficiency was that coordination amongst stakeholders was humbled, in 
particular between top management and shareholders as well as between management 
and subsidiary management. The detailed exploration of the debt contracts negotiated 
in the refinancing revealed that certain aspects repeatedly are key in negotiations. No 
overconfidence bias was identified in the cases regarding owner-managers to be more 
willing to accept performance-linked interest rate margins or by the design of the 
contract. This research was also not able to entirely support the assumption that debt 
contract design is an element to discipline managers and to mitigate asymmetric 
information aspects between shareholders and managers. The investigated negotiation 
processes rather allowed to conclude that managers accept certain restrictions in the 
financing contracts that are limiting the shareholders by trading key aspects. 
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Again the sole distinction between owner-managers and external managers was not 
able to completely attribute these inefficiencies to be either caused by owner-managers 
or external managers. However, the proposed financing strategy typology allowed for 
the investigation that prospector-type or defender-type cases faced the described 
inefficiencies. Analyser-type cases were able to avoid these processual gaps, except 
by the occurrence of an external influence such as in Case 2. 
Financial advisors had only limited abilities in enhancing process execution and in 
mitigating deficits, if involved. Therefore, the influence of financial advisors on the 
process seems still limited. 
 This research proposes that no universal financing strategy exists in the explored 
midcap cases and a sole distinction between owner-managers and external managers 
is not able to explain differences and inefficiencies. However, based on the developed 
financing strategy typology, several determinants and elements become more or less 
important for the financing decision which are attributable to various capital structure 
theories. This investigation and the proposed typology might help in the ongoing 
discussion on competing capital structure theories.  
The presented holistic financing strategy and the included financing principles are 
helpful for midcap company managers and shareholders in developing an own or in 
challenging and improving their existing financing strategy. Combined with the 
displayed prototype financing process, it can serve as a building block in enhancing 
financing decisions and overcome existing inefficiencies.  
 
8.2 Limitations of the Research 
Only midcap companies in Germany have been investigated and inference to other 
countries should be made with caution. The institutional environment regarding 
financing markets and practices as well as legal systems vary across countries and 
regions and therefore may influence financing decisions. Furthermore, the author 
relied on two interview participants per case, the managing director or owner-manager 
and one responsible person on the operational level, meaning that only a limited view 
is provided. Ideally, future research would also include other perspectives, for 
example, that of the firm's further key employees or of shareholders that have no 
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management role. This could be seen as a mean to obtain a more balanced 
understanding of financing in midcap firms and the identified processual gaps in the 
decision process. 
Another potential limitation of this study is the small sample size of midcap companies 
and the cross-sectional research design. The sample was not random and was derived 
from one geographic population. The study is limited to the extent to which it can be 
generalised to a wider population of midcap firms. However, the thesis uses a 
qualitative methodology that involves in-depth, semi-structured interviews which is 
uncommon in financing research and provided new insights regarding the financing 
decisions in a midcap environment. These could be investigated further with a wider 
questionnaire survey to make the results of this study more robust. The developed 
management typology in chapter 6 and the financing principles presented in section 
7.2 could serve as a basis for developing survey questions and testable variables to 
assess. 
The aim of the research to investigate a single financing decision allowed for a 
comparison of the operational situation of the company and the corresponding 
financing decision. However, longitudinal studies could substantiate the findings by 
analysing, if several financing decisions were based on a financing strategy. 
8.3 Recommendations for further Research 
Based on the research design applied and the financing decision explored, the results 
presented in the previous chapters would recommend to further investigate or broaden 
the following aspects. 
Develop and test the presented type of financing practices 
The examples for financing principles based on the developed holistic financing 
strategy and the financing strategy typology might be useful to broaden the discussion 
on determinants that would be able to assess capital structure theories. As elements 
and categories for the financing strategy typology are based solely on the 
investigations of the cases explored, further empirical research will help to substantiate 
or adjust the presented typology. 
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Ginn et al. (1995) used a different approach to categorise financing strategies and 
capital structure theories. They asked the CEOs during the data collection to read a 
description of the Miles & Snow typology and to classify strategies of competitors on 
the basis of descriptive profiles. Furthermore, the CEOs had to classify the strategies 
of their own organisations. This approach would help to substantiate the findings from 
the present research, as interview participants were not asked to perform such a self-
assessment. 
Further analyse debt contract design and overconfidence bias  
Meier & Esmatyar (2015) concluded in their research on management optimism and 
cost of capital that companies that are led by optimistic managers showed an increased 
gearing and a corresponding higher risk of insolvency. This adds to the result presented 
by Adam et al. in 2014 that overconfident managers are more likely to issue 
performance sensitive debt. 
The present research was not able to identify these aspects as almost all cases achieved 
a refinancing via external debt. In addition, the findings indicated that an 
overconfidence bias could exist but could be attributed to owner-managers or to 
external managers in different situations. As a third aspect, the document review 
provided signs that the management used the debt contract to discipline shareholders 
and organisational elements of the firm. This would add to the assumption that debt 
contracts limit managerial overconfidence (Malmendier et al., 2011; Meier & 
Esmatyar, 2015). Further research could assess if this was only the case in the present 
research or if this could be a more general phenomenon. 
Furthermore, the importance of the individual determinants that drive the selection of 
a particular instrument changed by comparing the original standard mezzanine 
decision with the refinancing. Longitudinal studies on financing decisions could help 
in understanding the effects that led to such a variation in the importance. 
Expand towards further financing decisions and regions 
The findings from this research and the proposed adoption of the Miles & Snow 
management typology to categorise German midcap companies in financing decisions 
should be contrasted with financing decisions in midcap firms in other countries. 
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To reveal general phenomena, this research could be performed in future refinancing 
decisions within German midcap companies, such as the refinancing of midcap bonds. 
It would be interesting to see whether the request by Börner et al. (2010) that midcap 
companies should strategically develop alternative sources of financing and to enhance 
transparency will further improve as already indicated by the more pro-active approach 
by the management. 
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Appendix 
A. Introduction Pack 
A.1 Cover Letter 
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A.2 Research Presentation (including the Information Request List) 
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A.2 (continued) 
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A.2 (continued) 
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B. Interview Guidelines and Link to the Research Propositions 
 
 
  
Section / question of the interview guideline
RP1: A 
formulated 
financing 
strategy exists 
and has been 
applied to in 
the performed 
refinancing 
process
RP2: A 
targeted 
optimal 
financing 
structure exists 
and 
refinancing of 
the standard 
mezzanine has 
been based on 
a pecking-
order approach
RP3a: The 
corporate 
strategy and 
characteristics 
of the 
management 
team influence 
the 
determination 
of the 
refinancing 
instrument 
RP3b: Relevant 
determinants 
and indicators 
influence the 
selection of the 
refinancing 
instrument
RP4a: The 
management 
has 
implemented 
procedures and 
measures to 
facilitate a 
successful 
completion of 
the refinancing
RP4b: The 
management 
team executed 
a timely 
refinancing 
process to avoid 
an increased 
risk
Section A - Factual Questions
1. Company Descriptors and Management Descriptors
1.1. Current sales of the company (ranges)
1.2. Number of employees (ranges)
1.3. Legal constitution of the company
1.4. Industry sector (multiple selection possible)
1.5. Shareholder structure
1.6. Current position within the company X
1.7 Prior job positions and responsibilities X
Section B - Interview
2. Financing Strategy and Financing Hierarchy
2.1. What is in your view a financing strategy? X
2.2. What are key elements of this financing 
strategy?
X X X
2.3. Is there a formulated and agreed financing 
strategy in place and communicated to all relevant 
recipients?
X
2.4. Is this financial strategy interlinked with the 
general company strategy and vision?
X X X
2.5.  Have there been any exceptions from this 
strategy in a financing decision process? If so, 
please exemplify
X X X X
2.6. When you compare your current financing 
structure, does it comply with the financing 
strategy?
X X X X
2.7. How has the standard mezzanine fitted in the 
financing strategy?
X X X X
2.8. How was the standard mezzanine financing 
instrument introduced to the 
company/management?
X X
2.9. Have advisors been involved in the original 
mezzanine financing process?
X
Related research proposition
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B. (continued) 
 
 
 
  
Section / question of the interview guideline
RP1: A 
formulated 
financing 
strategy exists 
and has been 
applied to in 
the performed 
refinancing 
process
RP2: A 
targeted 
optimal 
financing 
structure exists 
and 
refinancing of 
the standard 
mezzanine has 
been based on 
a pecking-
order approach
RP3a: The 
corporate 
strategy and 
characteristics 
of the 
management 
team influence 
the 
determination 
of the 
refinancing 
instrument 
RP3b: Relevant 
determinants 
and indicators 
influence the 
selection of the 
refinancing 
instrument
RP4a: The 
management 
has 
implemented 
procedures and 
measures to 
facilitate a 
successful 
completion of 
the refinancing
RP4b: The 
management 
team executed 
a timely 
refinancing 
process to avoid 
an increased 
risk
Section B - Interview (continued)
3. Refinancing Process
3.1. How many months prior to maturity of the 
standard mezzanine did the company start the 
refinancing process?
X
3.2. Who initiated the refinancing process 
(management, lender, advisor)?
X
3.3. Please describe the overall economic 
environment the company operated in at the start 
of the refinancing?
X
3.4. What have been the relevant determinants in 
analysing which instrument to use as the 
refinancing instrument?
X X X X
3.5. Have advisors been involved in the refinancing 
process? If so, external advisors or bank advisors?
X
3.6. Please describe the decision and negotiation 
process with the relevant financing partners?
X X
3.7. Was the company able to complete the 
refinancing within the envisaged timeframe? If not, 
how did the company mitigate the financing gap?
X X
3.8. Have there been other risk factors during the 
refinancing? How has the company reacted to 
them?
X X
3.9. What have been further critical success factors 
in the refinancing?
X X X X
4. Flexibility on Financing Strategy and post-financing Capital Structure
4.1. Please describe your capital structure post 
refinancing?
X
4.2. How has the refinancing process matched the 
defined financing strategy? (Check with question 
3.2.)
X
4.3. Has the financing risk profile of the company 
changed significantly? If so, please specify
X X
4.4. Please describe the relation of the company 
and the management team with their financing 
partners? Has it changed during the refinancing 
process?
X X X
4.5. Will the financing strategy be adopted to 
reflect the experiences during the refinancing and 
the behaviour of the financing partners and the 
availability of refinancing instruments?
X X X
Related research proposition
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C. Moody’s KMV RiskCalc Financial Ratios and Calculation 
Category Definition 
Activity Trade Creditors Ratio 
(Trade Liabilities + Notes Payable)*360 to Sales 
 
Debt Coverage Debt Coverage 
Ordinary Profit Before Depreciation to (Liabilities + 50% of Special Items 
with Equity Character** – Advances) 
 
Growth Sales Growth 
Sales(t)/Sales(t-1) – 1 
 
Leverage/Gearing Equity Ratio 
(Equity + 50% of Special Items with Equity Character – Intangible Assets) 
to (Total Assets – Intangible Assets – Cash & Equivalents – Short Term 
Financial Investments – Land & Buildings) 
 
Liabilities Structure 
(Trade Liabilities + Bank Liabilities + Notes Payable) to (Liabilities + 50% 
Special Equity – Advances) 
 
Liquidity Cash to Current Liabilities  
Cash & Equivalents to Current Liabilities 
 
Profitability EBITD to Assets  
EBITD*** to Total Assets 
 
Ordinary Profit to Sales  
Ordinary Profit to Sales 
 
Cost Personnel Expense to Sales  
Personnel Expense / Sales 
 
Size Size  
Inflation adjusted Sales (2002 Euros) 
 
**  The name of this line item in German is “Sonderposten mit Rücklageanteil”  
*** EBITD stands for Earnings before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation 
 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service (2006, p. 12) 
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D. Document and Information Overview 
D.1 Case 1 
D.1.1 Interviews 
D.1.1.1 Interview 1 
Position:  Chief financial officer (CFO) 
Date of the interview: 12.07.2013 
Duration: 160 minutes 
Form: Telephone call 
Date of re-interview: 25.07.2013 
Duration: 45 minutes 
Form: Telephone call 
D.1.1.2 Interview 2 
Position:  Head of the treasury department 
Date of the interview: 05.07.2013 
Duration: 180 minutes 
Form: Telephone call 
Date of re-interview: 25.07.2013 
Duration: 30 minutes 
Form: Telephone call 
D.1.2 Analysed documents 
 Company 1 audited consolidated financial statements as of 31.12.2004 
 Company 1 audited consolidated financial statements as of 31.12.2011 
 Investment policy of company 1 
 Hedging memorandum of company 1 
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 For the original mezzanine financing 
 H.E.A.T MEZZANINE I-2005 S.A. financing agreement 
 Protocol of the supervisory board meeting, June 2005 
 For the refinancing 
 Invitation letter to the banks to participate in the upcoming refinancing 
 Analysis of the refinancing proposals, dated 19.07.2012 
 Senior syndicated loan agreement, dated 18.12.2012 and previous draft 
versions 
 Internal email correspondence 
 Ledger of group bank facilities [Bankenspiegel] of company 1 as of 
31.12.2012 
D.1.3 Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations 
Sign-off from the company: 22.07.2013 
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D.2 Case 2 
D.2.1 Interviews 
D.2.1.1 Interview 1 
Position:  Chief financial officer (CFO) 
Date of the interview: 06.11.2013 
Duration: 120 minutes 
Form: Meeting 
D.2.1.2 Interview 2 
Position:  Head of the treasury department 
Date of the interview: 06.11.2013 
Duration: 160 minutes 
Form: Meeting 
D.2.2 Analysed documents 
 Company 2 audited consolidated financial statements as of 31.12.2005 
 Company 2 audited consolidated financial statements as of 31.12.2012 
 Company 2 vision and strategy presentation, dated 15.02.2005 
 Company 2 strategy update, dated 15.09.2008 
 For the original mezzanine financing 
 PREPS 2006-1 financing agreement 
 For the refinancing 
 Invitation letter and request for proposal 
 Senior syndicated loan agreement, dated 15.02.2013 
 Draft versions of the syndicated loan agreement and compare versions to the 
prior syndicated loan agreement, dated 20.05.2009 
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 Presentations to the supervisory board 
 Analysis on the received refinancing proposals 
D.2.3 Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations 
Sign-off from the company: 20.11.2013 
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D.3 Case 3 
D.3.1 Interviews 
D.3.1.1 Interview 1 
Position:  Chief financial officer (CFO) 
Date of the interview: 08.11.2013 
Duration: 150 minutes 
Form: Meeting 
D.3.1.2 Interview 2 
Position:  Head of Finance, Treasury & Accounting  
Date of the interview: 08.11.2013 
Duration: 120 minutes 
Form: Meeting 
D.3.2 Analysed documents 
 Company 3 audited consolidated financial statements as of 31.12.2005 
 Company 3 audited consolidated financial statements as of 31.12.2012 
 Financing guidelines, dated June 2006 
 For the original mezzanine financing 
 PREPS 2006-1 financing agreement 
 For the refinancing 
 Invitation letter and information package shipped to the banks 
 Presentations to the supervisory board 
 Analysis on the received refinancing proposals 
 Ledger of group bank facilities [Bankenspiegel] of company 3 as of 
31.12.2013 
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D.3.3 Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations 
Sign-off from the company: 16.12.2013 
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D.4 Case 4 
D.4.1 Interviews 
D.4.1.1 Interview 1 
Position:  Chief executive officer (CEO) 
Date of the interview: 18.11.2013 
Duration: 180 minutes 
Form: Meeting 
D.4.1.2 Interview 2 
Position:  Head of Treasury  
Date of the interview: 19.11.2013 
Duration: 150 minutes 
Form: Meeting 
D.4.2 Analysed documents 
 Company 4 audited consolidated financial statements as of 31.12.2005 
 Company 4 audited consolidated financial statements as of 31.12.2012 
 For the original mezzanine financing 
 CB MezzCAP financing agreement 
 Prime 2007-1 financing agreement 
 For the refinancing 
 Documentation on the prolongation of the CB MezzCAP factility 
 Bridge loan agreement for the Prime 2007-1 facility 
 Memorandum of understanding on the envisaged long-term refinancing 
structure 
 Internal email correspondence 
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D.4.3 Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations 
Sign-off from the company: 28.11.2013 
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D.5 Case 5 
D.5.1 Interviews 
D.5.1.1 Interview 1 
Position:  Chief financial officer (CFO) 
Date of the interview: 10.12.2013 
Duration: 120 minutes 
Form: Meeting 
D.5.1.2 Interview 2 
Position:  Head of Finance 
Date of the interview: 10.12.2013 
Duration: 140 minutes 
Form: Meeting 
D.5.2 Analysed documents 
 Company 5 audited consolidated financial statements as of 31.12.2006 
 Company 5 audited consolidated financial statements as of 31.12.2012 
 Company 5 financing guidelines, dated 2003 
 PREPS 2007-1 financing agreement 
 For the refinancing 
 Midcap bond prospectus of company 5, dated September 2013 
D.5.3 Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations 
Sign-off from the company: 26.11.2013 
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D.6 Case 6 
D.6.1 Interviews 
D.6.1.1 Interview 1 
Position:  Chief executive officer (CEO) 
Date of the interview: 20.01.2014 
Duration: 90 minutes 
Form: Meeting 
D.6.1.2 Interview 2 
Position:  Head of Finance and Accounting 
Date of the interview: 20.01.2014 
Duration: 120 minutes 
Form: Meeting 
D.6.2 Analysed documents 
 Company 6 audited consolidated financial statements as of 31.12.2005 
 Company 6 audited consolidated financial statements as of 31.12.2012 
 For the original mezzanine financing 
 StaGe Mezzanine 2006 financing agreement 
D.6.3 Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations 
Sign-off from the company: 03.02.2014 
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D.7 Case 7 
D.7.1 Interviews 
D.7.1.1 Interview 1 
Position:  Chief executive officer (CEO) 
Date of the interview: 21.01.2014 
Duration: 100 minutes 
Form: Meeting 
D.7.1.2 Interview 2 
Position:  Head of Accounting 
Date of the interview: 21.01.2014 
Duration: 90 minutes 
Form: Meeting  
D.7.2 Analysed documents 
 Company 7 audited consolidated financial statements as of 28.02.2003 
 Company 7 audited consolidated financial statements as of 28.02.2010 
 For the original mezzanine financing 
 PREPS 2004 financing agreement 
 For the refinancing 
 Senior syndicated loan agreement, dated 24.11.2011 
 Draft versions of the syndicated loan agreement 
D.7.3 Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations 
Sign-off from the company: 03.02.2014 
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E. Individual Case Summaries  
The following section provides a more detailed overview on the cases analysed in this 
research. Each case overview will start with a short description of the company and 
the interview participants. It will then present the general outline on the company’s 
financing strategy and the standard mezzanine instrument used. A description of the 
company’s situation at the time of the refinancing completes each overview. 
E.1 Case 1 
E.1.1 Description of the Company 
The company that forms the object of analysis for Case 1 is a family-owned business, 
operated by members of the owner family. The company is active in the food sector 
with annual sales ranging between € 250 million and € 500 million and 500 to 1,000 
employees. It operates in 20 countries all over Europe and Russia and is constituted as 
incorporation (“Aktiengesellschaft”) under German and Swiss law. Interview 
participants were the CFO of the company who is also representing one family tree 
and the Head of Treasury. The Head of Treasury joined the company almost ten years 
ago and held similar positions with a competitor for six years. He started his 
professional career as a public accountant working for a large international audit firm.  
E.1.2 Financing Strategy 
The company follows a financing strategy that is not formally written down, but 
generally accepted between the owner family trees and communicated to all relevant 
employees in the firm. Several financing guidelines e.g. for hedging and investment 
policy have been implemented as written memoranda as well as a handbook on 
business planning for all group companies. These memoranda include general rules on 
financing, limitations on bilateral financing via local bank partners and a general core 
bank policy (Company 1 hedging memorandum, D.1.2; Company 1 investment policy, 
D.1.2). The predominant strategic financing element is that there must not be any 
equity provided by external parties. In case of a change in the ownership structure, a 
formal memorandum at shareholder level limits the ability to sell equity stakes outside 
the existing family trees (Company 1 interview, D.1.1.1). 
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E.1.3 Standard Mezzanine Financing 
The company used a standard mezzanine facility in 2005 out of the H.E.A.T 
MEZZANINE I-2005 S.A. programme. The principal relationship bank introduced the 
instrument to the company as the company was seeking for an expansion of its external 
financing capabilities to fund its Eastern European growth strategy. One of the key 
aspects for using standard mezzanine according to the two participants was the ability 
to enter into new external financing markets without diluting the existing shareholders 
and to cover with a significant reduction in sales of more than 17% in 2004, following 
a late response to a change in client preferences (Company 1 supervisory board 
presentation June 2005, D.1.2). The second key aspect was the enhancement of the 
group's economic equity ("wirtschaftliches Eigenkapital") with positive response from 
external debt providers. The standard mezzanine instrument could be classified as 
economic equity under German GAAP (HGB) and from the senior bank lenders in 
their internal rating of the company. 
E.1.4 Refinancing 
Situation of the Company 
The company showed a strong position in the domestic market with a market share of 
approximately 50%, according to both interview participants. Nevertheless, some 
growth markets in Eastern Europe required ongoing funding from the top holding 
company, as they have not reached adequate profitability levels yet (Company 1 
audited consolidated financial statements as of 31.12.2012, D.1.2). Overall group 
profitability, measured by Moody’s KMV RiskCalc as EBITD to assets, increased to 
17.9% prior to the refinancing, compared to 15.8% prior to the original mezzanine 
financing. These developments led to a strong credit profile of the company at the time 
of the refinancing, as the Moody’s calculated equity ratio remained solid with 35% of 
the total assets. By looking at an equity ratio that is calculated by balance sheet equity 
divided through total balance sheet assets, the ratio reduced from 31% to 25% prior to 
the refinancing. Liabilities structure reached 87%, an almost identical level compared 
to 88% prior to the mezzanine financing. 
Refinancing Process 
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The refinancing process started with the approach of potential financing partners six 
to seven months in advance of the maturity date. There was a differing view from both 
participants on the question, who initiated the refinancing process. One participant 
stated that the company started with the internal preparation. However, the second 
interview participant quoted that the former core relationship bank that already 
introduced the standard mezzanine approached the company and presented an overall 
refinancing concept for the company and its subsidiaries (Company 1 interview, 
D.1.1.1; Company 1 interview, D.1.1.2). 
Both interview participants describe the refinancing process as complex and lengthy, 
as the new financing structure did not only include the refinancing of the standard 
mezzanine, but also a complete group wide refinancing. This shows a change in the 
overall financing strategy from bilateral financing to a centralised lending with several 
financing instruments to be combined. A selection process for the lead banks included 
up to nine potential financing partners (Company 1 senior syndicated loan agreement, 
D.1.2). Such selection process has never been performed before (Company 1 
interview, D.1.1.2). Nevertheless, the company was able to use the favourable 
financing environment and the increased appetite from debt investors for non-cyclical 
borrowers at that time to replace the standard mezzanine. 
Changes in the Financing Strategy 
The overall financing strategy had undergone a significant change during the 
refinancing in 2012 and 2013. The general financing layout changed from bilateral 
loans at the level of the respective group company to a syndicated financing at the level 
of the group top holding company. Nevertheless, some bilateral financings have been 
prolonged or newly introduced to cover individual needs, e.g. for the Eastern European 
subsidiaries or for state-backed financing ("Förderkredite") (Company 1 bank account 
ledger as of 31.12.2012, D.1.2). 
Several aspects were mentioned to be key in the refinancing. The first aspect was the 
intention to broaden the lender base by introducing new banks to the company and 
other potential debt lenders by debt capital market products to the financing structure. 
The second aspect was the requirement by the top management and the owner families 
to strictly limit the information that will be made available to the potential financing 
partners. The third aspect was a limitation requirement on transferability of the debt 
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instrument to ensure that financing partners chosen will be the relevant negotiation 
partners in a stress scenario (Company 1 interview, D.1.1.1; Company 1 interview, 
D.1.1.2). The fourth and last aspect was a focus on well established financing products 
to ensure that the instrument chosen will not bear an increased refinancing risk due to 
its unavailability at the next refinancing. The third and fourth aspect can be seen as a 
direct result from the former standard mezzanine financing and the missing direct 
refinancing option by using a new standard mezzanine instrument. These aspects are 
now seen to be core elements of the financing strategy. 
E.1.5 Post-financing Capital Structure 
Both participants stated that the company shows an increased level of senior debt, even 
though provided via several financing instruments. The company’s equity remained at 
a very comfortable level and liquidity is seen from the participants to be at an adequate 
level to allow for planned investments and operational needs of the group. The 
comparison of the calculated key financial ratios before the initial standard mezzanine 
financing and before the performed refinancing substantiates the feedback from the 
interview partners. 
The missing of an instrument that also qualifies as economic equity and the ongoing 
financing needs of the Eastern European activities led to the conclusion from both 
interview participants, that there is an enhanced risk from the financing activities. 
However, both participants stated that this enhanced financing risk is mitigated by the 
operational strength of the group and by the new financing structure that provides 
greater flexibility and refinancing certainty (Company 1 interview, D.1.1.1; Company 
1 interview, D.1.1.2). 
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Moody’s KMV RiskCalc Key Financial Ratios of Company 1 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations, D.1.3. 
  
Position …Standard Mezzanine ...Refinancing
Activity
Trade Creditors Ratio 39.27 50.53
Debt Coverage
Debt Coverage 30.4% 29.8%
Growth
Sales Growth -17.2% 6.7%
Leverage/Gearing
Equity Ratio 46.3% 35.0%
Liabilities Structure 88.4% 87.0%
Liquidity
Cash to Current Liabilities 34.4% 18.1%
Profitability
EBITD to Assets 15.8% 17.9%
Ordinary Profit to Sales 7.4% 8.4%
Cost
Personnel Expenses to Sales 12.2% 13.2%
Key financial ratios prior to…
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E.2 Case 2 
E.2.1 Description of the Company 
Case 2 focuses on a company which is active in the automotive sector, employs 
between 1,000 and 1,500 people and achieves sales in a range between € 250 million 
and € 500 million. It is incorporated as German Limited partnership with a limited 
liability company as general partner (“GmbH & Co. KG”). In 2008, a private equity 
investor became minority shareholder of the company through a capital increase; the 
majority of the shares remain with the family of the founder. This change in the 
ownership structure followed an intense restructuring of the company in the years 2008 
and 2009 given the overall breakdown of the global automotive industry. The CFO as 
well as the Head of Treasury aced as interview participants. Both participants held 
previous positions with other firms. The CFO acted as Director of Finance of a 
competitor and as Director of Finance for the company’s EMEA operations prior to 
the actual function. The Head of Treasury held positions as Vice President Finance for 
a multinational industrial conglomerate and started her career as a relationship 
manager of an international bank. 
E.2.2 Financing Strategy 
There is no formal written financing strategy existing within the company, but several 
elements have been developed and agreed between the board of directors and the 
supervisory board. These elements include a target capital structure of the company, 
preferred financing instruments and key financial indicators presented in the 
management reporting (Company 2 management reporting as of 30.09.2013, D.2.2). 
Key financial indicators and their target ranges are formulated within the general 
corporate strategy (Company 2 vision and strategy presentation, dated 15.02.2005, 
D.2.2.; Company 2 strategy update, dated 20.09.2008, D.2.2). Both participants stated 
that the financing strategy is a segment of the overall corporate strategy. 
E.2.3 Standard Mezzanine Financing 
The standard mezzanine instrument was implemented in 2006 as a requirement from 
banks to enhance the company’s balance sheet equity – which represented 18.5% of 
the total assets – in preparation of an external growth initiative (Company 2 audited 
consolidated financial statements as of 31.12.2005, D.2.2). Several relationship banks 
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introduced different standard mezzanine tranches to the company. The shareholders at 
that time were reluctant to provide further liquidity to bolster the capital structure of 
the firm but reject any option to introduce an external shareholder (Company 2 
interview, D.2.1.1). External debt providers reacted positive on the inclusion of the 
standard mezzanine in their internal rating and one interview participant stated that the 
standard mezzanine also enhanced the external rating profile to some extent. The 
second participant contrasted that response as in her view there was only very limited 
to none effect in the external rating result (Company 2 interview, D.2.1.2). The 
company used a PREPS 2006-1 tranche as standard mezzanine instrument. 
E.2.4 Refinancing 
Situation of the Company 
In the years 2008 and 2009, the global automotive sector went through a significant 
restructuring phase, which affected the company. The company had to cope with 
several breaches of financial covenants under the existing senior loan facilities and 
needed to agree a restructuring-adjusted new syndicated loan agreement. To release 
the company from this unfavourable negotiating situation with the core banks, the 
shareholders changed their rejection against external equity and introduced a minority 
shareholder to the capital structure. After a recovery year in 2010, the company was 
able to increase performance and profitability in 2011 and 2012. However, the equity 
ratio remained with 23.2% of total assets at a rather low level and shows the significant 
effects of leveraging the business before the execution of the expansion strategy and 
the following restructuring phase (Company 2 audited consolidated financial 
statements as of 31.12.2012, D.2.2). The effects of the restructuring phase were also 
traceable in the development of the cost indicator calculated with Moody’s KMV 
RiskCalc. Personnel expenses to sales lowered from 23.3% in 2005 to 18.9% in 2012 
(Company 2 Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations, D.2.3). 
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Refinancing Process 
Both participants describe the refinancing process with the relevant financing partners 
as complex even though the company started with the internal preparations 14 to 16 
months before the maturity of the standard mezzanine (Company 2 interview, D.2.1.1; 
Company 2 interview, D.2.1.2). The company approached potential financing partners 
12 months prior to maturity. One aspect that enhanced complexity was the starting 
point of the negotiations as all potential financing partners based negotiations on the 
existing restructuring-near syndicated loan agreement. 
In addition, the early start of the refinancing process required the standard mezzanine 
provider to accept a voluntary prepayment. However, the provider showed limited 
availability to co-operate due to discontinuation of his activities, but the relationship 
bank that introduced the mezzanine provider helped in the negotiations and became 
one of the Mandated Lead Arrangers of the new financing (Company 2 interview, 
D.2.1.2). 
Given the equity ratio with 23% before the refinancing being at the lower end of a 
comfortable area, the banks tried to shift parts of the financing to a debt capital market 
instrument (hybrid bond). Both participants stated that this was not in the interest of 
the company as the firm skipped the external rating during the restructuring phase and 
was not intended to be re-established (Company 2 interview, D.2.1.1; Company 2 
interview, D.2.1.2). 
A special situation occurred during the refinancing process, as an EU antitrust 
investigation started in three countries during the negotiation. Nevertheless, a clear and 
transparent communication strategy to the mandated banks led to almost no further 
complexity according to both participants (Company 2 interview, D.2.1.1; Company 
2 interview, D.2.1.2). 
Changes in the Financing Strategy 
Given the experiences of the shareholder and the management of the company, one 
essential aspect of the refinancing process was to establish a stable and well-mixed 
lender base by leaving behind the restructuring-near financing contracts at the same 
time. The management decided not to execute a new financing structure including any 
debt capital market instruments, as proposed by the banks. Therefore, there has not 
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been a significant change in the overall financing strategy, but several aspects could 
be adjusted during the refinancing process. In addition, the new financing structure 
allowed the company to gain flexibility for the upcoming growth scenario in the global 
automotive sector in 2013 and beyond (Company 2 interview, D.2.1.1). 
E.2.5 Post-financing Capital Structure 
The capital structure post refinancing is seen to be more simplified as no further 
mezzanine or hybrid financing instrument is included. Even though the equity ratio 
decreased compared to the situation prior to the initial mezzanine financing, both 
participants describe their equity position as solid and within the defined management 
key performance indicators (Company 2 interview, D.2.1.1; Company 2 interview, 
D.2.1.2). 
They see their relationship with their lenders enhanced during the last 16 months due 
to constructive discussions and negotiations. In addition to the negotiations on the 
syndicated loan facility, the company also initiated alternative financing instruments 
such as reverse factoring to enhance their equity ratio in the future (Company 2 
interview, D.2.1.2). 
Further changes in their financing strategy might occur according to the CFO as soon 
as the management thinks an adjustment will be necessary due to internal 
developments and/or due to changes in the financing markets (Company 2 interview, 
D.2.1.1). 
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 Moody’s KMV RiskCalc Key Financial Ratios of Company 2 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations, D.2.3. 
  
Position …Standard Mezzanine ...Refinancing
Activity
Trade Creditors Ratio 30.39 34.18
Debt Coverage
Debt Coverage 26.1% 34.8%
Growth
Sales Growth 4.4% 0.6%
Leverage/Gearing
Equity Ratio 18.5% 23.2%
Liabilities Structure 69.2% 63.1%
Liquidity
Cash to Current Liabilities 16.6% 15.7%
Profitability
EBITD to Assets 14.2% 18.6%
Ordinary Profit to Sales 3.9% 4.6%
Cost
Personnel Expenses to Sales 23.3% 18.9%
Key financial ratios prior to…
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E.3 Case 3 
E.3.1 Description of the Company 
Case 3 explores a family-owned company that is active in the broader power and 
utilities sector. The company presented current sales between € 50 million and € 150 
million and employs between 100 and 250 people. The company is founded as 
incorporation (“Aktiengesellschaft”) under German law. The two interview 
participants were the CFO and the Head of Finance, Treasury & Accounting. Both 
participants have a qualification as a German accountant. The CFO held previous 
positions as Head of Finance of a large cap competitor. The Head of Finance, Treasury 
& Accounting started his career as a banker, before joining an accountancy firm. The 
CFO is also representing one tree of the owner family. 
E.3.2 Financing Strategy 
The company implemented formulated financing guidelines in 2006. These financing 
guidelines outline the targeted capital structure of the company, preferred financing 
instruments, current relationship banks as well as a hedging concept regarding 
instruments and strategies (Company 3 financing guidelines, D.3.2). The financing 
guidelines are distributed to the relevant organisational areas of the company, 
including treasury, accounting, financing and legal (Company 3 interview, D.3.1.1).  
In addition, the guidelines set out the basic parameters on how these organisational 
areas should act and interact. The overall financing structure of the company is also 
described therein, as well as definitions of key processes for the group wide liquidity 
and financing management (Company 3 financing guidelines, D.3.2). Furthermore, the 
financing guidelines lay out the information and transparency rules the company wants 
to follow, especially standards for the financial reporting, external communication and 
fiscal reports. 
E.3.3 Standard Mezzanine Financing 
Several relationship banks presented standard mezzanine options to the company. The 
instrument chosen was a tranche of PREPS 2006-1, which has been element of a 
proposal from one relationship bank for a complete refinancing of debt layers by 
covering further growth expectations (Company 3 interview, D.3.1.1). The structure 
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allowed to enhance the (economic) equity ratio and therefore enabled further financing 
steps to cope with the expected further organic growth from 2006 onwards (before the 
financial crisis) and the need for additional working capital and capex financing. 
The standard mezzanine has been not explicitly seen as an exception the financing 
guideline, because the capital structure – which is measured via equity ratio and 
leverage – was met and the instrument was developed by one of the relationship banks 
and has been presented by them to the company. 
E.3.4 Refinancing 
Situation of the Company 
The company had positive earnings in the years 2010 to 2012 which they managed to 
retain and therefore enhanced its equity ratio. The regulatory uncertainty in the 
German power and utilities market that arose in the last years led to a decrease in 
profitability margins and key financial ratios. EBITD to assets lowered from 9.0% one 
year prior to the original mezzanine financing in 2005 to 6.8% in 2012 (Company 3 
audited consolidated financial statements as of 31.12.2012, D. 3.2). 
Refinancing Process 
Approaches from several consultancy firms and researcher that were performing 
studies on the upcoming refinancing led to an early internal discussion on how to 
refinance the standard mezzanine. However, two relationship banks contacted the 
company approximately 12 months before the maturity date and presented refinancing 
concepts (Company 3 interview, D.3.1.2).  
The mentioned uncertainty on the legal and regulatory environment in the sector led 
to a situation where financing partners performed a detailed check of the presented 
financial plan. As a result, they requested some security mechanisms in the new loan 
documentation as well as an external validation of the business plan via a due diligence 
to provide additional comfort (Company 3 interview, D.3.1.2). The mitigation of the 
risk concerns from the lenders also included a careful design of financial covenants, 
including their adjustment and of the overall financing documentation. 
The negotiations were described from both participants as constructive but intense. 
The core bank that introduced the standard mezzanine had to be negotiated to become 
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one of six relationship banks that offer a new syndicated loan facility. The bank that 
provided the refinancing proposal has been upgraded to become coordinator of the 
relationship banks (Company 3 interview, D.3.1.1; Company 3 interview, D.3.1.2). 
Changes in the Financing Strategy 
The repayment of standard mezzanine was possible via retained earnings and a slight 
increase in bank debt. Therefore, only partners mentioned within financing guidelines 
provided external debt financing to the company after the refinancing of the standard 
mezzanine (Company 3 interview, D.3.1.1). Given the operational performance, 
leverage even declined compared to the year of mezzanine issuance. However, one 
participant questioned whether the current capital structure combined with the 
decreasing profitability would match the challenges arising from regulatory as well as 
economic uncertainty. The existing shareholders gave a clear refusal on the 
management’s proposal to introduce a minority shareholder to strengthen the equity 
ratio (Company 3 interview, D.3.1.1). 
E.3.5 Post-financing Capital Structure 
The new financing structure incorporates a new financing element, reverse factoring, 
which has been introduced in the bank’s proposal. Both participants stated that the 
overall financing risk profile has been bolstered due to (a) the long term refinancing, 
(b) the introduction of an additional financing instrument, and (c) the composition of 
the bank club which broadened the lender base and the conservative documentation 
(Company 3 interview, D.3.1.1; Company 3 interview, D.3.1.2). The equity position 
is described as being comfortable for companies within the power and utilities sector, 
but with limited potential to enhance the equity via a capital increase to cope with 
increased risk due to operational and regulatory uncertainty. Therefore, the 
management described the overall risk profile of the company as increased compared 
to the initial mezzanine financing process (Company 3 interview, D.3.1.1). 
The financing guidelines has been adopted several times since the initial mezzanine 
financing. For instance, approved financing partners had to be changed due to the 
discontinuation of some banks in the German market during the last years, or their re-
entry into the financing market. As another example, reverse factoring needed to be 
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adopted as preferable financing instrument in the financing guidelines (Company 3 
interview, D.3.1.1). 
 Moody’s KMV RiskCalc Key Financial Ratios of Company 3 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations, D.3.3. 
  
Position …Standard Mezzanine ...Refinancing
Activity
Trade Creditors Ratio 2.02 1.61
Debt Coverage
Debt Coverage 38.3% 28.0%
Growth
Sales Growth 11.1% 4.7%
Leverage/Gearing
Equity Ratio 22.9% 29.5%
Liabilities Structure 53.9% 26.0%
Liquidity
Cash to Current Liabilities 16.6% 1.4%
Profitability
EBITD to Assets 9.0% 6.8%
Ordinary Profit to Sales 7.2% 4.6%
Cost
Personnel Expenses to Sales 12.7% 7.2%
Key financial ratios prior to…
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E.4 Case 4 
E.4.1 Description of the Company 
Owned by the founder family and operated by members of the family, the company 
that was studied in this case is active in the manufacturing sector, especially for the 
transport and logistics industry. Sales levels were between € 50 million and € 150 
million. The company employed less than 100 people in 2013. Interview participants 
were the CEO as well as the Head of Treasury. Both represent the owner family and 
had no prior external job experience. 
E.4.2 Financing Strategy 
The participants explained that there is no need for a formulated financing strategy as 
family members – who are also shareholders – cover all relevant financing functions 
(Company 4 interview, D.4.1.1; Company 4 interview, D.4.1.2). Therefore, all 
interests are aligned. Nevertheless, they refer to generally accepted financing 
principles. The major paradigm is that the equity must be kept within the owner family. 
A second paradigm is based on the financial covenant in their senior financing 
agreement that they must comply with. This financial covenant is a leverage ratio 
(Company 4 interview, D.4.1.2). 
E.4.3 Standard Mezzanine Financing 
Company 4 represents the only company within the analysed cases that used two 
standard mezzanine tranches from different providers. In 2006, the company obtained 
a tranche under the CB MezzCAP programme. The following year, the second tranche 
was paid out to the company from the Prime 2007-1 programme. 
According to both participants, standard mezzanine fitted into the financing principles 
as it did not dilute the existing shareholder structure. In addition, it represented a tax 
efficient financing instrument and (at least under German HGB) was not only 
considered as economic equity capital in the view of the financing partners but also as 
equity element in the financial statement of the company. 
One of the relationship banks introduced the first standard mezzanine tranche as part 
of a request for a larger investment financing to establish a new production line. The 
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second instrument was chosen via a request for proposal that was initiated via the 
company from three relationship banks (Company 4 interview, D.4.1.2). 
E.4.4 Refinancing 
Situation of the Company 
The company had to undergo a significant replacement and expansion capex cycle in 
the years 2010 and 2011 to cover the planned operational development. The 
transportation and logistics sector in 2013 still recovered from the two crisis pushbacks 
in 2007/2008 and in 2010. Therefore, the sector, which the company delivers all 
products to, is still very careful in replacing existing machines and extends the average 
economic lifetime, which led to a shortfall in orders in 2011 (Company 4 interview, 
D.4.1.1). The year 2012 provided a slight increase in order intake, but still 
approximately 20% below the strategic business plan of the company (Company 4 
interview, D.4.1.2). Given that the average duration from order intake to sales takes 
eight to twelve months, revenues decreased again by 7.4% in 2012 as shown in the 
table. Profitability levels and equity ratio decreased accordingly (Company 4 Moody’s 
KMV RiskCalc calculations, D.4.3). 
The firm renewed its facilities in 2011 and increased its production capacities which 
led to a significant production overcapacity. In addition, one family tree offered a sale 
of their stake, which required significant financing that was needed to be provided via 
the company (at least a majority stake) (Company 4 interview, D.4.1.1). 
Refinancing Process 
The existing mezzanine providers approached the company in Spring 2013 and asked 
for a statement on the repayment strategy after their review of the financial reporting 
for the fiscal year 2012 and a potential covenant default by year-end 2013 (based on 
the presented budget for 2013) given the development in the sector (Company 4 
interview, D.4.1.2). 
First negotiations with the existing senior lenders led to the conclusion, that a complete 
long term refinancing of the mezzanine facilities via debt was not possible based on 
the financial performance of the company in 2011 and 2012. The banks also rejected 
the proposed purchase of the equity stake from one family tree by the remaining 
shareholders by using company debt capacity (Company 4 interview, D.4.1.1). The 
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following negotiations led to an extension of one mezzanine tranche and a bridge 
financing for the second mezzanine tranche. This bridge structure allowed for a more 
comfortable timeframe to negotiate the overall long term refinancing of the firm with 
senior lenders (Company 4 interview, D.4.1.2). 
The planned change in shareholder structure has been put on hold, because (a) the 
current financial development led to a new purchase price assessment for the equity 
stake, and (b) the given unavailability of sufficient funds from senior lenders, the 
remaining shareholders and company liquidity to purchase the stake on sale. The banks 
forced the company to hold the potential change in the shareholder structure until the 
mezzanine refinancing was solved by mid-2014 at least (Company 4 interview, 
D.4.1.1). 
Changes in the Financing Strategy 
The described unsolved long-term refinancing situation and the intended change in the 
shareholder structure might lead to changes in the accepted financing principles. One 
interview participant stated that an external minority shareholder could be included 
until the remaining family tree can repurchase this minority stake and the long-term 
financing of the company is secured (Company 4 interview, D.4.1.1). 
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E.4.5 Post-financing Capital Structure 
Given the refinancing process was still in process at the time of the research, the 
definitive capital structure after the refinancing was not clear. One participant stated 
that the capital structure is likely to involve individual mezzanine or a minority 
external shareholder (Company 4 interview, D.4.1.1). The postponed sale of the equity 
stake and the decreased risk profile of the firm due to the sector environment is 
expected to lead to a situation where the company will be bound to long term debt 
financings and potentially external equity / mezzanine providers to allow for a 
successful refinancing of the standard mezzanine and - eventually - the financing of 
the buy-out (Company 4 interview, D.4.1.2). 
Moody’s KMV RiskCalc Key Financial Ratios of Company 4 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations, D.4.3. 
  
Position …Standard Mezzanine ...Refinancing
Activity
Trade Creditors Ratio 16.55 7.32
Debt Coverage
Debt Coverage 18.0% 13.5%
Growth
Sales Growth 8.7% -7.4%
Leverage/Gearing
Equity Ratio 37.4% 23.7%
Liabilities Structure 62.0% 67.7%
Liquidity
Cash to Current Liabilities 10.7% 5.4%
Profitability
EBITD to Assets 13.8% 6.3%
Ordinary Profit to Sales 5.0% 1.4%
Cost
Personnel Expenses to Sales 23.0% 22.0%
Key financial ratios prior to…
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E.5 Case 5 
E.5.1 Description of the Company 
The company that is explored in Case 5 is an international manufacturing company 
with sales in a range between € 250 million and € 500 million. The company employs 
between 500 and 1,000 people and is incorporated as a German limited liability 
company (“GmbH”). The group is structured as a holding with several operating 
entities. The holding company is family owned, but operated via an external 
management team. Interview participants were the CFO and the Head of Finance of 
the holding company that are responsible for the group-wide financing. Whereas the 
Head of Finance started his career with the company, the CFO held a prior position as 
CFO of the European operations of a large cap competitor. 
E.5.2 Financing Strategy 
The company has implemented formulated financing guidelines since the year 2003. 
These guidelines include group-wide financing rules, especially cash pooling, external 
financing options and limitations. The financing guidelines do also supply a process 
handbook for financing decisions at subgroup and at group level providing key terms 
and conditions that need to be considered in each financing negotiation (e.g. 
collateralisation and/or parent guarantees, maturity profiles). Furthermore, the 
guidelines include a list of preferred bank partners to ensure not to have a fragmented 
bank universe and to avoid concentration risk at the same time (Company 5 financing 
guidelines, D.5.2). 
The financing guidelines have been developed in the group wide strategy review 
process in 2003 (after the dotcom crisis) and the abandoning of the planned IPO of the 
company (Company 5 interview, D.5.1.1). They are part of every strategy review at 
top-management level and have been adjusted several times due to changes in the 
group structure and the implementation of a cash pooling agreement. They are 
currently under revision to allow for the implementation of a separate special purpose 
vehicle (“FinanceCo”) to prepare for the first planned bond issuance on the German 
midcap bond market (Company 5 interview, D.5.1.1). 
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E.5.3 Standard Mezzanine Financing 
The company intended to perform an IPO in 2002, but due to the unavailability of the 
stock market, the existing shareholder had to inject additional capital to cover the 
turbulences in the years 2002 and 2003. In 2006, the existing shareholder intended a 
partial repayment of the capital injection to pursue other financing options (Company 
5 interview, D.5.1.2). Standard mezzanine was the preferable option for the company 
at that time as it enhanced the overall financing capability of the group by not enlarging 
the financing risk profile significantly. Therefore, the company kept the economic 
equity at a stable level and managed to use this situation for a refinancing process to 
secure favourable terms in 2007 (Company 5 interview, D.5.1.2). 
E.5.4 Refinancing 
Situation of the Company 
After an internal restructuring process in 2008 and 2009, leading to cost reductions 
and increased flexibility to mitigate further economic downturns, the company had a 
positive development in the years 2011 to 2013 (Company 5 interview, D.5.1.1). The 
EBITDA-breakeven point as key financial performance indicator for the restructuring 
was lowered to 70% of actual sales, compared to 85% in 2007 (Company 5 interview, 
D.5.1.2). EBITD to assets were at a record level of 23.3%, according to one interview 
participant (Company 5 interview, D.5.1.2), compared to 7.2% at the time of the initial 
mezzanine financing (Company 5 Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations, D.5.3). 
Refinancing Process 
The management started to evaluate refinancing options approximately 12 months 
before the maturity date of the standard mezzanine, based on a proposal from a 
financing partner to refinance standard mezzanine via a German midcap bond 
(Company 5 interview, D.5.1.1). 
The company invited several potential financing partners and arrangers of debt capital 
market products to select the preferred solution for the group. The request for proposal 
asked for a refinancing not only of the standard mezzanine, but for a refinancing of 
major parts of group debt. The selection process led to a combination of a debt capital 
market instrument (midcap bond) with a bank-arranged revolving facility (Company 
5 interview, D.5.1.2). Placement risks of a debt capital market instrument were 
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mitigated via a bridge-to-bond financing that was offered from the mandated banks. 
According to both participants, the financing markets showed increased volatility at 
the year-end of 2013. Therefore, in case that the placement would not have met 
expectations, the bridge-to-bond facility included an option to be shifted in a mid-term 
syndicated loan facility (Company 5 interview, D.5.1.1; Company 5 interview, 
D.5.1.2). 
Changes in the Financing Strategy 
The usage of a debt capital market instrument did not involve a change in the financing 
strategy of the group, as the access to capital markets (debt and equity) was already 
considered when the financing guidelines were established in 2003 (Company 5 
interview, D.5.1.1; Company 5 interview, D.5.1.2). 
E.5.5 Post-financing Capital Structure 
The overall refinancing included the standard mezzanine tranche as well as senior 
secured term debt and revolving credit facilities through a combination of retained 
earnings, the issuance of a midcap bond (backed by a bridge loan facility) and a senior 
secured revolving credit facility (Company 5 interview, D.5.1.2). As a result, the 
equity ratio decreased from 38.3% prior to the refinancing to 30.1%, due to the lack of 
the midcap bond to be disclosed as equity-like instrument (Company 5 Moody’s KMV 
RiskCalc calculations, D.5.3). But in fact, the midcap bond represents a subordinated 
instrument compared to the senior secured revolving credit facility (Company 5 
midcap bond prospectus, D.5.2). Nevertheless, the equity ratio represents in the view 
of the interview participants a solid figure, given the fact that during the restructuring 
years in 2008 and 2009 the equity ratio was even below levels of 30.0% (Company 5 
interview, D.5.1.1; Company 5 interview, D.5.1.2). 
Interest expenses increased at group level due to refinancing of senior secured term 
debt via the midcap bond. However, other terms and conditions (such as repayments, 
information rights and financial covenants) could be modified in advance of the 
company (Company 5 interview, D.5.1.2). The bond serves as the main long term debt 
financing instrument and shows with a tenor of seven years the same maturity profile 
as standard mezzanine (Company 5 midcap bond prospectus, D.5.2). 
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Both participants recognised the increased flexibility that the company gained by 
entering into a new financing market and reduce dependence from financing banks 
(Company 5 interview, D.5.1.1; Company 5 interview, D.5.1.2). 
Moody’s KMV RiskCalc Key Financial Ratios of Company 5 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations, D.5.3. 
  
Position …Standard Mezzanine ...Refinancing
Activity
Trade Creditors Ratio 101.46 48.72
Debt Coverage
Debt Coverage 9.4% 59.0%
Growth
Sales Growth 16.6% 3.0%
Leverage/Gearing
Equity Ratio 42.7% 38.3%
Liabilities Structure 98.4% 85.0%
Liquidity
Cash to Current Liabilities 10.4% 18.0%
Profitability
EBITD to Assets 7.2% 23.3%
Ordinary Profit to Sales 3.0% 11.1%
Cost
Personnel Expenses to Sales 39.0% 36.3%
Key financial ratios prior to…
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E.6 Case 6 
E.6.1 Description of the Company 
The family-owned and operated company achieved sales in a range up to € 50 million. 
The company, which is active in the manufacturing sector, employs less than 100 
persons. The CEO as well as the Head of Finance and Accounting acted as interview 
participants, who also represent the owner family. The CEO has been with the firm for 
more than 20 years, starting with his apprenticeship. The Head of Finance and 
Accounting started his career with the company directly after his completion of his 
diploma in commerce. 
E.6.2 Financing Strategy 
Even though both participants responded that a financing strategy should be “one of 
the baseplates of the overall strategy of a firm” (Company 6 interview, D.6.1.1), the 
company has no formulated financing strategy in place. They stated that there is no 
need for a formulated strategy or a described process as financing decisions are taken 
by the owner in general. In case the owner decides to pursue a different financing 
instrument than used before, the financing strategy changes (Company 6 interview, 
D.6.1.1; Company 6 interview, D.6.1.2). As standard mezzanine has never been used 
before the year 2006, this was seen as an exception from the overall financing strategy 
in 2007. One participant redefined during the interview session that in fact, the 
company has no financing strategy, but a financing behaviour (Company 6 interview, 
D.6.1.2). The company endeavoured a broad financing base that is structured via 
bilateral financing agreements with ten banks. 
E.6.3 Standard Mezzanine Financing 
The company used a tranche of StaGe Mezzanine 2006 programme. According to the 
participants, standard mezzanine was seen as another bilateral agreement with a 
financing partner, introduced by relationship banks. Therefore, it fitted into the 
described financing behaviour (Company 6 interview, D.6.1.1; Company 6 interview, 
D.6.1.2). 
Standard mezzanine was introduced to the firm by the relationship banks as they 
requested an increase in the balance sheet equity ratio, following a significant increase 
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in sales in the years before (Company 6 interview, D.6.1.2). The owner family was not 
able to provide an adequate amount of new equity. Therefore, standard mezzanine 
filled this gap and avoided a dilution of the current shareholders. Several proposals 
from relationship banks were provided to the company; two offers were negotiated in 
depth (Company 6 interview, D.6.1.1). 
E.6.4 Refinancing 
Situation of the Company 
The company faced an overall prospering economic environment in the years 2011 
and 2012 in the core domestic market which led to strong earnings. The interview 
participants described the company to be still in a growth phase, with an increase in 
sales by 16.9% in the year before the refinancing (Company 6 interview, D.6.1.1). In 
addition, the company’s profitability rose to 15.0% on EBITD to assets basis and to 
12.5% in the profit to sales ratio (Company 6 Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations, 
D.6.3). 
Refinancing Process 
The refinancing process was initiated six months prior to the maturity date of the 
standard mezzanine facility as several relationship banks approached the firm. The 
discussions were described as being constructive and the negotiation and refinancing 
process was completed within ten weeks (Company 6 interview, D.6.1.2). 
Changes in the Financing Strategy 
The overall financing behaviour or strategy remained unchanged in the view of the 
participants (Company 6 interview, D.6.1.1). The company kept bilateral relationships 
to each financing partner rather than to opt for a syndicated credit solution. Strong 
balance sheet and retained earnings allowed a refinancing structure excluding a new 
junior debt instrument. Based on the financing market conditions at the refinancing, 
new working capital financing instruments were introduced to the company that fitted 
the current financing need (Company 6 interview, D.6.1.2). 
E.6.5 Post-financing Capital Structure 
Due to the company’s retained earnings from the strong economic years 2011 and 
2012, no new mezzanine was required. The introduction of new working capital 
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financing products like borrowing base lending and factoring helped to secure all 
financing needs. As a result, the company broadened its lender base and instruments 
available to the company (Company 6 interview, D.6.1.2). The avoidance of 
shareholder funds to be involved in the refinancing and any restrictions on dividends 
by the financing partners was seen as another important factor to be achieved in the 
refinancing (Company 6 interview, D.6.1.1). The equity ratio remained around 30% 
and the financing banks were also willing to accept short term equity levels below 30% 
during the fiscal year in case that borrowing base financing will lead to such level 
(Company 6 interview, D.6.1.2). 
Moody’s KMV RiskCalc Key Financial Ratios of Company 6 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations, D.6.3. 
  
Position …Standard Mezzanine ...Refinancing
Activity
Trade Creditors Ratio 49.03 48.96
Debt Coverage
Debt Coverage 12.0% 24.0%
Growth
Sales Growth 6.1% 16.9%
Leverage/Gearing
Equity Ratio 16.6% 31.2%
Liabilities Structure 89.9% 98.7%
Liquidity
Cash to Current Liabilities 3.3% 0.2%
Profitability
EBITD to Assets 8.3% 15.0%
Ordinary Profit to Sales 5.4% 12.5%
Cost
Personnel Expenses to Sales 28.4% 27.3%
Key financial ratios prior to…
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E.7 Case 7 
E.7.1 Description of the Company 
The company explored is active in the broader media sector. The founding family 
controls the company via a holding entity. Sales in the year 2013 amounted in a range 
between € 50 million and € 150 million. The company employed between 100 and 150 
people and is incorporated as a German limited partnership with a limited liability 
company as general partner (“GmbH & Co. KG”). An external management team has 
been implemented several years ago during a succession reorganisation. The CEO as 
well as the Head of Accounting, who is also responsible for the financing activities, 
acted as interview participants. 
E.7.2 Financing Strategy 
Both participants explained that there is no formal written financing policy in place at 
the company. There exists a verbal agreement between the top management and the 
owner family on general financing principles including that the net debt level should 
not exceed a level of 1.5x consolidated EBITDA, which would indicate an investment 
grade rating for the company. Both participants stated that there is no general link 
between the overall corporate strategy and the financing strategy (Company 7 
interview, D.7.1.1; Company 7 interview, D.7.1.2). 
E.7.3 Standard Mezzanine Financing 
The company intended to acquire a competitor in 2005, according to both participants. 
Even though the leverage was around 1.6x consolidated EBITDA, the equity ratio of 
the company was in a range of 18.5%, below a comfortable level for the banks involved 
(Company 7 interview, D.7.1.1). Therefore, the banks proposed to add a mezzanine 
financing to the balance sheet of the company to avoid a further decrease in equity 
after the potential acquisition (Company 7 interview, D.7.1.2). In addition, the owner 
family was not able to provide the required funds for the acquisition but did not want 
to increase its bank debt significantly above the internal barrier of 1.5x EBITDA. The 
firm already entered into discussions with a private equity sponsor. Nevertheless, these 
negotiations were aborted due to the cognition that the company and the family 
shareholders would not be able to take out and repay the sponsor because of his IRR 
expectations (Company 7 interview, D.7.1.1). 
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E.7.4 Refinancing 
Situation of the Company 
Based on the standard mezzanine financing, the economic equity position of the 
company was considered to be strong with a ratio of 48% (Company 7 interview, 
D.7.1.1, Company 7 audited consolidated financial statements as of 28.02.2010). 
Nevertheless, sales and profitability levels have been under constant pressure due to 
intense competition in Germany and challenges in the European markets as result of 
the financial crisis. EBITD to assets reduced from 27.5% prior to the initial mezzanine 
financing to 19.9% the year before the refinancing. Accordingly, ordinary profit to 
sales reduced from 13.6% to 6.5% (Company 7 Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations, 
D.7.3). In addition, a change in the shareholder structure due to the passing of the old 
shareholder led to a structural reorganisation at company level (Company 7 interview, 
D.7.1.1). 
Refinancing Process 
The refinancing process was initiated eight months prior to the maturity with the start 
of the negotiations of the overall group wide refinancing. The shareholders ability to 
inject new funds was limited. In fact, they required a minimum level of dividends to 
be able to pay the inheritance tax (Company 7 interview, D.7.1.1). The discussions 
with the banks have been described as constructive negotiations. One of the reasons 
for this constructive situation was the fact that the key relationship bank represented 
the core bank for the private financing of the shareholders as well and was therefore 
able to get a full picture on the financing situation (Company 7 interview, D.7.1.1). As 
a result, the company was able to refinance the standard mezzanine completely via 
bank debt. The new financing contract included a maximum annual dividend 
agreement with shareholders and a mechanism to strengthen the capital reserves of the 
firm to achieve an acceptable equity ratio within the next three years as the equity ratio 
dropped below 30% after the exit of the standard mezzanine (Company 7 interview, 
D.7.1.2). 
Changes in the Financing Strategy 
There has been no fundamental change in the understanding between management and 
shareholders to comply with a determined net leverage level. However, given the 
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specific situation at shareholder as well as at company level, the company will exceed 
the leverage level for the next three years (Company 7 interview, D.7.1.1; Company 7 
interview, D.7.1.2). During these three years, the company expects to be able to restore 
these levels, based on the limitation on dividends to the shareholders and under the 
assumption that the operational effects will not become worse. 
E.7.5 Post-financing Capital Structure 
The refinancing structure led to a net leverage that exceeded the agreed levels. 
However, this represented in view of both participants the only suitable solution for 
the company to comply with the boundaries by shareholders, banks and mezzanine 
providers in the refinancing (Company 7 interview, D.7.1.1). The equity ratio dropped 
but the banks and the shareholders implemented a mechanism to enhance the ratio at 
an investment grade level (Company 7 interview, D.7.1.2). 
Moody’s KMV RiskCalc Key Financial Ratios of Company 7 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV RiskCalc calculations, A.7.3. 
 
Position …Standard Mezzanine ...Refinancing
Activity
Trade Creditors Ratio 44.15 40.12
Debt Coverage
Debt Coverage 45.4% 34.5%
Growth
Sales Growth -0.7% -3.8%
Leverage/Gearing
Equity Ratio 18.5% 48.0%
Liabilities Structure 72.9% 75.9%
Liquidity
Cash to Current Liabilities 10.8% 21.8%
Profitability
EBITD to Assets 27.5% 19.9%
Ordinary Profit to Sales 13.6% 6.5%
Cost
Personnel Expenses to Sales 14.2% 14.4%
Key financial ratios prior to…
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